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INTRODUCTION
Russian President Vladimir Putin has come to rule his nation through
the creation of a culture of terror and he has begun to use similar tactics in
his dealings with the world. It is the purpose of this Article to articulate a
way forward for the global community in the light of what is truly an
unprecedented development: a rogue nuclear superpower whose leadership
governs through assassination; which invades and threatens to invade
peaceful nations; and which routinely makes loose and irresponsible nuclear
threats.
First, a word about what is meant by "culture of terror." A culture of
terror, to summarize the scholarly consensus, is a weapon of political
intimidation. A superior force makes use of unpredictable but extreme acts
of violence to keep its opponents weak and confused and the great mass of
people too intimidated to act in concert.' It creates a "space of death"2 and
"establishes 'collective fear' as a brutal means of social control."3 Rumors,
whispered threats, vaguely-described conspiracies, in addition to
"systematic murder" all play a part in the creation and maintenance of a
culture of terror. The culture of terror is both a state of being6 and a means
to an end.7 As such, it has been used by authoritarian regimes, narco-
1. A seminal study in the culture of terror is Michael Taussig, Culture of Terror - Space of
Death: Roger Casement's Putomayo Report and the Explanation of Torture, 26 COMPARATIVE
STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 467-97 (1984). See also Marcelo M. Sudrez-Orozco,
Speaking of the Unspeakable: Toward a Psychosocial Understanding of Responses to Terror, 18
ETHOS 353-83 (1990); Inge Brinkman, Ways of Death: Accounts of Terror From Angolan
Refugees in Namibia, 70 AFRICA: JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN INSTITUTE 1-24
(2000); Chris Ballard, The Signature of Terror: Violence, Meaning, and Landscape at Freeport, in
INSCRIBED LANDSCAPES: MARKING AND MAKING PLACE 13-26 (Bruno David and Meredith
Wilson eds., 2002); Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, Terror in a Maoist Model Village, Mid-western
Nepal, 33 ANTHROPOLOGY 383-401 (2009).
2. JEFFREY S. JURIS, NETWORKING FUTURES: THE MOVEMENTS AGAINST CORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION 167 (2008); Stephanie C. Kane, The Art of Torture and the Place ofExecution: A
Forensic Narrative, 35 POLAR: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY JOURNAL 53, 63 (2012).
3. Judith Pettigrew, Living Between the Maoists and the Army in Rural Nepal, in
HIMALAYAN PEOPLES' WAR: NEPAL'S MAOIST REBELLION 262, 261-62 (Michael Hutt ed.,
2004).
4. TIMOTHY TACKETT, THE COMING OF THE TERROR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 125
(2015); and GARY ALAN FINE & BILL ELLIS, THE GLOBAL GRAPEVINE: WHY RUMORS OF
TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION AND TRADE MATTER 203-204 (2010); Glen Perice, Political Violence
and the Public Eye, in CULTURAL SHAPING OF VIOLENCE: VICTIMIZATION, ESCALATION, AND
RESPONSE 249, 253 (Myrdene Anderson ed., 2004).
5. Clara Sacchetti, Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia, 48
ANTHROPOLOGICA 283-284 (2006).
6. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 357 (2008); Alex P. Schmid, Introduction to THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
TERRORISM RESEARCH 1, 3 (Alex P. Schmid ed., 2011).
7. Martha Crenshaw, How Terrorists Think: Fhat Psychology Can Contribute to
Understanding Terror, in TERROR: ROOTS, IMPACT, RESPONSE 71-80 (Lawrence Howard, ed.,
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gangs,9 and terrorist operations, such as ISIS.10
Vladimir Putin, it will be demonstrated in this Article, has created a
regime that governs domestically through the promotion of a culture of
terror. It is a culture that he has also begun to employ to get his way in his
dealings with other nations. His tactics and his methods represent a
profound and unique threat on the world stage today and calls for a global
response.
This Article is divided into five sections. In the first two sections, I
consider the widespread and sustained use of political killing that has
occurred during Putin's time in the Kremlin and how that has brought about
a culture of terror. Section III considers the ways in which Putin has begun
to export his brutal methods of intimidation to his dealings with other
nations. Section IV considers the ways in which Vladimir Putin has begun
to rely on reckless threats to use nuclear weapons as a means of enforcing
his will on the world. Section V, finally, argues for comprehensive, multi-
faceted, collective action by the world community to bring to a halt this
growing culture of terror.
I. BORIS NEMTSOV
Had Boris Nemtsov never entered politics, had he kept working quietly
in his chosen field of physics, he might well have achieved worldwide
recognition for any number of scientific accomplishments. He earned his
doctorate degree at the age of twenty-five from the Lobachevsky State
University of Gorky, a leading Soviet and now Russian research institute in
the field of radio physics."
As a young physicist, he authored or co-authored over sixty academic
1992).
8. MARTIN J. SMITH, POWER AND TERROR 133-37 (2009).
9. HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 133-68 (2013); CINDY C. COMBS,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TERRORISM 347-49 (Rev. ed., 2007); and Mexican Drug Lords Decapitate
1,300 in Last Five Years, ANSA - English News Service, October 29, 2012.
10. THE UNITED NATIONS: LIVING UNDER ISIS IN SYRIA, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (2014); Kazi
Anwarul Masud, The Threat ofISIS and the Global Response - Analysis, EURASIA REVIEW, Aug.
17, 2014, available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/17082014-threat-isis-global-response-
analysis/; Iraq 'Islamic State' Is Quite Happy To Rule By Terror, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE
(Jordan), July 24, 2014; Jacob Siegel, 'Cub of the Caliphate:' The Real Target of ISIS's Child-
Soldier Execution Video, THE DAILY BEAST, Mar. 11, 2015. Cf, Liz Sly, Islamic State Appears to
Be Fraying From Within, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2015 (ISIS terror tactics may be causing
group to dissolve from within).
11. 2 BERNARD A. COOK, EUROPE SINCE 1945: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 901 (2001); Nemtsov's
alma mater has been renamed the Lobachevsky State University of Niznhy Novgorod, and is now
considered a world-class research university. See Niznhy-Novgorod University Receives World-
Wide Acclaim as Russian Start-ups Present Themselves in Maryland, MARCHMONT NEWS, Nov.
10,2014.
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articles dealing with "quantum physics, thermodynamics, and acoustics."12
He was among the inventors of an acoustic laser.13 He had, in other words,
launched what had every promise of becoming a creative, powerful
academic career at the Gorky Radio-Physics Research Institute.14
Nemtsov, however, was drawn to politics in the wake of the 1986
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. He organized local protests in Nizhny-
Novgorod calling for reforms in the nuclear power industry." Four years
later, in 1990, with the passage of democratic reforms, Nemtsov ran for and
was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation representing
Nizhny-Novgorod. 16
Nemtsov enjoyed meteoric political success in the 1990s. The turning
point for Nemtsov came in August, 1991. A group of old Soviet leaders
seeking to roll back Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms staged a coup which they
hoped would remove him from power.17 A tense situation developed in Red
Square as it appeared for a while that troops of the Soviet army might fire
on protestors gathered there." Nemtsov, however, was among those who
stood against the coup plotters and successfully negotiated with the Soviet
Army to disobey orders. 19
The coup, although unsuccessful in its stated goal of returning Russia to
its Soviet past, did bring about unexpected but lasting changes to Russian
political life. Mikhail Gorbachev remained in office as Secretary General of
the Soviet Union only a few months longer20 and the Soviet Union itself
dissolved by the end of 1991.21 Its various constituent Republics gained
their independence as free-standing nations, including, most especially, the
12. Boris Nemtsov: From Reformist Wonder Boy to Disgruntled Opposition Leader, RT
NEWS, Feb. 28, 2015.
13. BORIS EFIMOVICH NEMTSOV, http://to-name.ru/english/biography/boris-nemtsov.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015) and A.N. Kotyusov & Boris E. Nemtsov, Acoustic Laser, 37 ACOUSTIC
J. 123-29 (1991).
14. CATHERINE J. DANKS, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 358
(2001).
15. ROBERT A. SAUNDERS & VLAD STRUKOV, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 408 (2000).
16. WAYNE ALLENSWORTH, THE RUSSIAN QUESTION: NATIONALISM, MODERNISM, AND
POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA 289 (1998).
17. For background, consult, Victoria E. Bonnell & Gregory Freidin, Introduction to RUSSIA
AT THE BARRICADES: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF THE AUGUST, 1991, COUP 3-30 (Victoria E.
Bonnell, Ann Cooper, & Gregory Freidin, eds., 1994)
18. ROGER R. REESE, THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET
ARMY, 1917-1991 182 (2000),.
19. KIMBERLY MARTEN ZISK, WEAPONS, CULTURE, AND SELF-INTEREST: SOVIET DEFENSE
MANAGERS IN THE NEW RUSSIA 69 (1997).
20. Bemd St8ver, Eastern Europe, in, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE COLD WAR 174,
186 (Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goeddes, eds., 2013).
21. JAMES R. ARNOLD & ROBERTA WIENER, COLD WAR: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE
GUIDE 353-54 (2012).
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Russian Federation.2 2
In recognition of his talents and in return for his obvious loyalty, Boris
Yeltsin, the new President of the Russian Federation, named Nemtsov the
governor of Nizhny-Novgorod in November, 1991.23 Nemtsov was among
the most aggressive of the free-market reformers, and he quickly moved to
privatize land-holdings in his region.2 4 In December 1993, Nemtsov ran for
and was elected to the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian
Parliament.2 5 In 1995, he was re-elected governor of Nizhny-Novgorod,2 6
and shortly after that was appointed Yeltsin's Deputy Prime Minister.2 7
The way was now open to even greater success. By 1997, Nemtsov was
looking like an obvious successor to Boris Yeltsin as President of the
Russian Federation. 28 He polled well in public opinion surveys. 29 Fissures,
however, began to appear in the Russian economy in the summer and fall of
1997,30 and these cracks turned into a crisis by the summer of 1998.31 A
22. STEPHEN K. BATALDEN, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF EURASIA: HANDBOOK
OF THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 3-4 (1997).
23. ROSE BRADY, KAPITALIZM: RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE TO FREE ITS ECONOMY 67 (1999), p.
67.
24. FRED COLEMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE: FORTY YEARS THAT
SHOOK THE WORLD, FROM STALIN TO YELTSIN 369 (1996).
25. His victory, in fact, was overwhelming. Nemtsov won with 66 % of the vote. Vladimir
Gel'man, Russia's Elites in Search of Consensus: What Kind of Consolidation? in ELITES AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA 29, 35 (Anton Steen & Vladimir Gel'man, eds., 2003).
26. ROBERT SERVICE, RUSSIA: EXPERIMENT WITH A PEOPLE 279 (2002). Service, one of the
most important historians of Soviet and post-Soviet affairs, described Nemtsov as "a new Russian
Wunderkind." Id.
27. IVAN ZASURSKII, MEDIA AND POWER IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 115 (2004).
28. [I]n August, 1994, Yeltsin said he could see Nemtsov as the worthiest successor to
himself as president.- TIMOTHY J. COLTON, YELTSIN: A LIFE (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
By the spring of 1997, Nemtsov's position looked even stronger. VLADIMIR GEL'MAN, OTAR
MARGANIYA, & DMITRY TRAVIN, REEXAMINING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN
RUSSIA, 1985-2000: GENERATIONS, IDEAS, AND CHANGES 100 (2014).
29. Two public opinion surveys in the spring and early summer of 1997 named Nemtsov
"the 'most trusted politician' in Russia." Holger Jensen, Ailing Giant: World's Biggest Nation Will
Show Up With Load of Economic Baggage That Has Global Impact, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 5, 1997; and David Hoffman, Russian Officials Open Anti-Monopoly Drive: Powerful
Energy Companies Targeted, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 1997 (reporting similar news).
30. Publicly, in the summer and fall of 1997, the Russian government painted a rosy picture
of Russia's prospects. See, for instance, Michael Specter, Russian Economic Decline Has Been
Halted, Yeltsin Claims, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 5, 1997; Mitchell Landsberg, Yeltsin Declares
Inflation Beaten, Issues New Ruble, SOUTH FLORIDASUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 1997; Carol J.
Williams, Russia On Road to Prosperity, Yeltsin Says, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 5, 1997.
On the other hand, a spate of negative stories also began to appear. See, for instance, Geoffrey
York, Official: 70 Percent of Russia's Farms on Verge of Collapse, MOBILE REGISTER, June 2,
1997; Alan Philps, Money Flowing Abroad Drains Russian Economy: Tax Grab Drives Russians
to Send Earnings Out of the Country, OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 6, 1997; Yeltsin Says State Must
Increase Role in Russian Economy: Action Deemed Necessary to Curb Excesses of the Rich
Under Capitalism, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 25, 1997; Charles W. Holmes, Roofless and Ruthless
in the New Russia, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Sept. 7, 1997 (on the problem of extortion and low-
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currency crisis32 led to a Russian default on sovereign debt,33 and this in
turn provoked a severe recession.34 And suddenly, the brilliant young
reformer's star was dimmed and he was forced from office.35 He was too
closely associated with the West and with privatization to maintain his lofty
stature in the public's mind.36
As it happened, Boris Yeltsin resigned from the presidency
unexpectedly in December 1999, before the completion of his term, and
was succeeded by Vladimir Putin who had been named a deputy prime
minister only a few months before.37 Serving either as president or as prime
minister since his formal rise to power,38 Putin has exercised an autocratic
control over Russia ever since his ascension to the highest office.3 9 Nemtsov
was forced to move into the opposition, where he proved himself one of
Putin's most fearless and relentless critics.40
level crime confronting small businesses in Russia); and David Hoffman, Russia's Struggle: Who
Will Control Market Economy? Yeltsin Aides Take on the Moguls, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 26,
1997 (featuring a long account of Boris Nemtsov's proposed campaign against bandit capitalism).
31. By 1998, economic output was only around 50 percent of its 1989 level, Haizhou Huang,
Dalia Marin, & Chenggang Xu, Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery, and Banking Development
in Russia, Ukraine, and Other FSU Countries 3 (IMF Working Paper, 2004).
32. COSTAS LAPAVITSAS, CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE 142-43 (2012).
33. MARTIN G. GILMAN, No PRECEDENT, No PLAN: INSIDE RUSSIA'S 1998 DEFAULT
(2010) is probably the best account of the crisis. Gilman writes, too hopefully, of his belief that
Russia "has opted to join the global economy and political system as a partner." Id at 1.
34. PADMA DESAI, FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONTAGION, AND CONTAINMENT: FROM ASIA TO
ARGENTINA 3-4 (2003).
35. Yeltsin removed Nemtsov from his position as deputy prime minister in late August,
1998. Reformer Nemtsov Will Not Join New Russian Government, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 1998.
Yeltsin named Victor Chemomyrdin his new prime minister intending to have Chernomyrdin
succeed him as president. Yeltsin Names Heir Apparent, WINDSOR STAR (Ontario), Aug. 25,
1998; and Chernomyrdin To Run For President in 2000, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 14,
1998. Nemtsov soon quarreled with Chemomyrdin. Nemtsov Blames Russia Crisis on
Chernomyrdin, REUTERS Aug. 25, 1998. Yeltsin then moved Nemtsov further from the inner
circle of power, placing him in charge of a council overseeing local government. Nemtsov
Charged With Problems of Local Self-Government, SINOCAST, Sept. 22, 1998. Still, Nemtsov
continued to defend Yeltsin in the face of efforts to force his premature resignation from the
presidency. Yeltsin Is To Be In Office Until His Term Expires - Nemtsov, SINOCAST Oct. 22,
1998.
36. Joel M. Ostrow, Georgiy A. Satarov, & Irina Khakamada, Corrupting the Elections:
Enter the Oligarchs, in POLITICS IN RUSSIA: A READER 337, 361 (Joel M. Ostrow ed., 2013).
37. IAN JEFFRIES, THE NEW RUSSIA: A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS 30-31 (2002).
38. Putin served as President of Russia from 2000 to 2008. He stepped aside in 2008 to serve
as Prime Minister under Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2012. In 2012, he was elected to a third
term as President. See EDWIN BACON, CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 112 (3d ed. 2014).
39. Stephen Kotkin, The Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin: Russia's Nightmare Dressed Like
a Daydream, 94 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 140, 140 (2015), (explaining how "twenty-first century Russia
end[ed] up, yet again, in personal rule.") Id
40. Laura Smith-Spark, Boris Nemtsov: Opposition Figure Who Took on Vladimir Putin,
CNN, Feb. 28, 2015.
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Nearly from the beginning of Putin's rule, Nemtsov was making
allegations that went to the heart of his growing authoritarianism.4 1 He
developed his own set of proposals for bringing peace to Chechnya during
that province's rebellion against Russian rule.4 2 He proposed as well the
need for a searching inquiry to get to the truth concerning a series of
mysterious apartment building explosions in 1999 that were used as an
excuse for launching the second war on Chechnya.4 3 He was a brash,
boyish, gadfly who published a string of pamphlets cataloging the misdeeds
of the man at the top of the Russian pyramid.4 4 He attacked the disturbing
phenomenon of "Putinism," and all the adulation heaped upon the
strongman at the top of the Russian pyramid.4 5
From the earliest stages of its confrontation with Russia, Nemtsov
declared his support for Ukraine's national independence and freedom from
Russian domination.4 6 His support for Ukraine's territorial integrity grew
41. Thus Nemtsov within Putin's first month in office, warned that Putin may prove a
dangerous man. Russia: Liberals Wary of Vladimir Putin, VERO BEACH PRESS JOURNAL, January
25, 2000. He criticized Putin's early efforts to threaten the press. Sharon LaFraniere, Kremlin
Accused ofNew Threat to Media: Tycoon Says He Was Told to Give Up His Interest in State-Run
TV Channel, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 5, 2000. He criticized Putin for jailing a media critic.
David Hoffman, Probers Jail Top Russian Media Mogul: Gusinsky's News Outlets Had Criticized
Kremlin, WASHINGTON POST, June 14, 2000. He accused the government of "racketeer" tactics in
the arbitrary financial demands it made of businessmen. David Filipov, Police Raid Offices of
Russia's 'Oligarchs' But Putin's Pledge to Level Playing Field Cultivates Suspicion, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 12, 2000. At the end of 2000, he criticized Putin for revitalizing Soviet symbols,
including reviving Stalinist lyrics in the Russian national anthem. David Hoffman, Putin Seeks
Restoration of Soviet Symbols: Stalin-Era Anthem, Army's Red Banner Would Be Revived,
WASHINGTON POST Dec. 5, 2000.
42. Andrei Uglanov, Time To Send Nemtsov To Chechnya: Boris Nemtsov's Proposals For
Chechnya Are Actually Constructive, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY (Russia), Sept. 13, 2001; Natalia
Loginova, Nemtsov Wants to Get Maskhadov To Talk: Boris Nemtsov Comes Up With Another
Chechnya Initiative, DEFENSE AND SECURITY (Russia), Sept. 10, 2001; Russian MP Replies to
Putin's Challenge to Get Results With Rebels or Quit, BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 7,
2001; and Russian MP Nemtsov, Ingush President Discuss Means For Peace in Chechnya, BBC
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 5, 2001.
43. In 2002, Nemtsov called for the formation of a parliamentary commission to investigate
the apartment bombings, which served as pretext for entry into war. 1999 Bombings Still On
Russian Minds, NORTH CAUCASUS ANALYSIS available at www.jamestown.org (2002).
44. The reports he wrote included Putin: A Summing-Up; Putin and Gazprom; Putin and the
Financial Crisis; Putin and Corruption. Keith Gessen, Remembering Boris Nemtsov, LONDON
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 19, 2015.
45. Russia Under Putin: Echoes of the Soviet Era, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Mar. 6,
2007; Russian Opposition Leader Nemtsov Predicts End to Putinism' in 2009, BBC
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Jan. 1, 2009; Crisis Shows Weakness of State Built By Putin: Russian
Opposition Leader, BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Feb. 23, 2009; and Victor Davidoff,
Andropov Would Be Proud ofPutin, Moscow TIMES July 8, 2012.
46. Thus at the time of the Orange Revolution in November and December, 2004, which
brought to power Ukrainian western-oriented democrats over Vladimir Putin's staunch opposition,
Nemtsov sided with the reformers and against Putin. See, for instance, Kremlin Aghast at Prospect
of West-Leaning Government, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004; Andrei Lipsky, Technology of the
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more pronounced in the months leading up to his assassination.47 Indeed, he
was planning to lead a protest march against Russian involvement in
Ukraine at the time he was assassinated.48 The President of Ukraine, Petro
Poroshenko, suggested that Nemtsov was murdered for his continuing
backing of the Ukrainian cause and evidence he was about to reveal
concerning Russian direct military support.49
II. A LONG TRAIL OF TERROR AND BLOOD
A. The Murders
The targeted, theatrically-staged murder of Boris Nemtsov on February
27, 2015, within walking distance of the Kremlin, represents both a
culmination and a turning point.o It is a culmination because it is
impossible not to see it as a kind of horrific, grisly completion of a line of
political murders that stretch back in time to Vladimir Putin's first days in
People's Self-Organization: An Interview With Boris Nemtsov on His Eyewitness Impressions of
the Events in Uraine, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY (Russia) Dec. 7, 2004; and Iya Ferapontova, Ivan
Rodin, Kira Latukhina, & Irina Romancheva, He Will Neither Lie Nor Play Games: Experts Say
the Urainian Leader's First Visit Has Dispelled Moscow's Illusions About Dominating Post-
Soviet Territory, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Jan. 31, 2005. The Orange Revolution brought to power
Viktor Yushchenko, who had been fed a near-lethal dose of Dioxin in an assassination attempt in
the fall of 2004. Following his election to office, Yushchenko made Nemtsov an advisor charged
with introducing free-market reforms and soliciting western business. See Appointment of Russian
Politician as Aide to Ukrainian President Explained, BBC INTERNATIONAL NEWS Feb. 14, 2005;
Anfisa Voronina & Dmitry Simakov, Our Man in Ukraine: Liberal Politician Boris Nemtsov Is
Leaving Russia For Ukraine, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY Feb. 15, 2005. Needless to say, Nemtsov
encountered opposition to his role among Ukrainian politicians. See, for instance, Mara D.
Bellamy, Ukrainian Parliament Calls on Yushchenko to Sack Russian Adviser, Request is Non-
Binding, AP WORLDSTREAM, June 3, 2005. All the while, Nemtsov continued his criticism of
Putin's repressive policies. See, for instance, Sebastian Smith, Stirring For Russian Revolution:
Dissidents Are Making Noise Against President Putin, Loud Enough For Country's Leaders To
Take Notice, NEWSDAY Aug. 29, 2005.
47. Alexei Gorbachev, Peace March and Not the Fifih Column, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY
Aug. 25, 2014; Farida Rustamova, The Liberal Parties on the March, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY,
Sept. 5, 2014; and Vitaly Slovetsky, Safety Is Not In Numbers? WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Sept. 8,
2014.
48. Murder in Moscow: Opposition Leader Killed, VOA NEWS Feb. 27, 2015; Lora Moftah,
Murdered Opposition Leader Was a Longtime Putin Critic: Boris Nemtsov Had Been Due to Lead
a Mass Rally Against Putin and the War in Ukraine This Sunday, INT'L BUSINESS TIMES NEWS,
Feb. 27, 2015; and Howard Amos & David Millward, Leading Putin Critic Gunned Down Outside
of Kremlin: Boris Nemtsov, Former Deputy Prime Minister, Gunned Down Near Kremlin Before
Taking Part in March Against Russian War in Uraine, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (UK), Feb. 28, 2015.
49. Poroshenko: Boris Nemtsov Killed Over Evidence Linking Russia to Ukraine Conflict,
HUFFINGTON POST February 28, 2015.
50. Frederik Pleitgen, Alla Eshchenko, & Laura Smith-Spark, Crowds Mourn Killing of
Boris Nemtsov, Outspoken Putin Critic, CNN, Feb. 28, 2015; and Julia loffe, After Boris
Nemtsov's Assassination, There Are No Longer Any Limits,' N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 28,
2015.
Vladimir Putin's Culture of Terror: What is to be Done?
office.
1. Sergei Yushenkov
We might consider Sergei Yushenkov (1950-2003). He was a colonel in
the Red Army and a "professor of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" in 1991, at
the time of the fall of the Soviet Union.5 1 He entered politics in the middle
1990s with the goal of subjecting the military to the rule of law and
bringing the armed forces under strict civilian control.52
By the late 1990s, Yushenkov was plainly in the camp of the reformers.
He was an outspoken critic of the Russian war in Chechnya.53 Like
Nemtsov, he was suspicious of the mysterious apartment explosions that
served as the pretext for launching the second Chechen War in late 1999.54
By the early 2000s, he had become a leader of Russia's emerging
Liberal Party.5 He was a critic of the rising militarism evident in Russian
society.5 6 Initially, he was aligned strongly with the tycoon Boris
Berezovsky, who promised generous funding for Yushenkov's movement
although he subsequently reneged on his promise.5 7
After Berezovsky withdrew his funding, Yushenkov secured different
sources of funding and reorganized his Liberal Party. In April, 2003, he
was killed "by a single shot to the chest." 5 9 Immediately, suspicions
centered on the political motives for the assassination.6 0 And while some
51. ROBERT V. BARYLSKI, THE SOLDIER IN RUSSIAN POLITICS: 1988-1996 336 (1998).
52. Id
53. ROBERT SEELY, RuSSO-CHECHEN CONFLICTS, 1800-2000: A DEADLY EMBRACE 233
(Oxford: Frank Cass, 2001).
54. JOHN DUNLOP, THE MOSCOW BOMBINGS OF SEPTEMBER, 1999: EXAMINATION OF THE
RUSSIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS AT THE ONSET OF VLADIMIR PUTIN's RULE 211 (2014); and
Dmitry Bykov, Sergei Yushenkov: These Explosions Launched the Mechanism of War: An
Interview With Sergei Yushenkov About the Explosions in Moscow, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY
(Russia), Mar. 18, 2002.
55. Lyudmila Romanova, Yushenvkov: We Are Authentic Liberals, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY
(Russia), Dec. 21, 2001.
56. Amelia Gentleman, Reinventing Russia, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2001; Alexandra
Novikova, Russian Politicians and Generals Should Have Cooler Heads: Interview With Sergei
Yushenkov, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Aug. 7, 2002.
57. Kseniya Veretennikova, Berezovsky on the Barricades: Comments on the Split in the
Liberal Russia Party, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, December 9, 2002; Gifts For the President's
Birthday: The People Make of Verses and Jokes, Berezovksy Abandons Liberal Russia In Favor
of the Communists, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Oct. 9, 2002.
58. Anatoly Kostyukov, Shokin and Ivanov Replace Berezovsky: According to Sergei
Yushenkov, These Businessmen Will Sponsor Liberal Russia, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY (Russia),
Oct. 8, 2002; Maria-Louisa Tirmaste, Liberals Sign Up: Sergei Lushenkov Is Seeking Real
Democrats, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Feb. 2, 2003.
59. Russian MP's Death Sparks Storm, BBC NEWS Apr. 18, 2003; David Holley, Russian
Lawmaker is Slain, L. A. TIMES Apr. 18, 2003.
60. Russian MP's Death, supra note 59 ("Yushenkov's murder .... is seen by Russian
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convictions were eventually obtained,61 suspicions still center on Vladimir
Putin and his "security police."6 2
2. Anna Politkovskaya
Anna Politkovskaya was another victim (1958-2006). Born in New
York of Ukrainian diplomat parents,63 she trained as a journalist at Moscow
State University in the old Soviet Union.64 She enjoyed dual citizenship,
both American and Russian, although her home and life and love were all in
Russia.65
She came of age as a journalist in the 1990s. Like other reformers, she
was a critic of the second Chechen War (1999-2009)66 and conducted
award-winning investigative reporting from that region.67 She was fearless
in her coverage, even reporting from inside a major hostage incident - the
taking by Chechen guerilla fighters of a movie theater in Moscow in 2002.68
In the mid-2000s, she offered a more systematic criticism of Putinism.
In A Russian Diary, Politkovskaya described the ways in which Putin
sought to frustrate and suffocate Russian democracy.69 Following the
elections of December, 2003, Putin moved to draw opposition parties to
himself, under the umbrella of United Russia, his own political movement.70
Mature parliamentary democracy, featuring a loyal opposition, was made
impossible.71 He grounded his "authority solely on the fact that there is no
politicians and journalists as a political assassination"). Id
61. Jury Finds Guilty Four of Six Assassins of Duma's Yushenkov, ITAR-TASS, Mar. 19,
2004.
62. STEVEN ROSEFIELDE, RUSSIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE PRODIGAL
SUPERPOWER 210 (2005).
63. DAVID R. MARPLES, RUSSIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR STABILITY
324 (2011).
64. The journalism program at Moscow State University has been praised as world-class.
"Looking at the curriculum of the journalism school of Moscow State University, one could
assume that Russia has one of the best journalism schools in the world." Beate Ursula Josephi,
Conclusions, in JOURNALISM EDUCATION IN COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED PRESS FREEDOM 257
(Beate Ursula Josephi ed., 2010).
65. Because of her dual citizenship, her loyalty was under constant suspicion. STEVE
LEVINE, PUTIN's LABYRINTH: SPIES, MURDERS, AND THE DARK HEART OF THE NEW RUSSIA 71-
72 (2008).
66. CHARLES E. ZIEGLER, THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA 187 (2d ed. 2009).
67. Her two books on the subject include: ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A DITRY WAR: A
RUSSIAN REPORTER IN CHECHNYA (2001); and ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A SMALL CORNER OF
HELL: DISPATCHES FROM CHECHNYA (2003).
68. EDWARD H. SPENCE, ANDREW ALEXANDRA, AARON QUINN, & ANNE DUNN, MEDIA,
MARKETS, AND MORALS 212 (2011).
69. ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A RUSSIAN DIARY: A JOURNALIST'S FINAL ACCOUNT OF LIFE,
CORRUPTION, AND DEATH IN PUTIN's RUSSIA (Arch Tait, trans., 2007).
70. Id at 16-17.
71. Id at 24 ("Putin has crushed our argumentative Parliament"). Id
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alternative to him." 7 2
She built an even more comprehensive account of Putin's
authoritarianism in Putin 's Russia.73 Through a patient marshaling of the
details of ordinary life, "Politkovskaya demonstrate[d] that the law is
manipulated for political or criminal ends, often both at once. Corruption,
graft, and human rights abuses are flourishing under the former head of the
Federal Security Bureau, the reborn KGB [Putin]."7 4
Putin 's Russia brought on the death threats, some of them "directly
from the Kremlin." 7 5 She was poisoned in an unsuccessful assassination
attempt in September 2004.76 Finally, the death threats were made real on
October 7, 2006, Vladimir Putin's birthday, when Politkovskaya was found
shot to death in an elevator in her apartment building.7 7
3. Alexander Litvinenko
Many other opponents of Vladimir Putin have met similar fates. 7 8 Let
us consider just one more victim, Alexander Litvinenko (1962-2006).
Litvinenko went to work following college graduation in the middle 1980s
with the Russian internal security forces. 7 9 He later joined the KGB and
worked with counter-intelligence. 0 In the 1990s, he was active both in
72. Id. at 187. He has ensured, Politkovskaya wrote, that it was impossible for anyone to
arise within his circle "who could replace him in an emergency." Id. His "entourage" is composed
entirely of sycophants. Id.
73. ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, PUTIN's RUSSIA: LIFE IN A FAILING DEMOCRACY (2004).
74. Dianne Dempsey, Lorien Kaye, & Owen Richardson, "Book Reviews, " THE AGE
(Australia) January 15, 2005; cf., Michael McFaul, "Today's Russia Corruption in Putin's
Government Evidenced by Individuals' Suffering," FORT WAYNE JOURNAL GAZETTE, February
26, 2006 ("Politkovskaya makes her case against Putin not by systematically cataloging the
democratic rollbacks he has successfully pursued in the past six years .. .; [she] instead focuses on
dark dramas of individuals in the Putin era"). Id.
75. Henry Porter, Voices From the Grave Tell a Tale of Freedom Betrayed: Two of Putin's
Fiercest Critics Were Murdered Recently. And We Must Take Seriously the Allegations Made by
the Latest Victim OBSERVER, Nov. 26, 2006; Bridget Kendall, Chronicle of a Death Foretold,
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 7,2007.
76. Anna Politkovskaya, Poisoned By Putin, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 2004; Anna
Politkovskaya: Putin, Poison, and My Struggle For Freedom, THE INDEPENDENT Oct. 15, 2004.
77. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Death of a Journalist, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 2006; Michael
Mainville, Slaying of Russian Reporter Jolts Nation: 13th Journalist to Die Under Putin,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006; Murder in Moscow, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2006.
78. One list is found at Amy Knight, Russia: Another Dead Democrat, Mar. 2, 2015,
available athttp://nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/; another is found at The Putin Critics Who Have
Been Assassinated, SKY NEWS Mar. 3, 2015.
79. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 2005-2008 697-698(Lawrence
Goldman, ed., 2013). His father was a physician to the Interior Ministry and Alexander served in
the "61ite Dzerzhinsky special designation division." Id., at 697.
80. MARTIN SIXSMITH, THE LITVINENKO FILE: POLITICS, POLONIUM, AND RUSSIA'S WAR
WITH ITSELF 18 (2007).
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Chechnya and in the prosecution of organized crime.
In the late 1990s, he revealed, he had been asked to assassinate the
tycoon Boris Berezovksy, one of Russia's wealthiest men and someone who
had taken a strong interest in politics.8 2 Berezovsky took the allegations
seriously enough to express publicly his belief that he had been made a
target.8 3
Criticizing him for his very public sensationalizing, Putin himself fired
Litvinenko from the KGB.8 4 Faced with possible criminal prosecution if not
something worse, Litvinenko fled with his family, eventually settling in
London in 2001." He worked secretly on retainer for British intelligence
but it is likely that he would soon have been forgotten. 86 Had it not been for
the spectacular way he was targeted for death there was every possibility
that Litvinenko would have settled into a comfortable corner of the London
caf6 scene, where he could spin half-believable tales of derring do in far-off
corners of the Caucasus.8 7
Litvinenko was a gadfly. He was seen by many as a fabulist, whose
stories were too far-fetched to be believable. At least until he became the
target of one of the most elaborate, theatrically-staged assassinations of the
post-Cold-War period. On November 1, 2006, Litvinenko became ill." His
condition worsened dramatically over the course of the month and it soon
became clear that he was poisoned by a rare radioactive isotope of
81. ANGUS ROXBURGH, THE STRONGMAN: VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
RUSSIA 174 (2013).
82. ALAN S. COWELL, THE TERMINAL Spy: A TRUE STORY OF ESPIONAGE, BETRAYAL,
AND MURDER 109-12 (2008).
83. Officers: Killers, Thugs, in the New KGB, USA TODAY Nov. 18, 1998; FSB Men
Broadcast, Berezovsky Confirms Plot to Kill Him, SINOCAST, Nov. 18, 1998; Russian Law
Enforcement Agencies Becoming Crime Gangs: Berezovsky, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Nov. 18,
1998; Berezovsky Starts a Scandal With Publishing a Letter to FSB Head Putin, SINOCAST, Dec.
1, 1998.
84. Roxburgh, THE STRONGMAN, supra note 81, at 174.
85. IAN JEFFRIES, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 267 (2011).
86. NIGEL MCCRERY, SILENT WITNESSES: THE OFTEN GRUESOME BUT ALWAYS
FASCINATING HISTORY OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 221 (2013).
87. Near the time of his murder, Litvinenko published a book alleging, among other things,
that the bombings of apartment buildings in 1999 that triggered the second Chechen War, were
orchestrated by Vladimir Putin's security services. See Alexander Litvinenko & Yuri Felshtinsky,
BLOWING UP RUSSIA: THE SECRET PLOT TO BRING BACK KGB TERROR (2007). Cf, LUKE
HARDING, EXPELLED: A JOURNALIST'S DESCENT INTO THE RUSSIAN MAFIA STATE 179 (2011)
(providing further detail). Litvinenko also alleged that there were Russian security officers who
participated with the Chechen guerrillas who attacked and seized a Moscow theater in 2002. Ghost
of Regimes Past, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 4, 2006; and Masha Gessen, Orders to Kill, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 3, 2012.
88. John B. Dunlop, Post-Communist Political Violence: The Poisoning of Aleksandr
Litvinenko, in POLITICAL VIOLENCE: BELIEF, BEHAVIOR, AND LEGITIMATION 93, 100 (Paul
Hollander ed., 2008).
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polonium.89 Who kills by such exotic means? On his deathbed, Litvinenko
named Putin as the mastermind of this most difficult-to-achieve feat.90
Polonium is a highly deadly nuclear toxin. National governments
carefully control access to materials such as polonium. The cloak-and-
dagger style execution of Alexander Litvinenko could only have been
ordered by the highest levels of the Russian regime and had only one
purpose:91 the terrorizing and silencing of those who would investigate that
regime's atrocities on the world stage.92
B. Putin's Culture ofDomestic Terror
The long list of political killings, of which Yushenkov, Politkovskaya,
and Litvinenko form a part, constitute a pattern. Opponents of Vladimir
Putin, those who investigate him too closely, those who know too much and
tell too much, are likely to die violent deaths.93 Do we have smoking guns?
Not quite. But the inferences, the circumstantial evidence all point in one
direction.94 After all, none of these crimes are ever investigated seriously,95
and Putin's allies and friends never seem to fall prey to the same
89. Mary Jordan & Daniela Deane, High Levels of Radiation in Litvinenko's Body,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 24, 2006; Dead Spy Was Victim of Radiation: Radioactive Traces
Found in Bar and Restaurant - Foreign Office Has Spoken to Russia - Putin Dismisses
Accusations, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2006; Peter Finn & Mary Jordan, Radioactive Poison
Killed Ex-Spy: British Say Case of Putin Critic is Unprecedented, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25,
2006.
90. Text: Statement Dictated by Ex-KGB Spy Before Death, REUTERS, Nov. 24, 2006; and
Letter Condemns Putin, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 25, 2006.
91. Luke Harding writes, based on diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks: "The White
House thinks that Putin would have known about, and probably approved, the operation to murder
Litvinenko." Harding, EXPELLED, supra note 87 at 42.
92. ALEX GOLDFARB, DEATH OF A DISSIDENT: THE POISONING OF ALEXANDER
LITVINENKO AND THE RETURN OF THE KGB 343 (2007); METTA SPENCER, THE RUSSIAN QUEST
FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY (2010); and Alan Cowell, Shooting of Boris Nemtsov Draws
Comparisons to Death ofAnother Putin Foe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015.
93. Thus Joshua Keating writes: "Many opponents of Putin's government have been
harassed, subjected to smear campaigns, or even jailed, but those who turn up dead tend to have
revealed or were threatening to reveal embarrassing or incriminating information about those in
power." Joshua Keating, "hat Gets Critics Killed in Putin 's Russia, SLATE Mar. 3, 2015.
94. Within hours, Lynn Berry writes, the conspiracy theorists were out in force in Moscow,
blaming everyone from Islamic terrorists to Western provocateurs. They all ignore the most
obvious possibility: "That he was murdered for his relentless opposition to Putin." Lynn Berry,
Nemtsov a Possible Sacrificial Victim'Investigators Say, ABC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2015.
95. There is no reason to believe that the assassination of Nemtsov is being investigated
seriously. To be sure, a half-dozen suspects, mostly ethnic Chechens, were rounded up. One
committed suicide. Another confessed following torture and coercion. The trials, if the cases ever
move to trials, will be risible. Elliott C. McLaughlin & Matthew Chance, 6 Suspect in Boris
Nemtsov's Killing Dies in Suicide, CNN, Mar. 8, 2015; Nemstov Suspect 'Forced to Confess,'
BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Mar. 11, 2015; and Laura Mills, Suspect in Nemtsov Killing May Have
Been Tortured, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 2015.
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unfortunate fates putting the lie to claims that these murders are nothing
more than acts of random criminality.9 6
The Boris Nemtsov assassination, however, gives every indication of
being a turning point. Nemtsov, after all, was better known to the global
community. In the middle 1990s, there was every reason to believe he stood
an excellent chance of eventually becoming president of Russia. 97
But if the Nemtsov assassination represents a possible turning point in
the West's consciousness of political violence inside Putin's Russia, the
student of Russian and Soviet history will know that there are parallels to
the Nemstov murder, and the one that comes most directly to mind is the
killing of Sergei Kirov (1886-1934).98 In the 1920s, Kirov shown himself to
be an energetic and promising party leader from Azerbaijan.9 9
In the 1930s, he served in Leningrad, where his talents became obvious
on a national stage.10 0 At the Party Congress of 1934, it was said he was
elected to the Communist Central Committee with fewer negative votes
than Joseph Stalin.101 Thus he became Stalin's rival and was duly murdered
inside Leningrad Party headquarters in December, 1934.102
The Kirov assassination opened the gates to the instability and the
terror of the middle and later 1930s. 10 3 Two of Vladimir Lenin's old boon
companions, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, were tried and
executed.1 0 4 The Great Purges soon followed, with their show trials and
mass killings.105 Other members of the Bolshevik old guard-former Prime
Minister Alexander Rykov, revolutionary theorist Nikolai Bukharin, even
96. Ethan S. Burger & Mary Holland, Law as Politics: The Russian Procuracy and Its
Investigative Committee, 2 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN LAW 143, 164 (2008).
Andrey Lugovoi, who helped to deliver the polonium that killed Litvinenko, "is now an elected
member of the Russian Duma." Id On Lugovoi's involvement, see Bryan S. Judge, History of
Criminal Poisoning, in CRIMINAL POISONING: CLINICAL AND FORENSIC PERSPECTIVES 3, 10-11
(Christopher P. Holstege, Thomas M. Neer, Gregory B. Saathoff, & R. Brent Furbee, eds., 2011).
97. Supra notes 28 and 29, and accompanying text.
98. Ishaan Tharoor, Echoes ofStalin in the Murder of a Putin Foe in Moscow, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 4, 2015.
99. Howard M. Sachar, THE ASSASSINATION OF EUROPE, 1918-1942: A POLITICAL
HISTORY 133 (2015); and GERALD MALCOLM EASTER, RECONSTRUCTING THE STATE: PERSONAL
NETWORKS AND ELITE IDENTITY IN SOVIET RUSSIA 86-87 (2000).
100. HELEN RAPPAPORT, JOSEPH STALIN: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 149 (1999).
101. 2 WALTER G. Ross, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA, SINCE 1855, 255 (2005).
102. Matthew Lenoe, Fear, Loathing, Conspiracy: The Kirov Murder As Impetus For Terror,
in THE ANATOMY OF TERROR: POLITICAL VIOLENCE UNDER STALIN 195, 195 (James Harris ed.,
2013).
103. OLEG V. KHLEVNRUK, MASTER OF THE HOUSE: STALIN AND His INNER CIRCLE 127 37
(2009).
104. ARNO J. MAYER, THE FURIES: VIOLENCE AND TERROR IN THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN
REVOLUTIONS 653 (2000).
105. MATTHEW E. LENOE, THE KIROV MURDER AND THE GREAT TERROR 453-86 (2010).
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the head of the secret police Genrikh Yagoda-were eventually found
guilty of treason and duly executed.10 6 Stalin's tentacles finally reached
even into the Western Hemisphere with the murder, in August of 1940, of
Leon Trotsky in Mexico City.107
The atmosphere which these purges created, the attitudes which they
fostered were fear and helplessness. What Stalin wanted to create-and he
very much succeeded in this ambition-was a culture of terror.10s Vladimir
Putin, it seems clear, has now brought down on Moscow the same climate
of fear, the same culture of terror. 109 He has mastered the Stalinist
playbook.110 His apologists dissemble and dissimulate, seeking to blame
anyone-Muslims, Ukrainians-for the murder, hoping that western media
will focus on the shadows and ambiguities and give the strongman the
benefit of the doubt one last time."' He should know that there are many in
the West who have grown weary of being played for chumps. 1 2
Still, it is worth exploring what this murder signifies. First, the Nemstov
assassination represents not Vladimir Putin's strength but his weakness.1 1 3
One does not authorize or condone the murder of one's opponents if one is
dealing from a position of strength. Nemtsov was among the organizers of
protests against the Ukrainian war scheduled for the weekend he was
murdered. Perhaps Putin feared that the protests might have got out of
hand.1 14 Protests in places like Georgia (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and
Ukraine (2014), led ultimately to regime change in those places.
106. YURI FEOFANOV & DONALD D. BERRY, POLITICS AND JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: MAJOR
TRIALS OF THE POST-STALIN ERA 241-52 (1996); and STEPHEN F. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE
BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 1888-1938 368-81 (1980).
107. It was said that the Trotsky murder "was the most spectacular assassination since the
death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914." ROBERT SERVICE, TROTSKY: A BIOGRAPHY 492
(2009).
108. KATHLEEN E. SMITH, REMEMBERING STALIN'S VICTIMS: POPULAR MEMORY AND THE
END OF THE USSR 8 (1996).
109. Maxine David, What Boris Nemtsov's Assassination Says About Putin's Climate ofFear,
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 2, 2015.
110. Bill Powell, Boris Nemtsov's Murder Is a Killing Stalin Would Appreciate, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 3, 2015; Steve Gutterman, Dead 60 Years, Stalin's Influence Lingers in Putin's Russia,
REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2013.
111. Andrey Ostroukh & Alexander Kolyandr, Russia Probes Motives in Killing of Putin
Critic Boris Nemtsov: Investigators Looking at Any Links to Ukraine Crisis, Islamic Extremism,
or a Destabilization Plot, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 28, 2015.
112. Peter Eltsov, How Putin Killed Nemtsov: Even IfHe Didn't Pull the Trigger, the Russian
Leader Invited the Assassination, POLITICO MAGAZINE, Mar. 6, 2015.
113. Amanda Taub, The Terrifying Politics of Boris Nemtsov's Murder, Vox Mar. 4, 2015;
Mary Dejevsky, Boris Nemtsov Shot Dead: This Form ofPolitical Lawlessness Appeared To Be In
the Past: No Longer, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 1, 2015.
114. Putin's election in 2012 was greeted by organized protests in Moscow and the groups
that organized these protests seemed to show some degree of staying power. SAMUEL A. GREENE,
MOSCOW IN MOVEMENT: POWER AND OPPOSITION IN PUTIN's RUSSIA 214-16 (2014).
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Perhaps, also, Putin feared that Nemtsov had proof, as if further proof
were needed, of Moscow's aggression in Ukraine."' Publicly disseminating
such proof, revealing to grieving Russian mothers that their sons are dying
in Ukraine and that are being lied to about the cause and nature of their
deaths, was something that had to be stopped.1 1 6 Putin, again, is a man
acting not from strength but from weakness and fear.
Second, the assassination reflects a certain attitude of reckless
disregard. As Putin builds his culture of terror at home, as he cultivates his
climate of fear, he says to the world: "we don't care. We don't care what
you think of our means and our methods. Life in Moscow is a Hobbesian
world, nasty, brutish, and short, especially for those who dare to question
those at the top, who are running the show."1 1 7 More ominously, it may be
evidence that Putin is living in a bubble, an alternative universe, where he
genuinely believes that killings like Nemtsov's will go unremembered.1
Third, as with the killing of Kirov eighty years ago, we can expect that
Nemtsov's murder portends much greater instability.1 1 9 The word is
circulating that Vladimir Putin has drawn up a hit list and means to target
other prominent critics of the regime.12 0 Putin has enemies, both real and
imaginary. They could be anywhere, hiding around any comer, in the
military, in his general staff, in the Parliament, in the press, in the private
sector, among the oligarchs, in the academy. The paranoia that this killing
will unleash will extend across the fabric of elite Russian society and leave
everybody looking over their shoulders.12 1 After all, you don't have to be an
115. Indeed, this seems probable. See Samantha Payne, Boris Nemtsov Murder: Note
Exposing Putin's Lies' Over Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Revealed, INVESTORS BUSINESS TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2015.
116. Id.
117. "Putin has a different approach. Because he does not aspire to mold Russia's political
system into a Western-style democracy, he cares far less about Western opinions and Western
conditions for membership into Western clubs. Instead, his framework for understanding the
world has more in common with Khrushchev or Brezhnev than Gorbachev or Yeltsin." Professor
McFaul Testifies on 'Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain,' U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, May 17, 2007.
118. Lucian Kim, Putin the Pariah: The Russian President Is Isolated, Shunned, and Ignored:
And That Makes Him Even More Dangerous, SLATE, Nov. 18, 2014; and Ben Judah, Behind the
Scenes in Putin's Court: The Private Habits of a Latter-Day Dictator, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 2014.
119. Andrew C. Kuchins, Boris Nemtsov: The Death of a Real Russian Patriot, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, Mar. 2, 2015; Howard Amos, Foreign Russia
Investors Warn Over Nemtsov Killing,: THE MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015; and Nick Miller,
Boris Nemtsov's 'Ghastly' Murder Could Hurt Putin: Alexander Downer, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Mar. 1, 2015.
120. Howard Amos, Putin Critics Step Up Security Amid Reports ofBoris Nemtsov Style 'Hit
List, 'TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 14, 2005.
121. Roger Boyes, Murder in Moscow Will Undermine Despot Putin, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar.
5, 2015; and Gideon Rachman, Vladimir Putin's Survival Strategy Is Lies and Violence: Russian
President Stirs Nationalist Paranoia That Makes Nemtsov's Killing Possible, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2015.
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enemy to be on an enemy's list.
III. PUTIN EXPORTS His CULTURE OF TERROR
There are two principles that have governed post-World War II
relations among states. First, international borders are sacrosanct. Military
invasions of other nations constitute violations of international law.12 2
Second, threats of the first use of nuclear weapons are becoming
increasingly taboo. This nuclear taboo has gained particular strength in the
years since the conclusion of the Cold War. This taboo is factual - since the
horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no nation has seen fit to use nuclear
weapons in a combat setting. But it has also come to take on normative
dimensions, especially over the last two decades. Under the terms of this
taboo, it might remain possible to employ nuclear weapons in worst-case
scenarios where national survival is at stake, but their first use, or even the
threat of their first use has come to be disapproved of by the international
community.1 2 3 With his aggressions against Georgia and Ukraine, and his
122. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawed aggressive war as an instrument of national
policy and understood wars of aggression to be the unprovoked armed crossing of internationally
accepted boundaries. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSIVE WAR, AND SELF-DEFENCE 85
(2011). A proposed Soviet definition of international aggression, widely utilized in the 1930s,
condemned the unprovoked use of -declarations of war, invasions by armed forces, naval
blockades, and the bombardment of the armed forces of another state." Michael Roseberry,
Defining Aggression: An Analysis of Existing Approaches and a Proposal, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: SELECTED ISSUES 35, 40 (Sienho Lee ed., 2003). The rules adopted
for the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals and repeated United Nations' resolutions codified
this understanding of aggression as a basic principle of international law. See I.I. Lukashuk,
Crimes Against Peace: International Illegality and Criminality of Aggression, in THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 133-34 (George Ginsburgs & Vladimir
Nikolaevich Kudriatsev, eds., 1990); and Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression: Born of
the Failure of Collective Security Still Shackled to Its Fate? Time to Catch Up or Part Company,
in THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG: CIVILISING INFLUENCE OR INSTITUTIONALISED VIOLENCE?
131, 134-65 (David A. Blumenthal & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 2008). Cf, STEPHEN M.
SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JUDGE STEPHEN M.
SCHWEBEL 583 (1994) (a contemporary discussion); and DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: A
PORTRAIT IN LETTERS OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 543 (Steven R. Weisman ed., 2010)
(discussing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq).
123. The end of the Cold War is conventionally dated to the autumn of 1989, when the Berlin
Wall fell. In 1996, a question was presented to the International Court of Justice as to whether it
was permissible to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in a first strike. The Court deadlocked
on the question with Presiding Justice Muhammed Bedjaoui voting against the threatened first use
of nuclear weapons. I shall focus on the opinion that criticizes first use and threatened first use of
nuclear weapons. In this carefully drafted opinion, seven members of the Court wrote that the
possession of nuclear weapons had not been outlawed and that their non-use since 1945 did not
constitute generally accepted opinio juris. (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion 97, International Court of Justice, July 8, 1996). This opinion, however, went
on to stress that States were bound by international humanitarian law to respect "the civilian
population" and the "distinction between combatants and non-combatants" and that these
principles constrained the use or threats of use that nuclear states might employ Id.. Although the
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increasingly irresponsible and belligerent nuclear threats, Putin is now
applying in his dealings with the world the tactics he has used to intimidate
and divide his domestic political opposition. He is, in other words,
attempting to export his domestically-grown culture of terror to his relations
with other states. Let us explore the scope and nature of the threat the global
community now confronts.
A. Georgia
In 2003, the nation of Georgia had enjoyed twelve years of
independence from the Soviet Union. Georgia had been an independent
kingdom in the early modem period but was annexed into the Russian
Empire in 1800.124 It enjoyed three brief years of freedom following the
abdication of Czar Nicholas II (1918-1921),125 but it was then swallowed up
opinion did preserve some latitude for States to have recourse to nuclear weapons where national
survival is at stake, the opinion plainly asserted that "[I]f the use of force itself in a given case is
illegal for whatever reason the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal." Id. at 96. We
have seen significant development in the legal literature since the issuance of this opinion. In a
pair of important articles, Nina Tannenwald argued for the emergence of a "nuclear taboo," which
she defined as "behavior defined or perceived to be dangerous and [therefore] something that is
not done, said, or touched." Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the
Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 53 INT'L ORGANIZATION 433, 436 (1999). In this first
article, Tannenwald maintains that a taboo against a threatened or actual first use of nuclear
weapons with normative effect has now taken hold, at least among the Western democracies. Id. at
464. In her second article, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29 INT'L
SECURITY 5-49 (2005), she asserts that the nuclear taboo should be seen as "a particularly
forceful kind of normative prohibition." Id. at 8. She sees this taboo as having acquired near-
universal dimensions since the end of the Cold War, with one notable exception-"terrorists." Id.
at 42. Terrorists, unlike nation-states, "might relish violating [the nuclear taboo]." International
lawyers have also advanced the argument in important ways. Thus we find Stefaan Smis and Kim
Van der Borght reiterate the impermissibility of threatened first-use of nuclear weapons. See
Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 27 GEORGIA INT'L AND COMPARATIVE L. REV. 345, 356 (1999). Richard
Falk has argued that the Advisory Opinion must be seen within a larger context, as an important
step in the direction of a jurisprudence of a "global civil society." Richard Falk, The Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of Global Civil Society, 7
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 333, 338 (1997). More recently,
commentators have sought to expand the scope of international humanitarian law. Thus Gro
Nystuen has maintained that international humanitarian law forbidding the infliction of
"superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering" should serve as an additional legal restraint on the
use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. Gro Nystuen, Conclusions on the Status of Nuclear
Weapons Under International Law, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INT'L LAW (Gro Nystuen,
Stuart Casey-Maslen, & Annie Golden Bersagel eds., 2014).
124. RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, THE MAKING OF THE GEORGIAN NATION 59 (1988); and OLGA
MAIOROVA, FROM THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE: DEFINING THE RUSSIAN NATION THROUGH
CULTURAL MYTHOLOGY, 1855-1870, 88-89 (2010).
125. The nascent Soviet Union had recognized the independence of Georgia in March, 1918,
as part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. TIMOTHY C. DOWLING, RUSSIA AT WAR: FROM THE
MONGOL CONQUEST TO AFGHANISTAN, CHECHNYA, AND BEYOND 813 (2015).
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once again by the Red Army.1 2 6 In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's
dissolution, it now aspired to a peaceful coexistence among its neighbors.1 2 7
In 2003, Georgia was still governed by Eduard Shevardnadze (1928-
2014), Mikhail Gorbachev's former foreign minister and someone
grudgingly but still predictably solicitous of Moscow's interests.1 2 8 In that
year, however, popular unrest culminated in the so-called "Rose
Revolution,"1 2 9 which led to Shevardnadze's voluntary relinquishment of
office and the initial adoption of western-style parliamentary democracy.1 3 0
Russia, however, was unwilling to acquiesce in this state of affairs and
saw its opportunity to put pressure on Georgia through provoking unrest in
two of Georgia's more restive provinces-South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
This was a natural pressure point for Russia to use. South Ossetia and
Abkhazia sit on the border between the Russian Federation and the rest of
Georgia. There was, furthermore, a deep history of conflict between South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and Georgia traceable not only to the 1990s, but to
the distant reaches of history.131
South Ossetia comprises a distinctive ethnic group that traces its
history to the medieval people known as Alans, and today speak a language
126. JEREMY SMITH, RED NATIONS: THE NATIONALITIES EXPERIENCE IN AND AFTER THE
SOVIET UNION 47-48 (2013).
127. Edward Ozhiganov, The Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
in MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES 341, 388-89 (Alexei Georgievich Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler
Chayes, & Lara Olson eds., 1997).
128. NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV & CHRISTOPHER MARSH, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
INTERESTS, VECTORS, SECTORS 170 71 (2014); and ASTRID S. TUMINEZ, RUSSIAN
NATIONALISM SINCE 1856: IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY 244-45 (2000).
129. There was a strong democratic, popular component to this revolution. As one chronicler
of events put it, immediately after Shevardnadze's resignation, "massive crowds appeared in the
streets," and it was as if "the people themselves had been recreated or reconstituted as a totality, a
whole, a unity. There had been a rebirth of the category of publicness and peopleness in a country
that had for ten years or more known only private interestsl Paul Manning, Rose-Colored
Glasses? Revolutions and Cartoon Chaos in Postsocialist Georgia, 22 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 171, 201 (2007). As the Manning excerpt suggests, there was also a strong anti-
corruption element to the Rose Revolution. Londa Esadze, Georgia's Rose Revolution: People's
Anti-Corruption Revolution? in ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN GEORGIA 111, 113-15
(Louise Shelley, Erik R. Scott, & Anthony Latta, eds., 2007).
130. Writing from the perspective of 2012, Lincoln Mitchell takes a balanced view of the
democratic accomplishments of the Rose Revolution. It did not succeed in establishing authentic
democracy he argues. Rather, it has resulted in the triumph of a strongly centralized one party
presidential rule with "restricted freedom of speech and assembly." LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE
COLOR REVOLUTIONS 116 (2012).
131. LIAM D. ANDERSON, FEDERAL SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC PROBLEMS: ACCOMMODATING
DIVERSITY 239-43 (2013); Lawrence Broers, Unpacking the Meta-Conflict: Claims to
Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Territorial Integrity in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, in
THE MAKING OF MODERN GEORGIA, 1918-2012: THE FIRST GEORGIAN REPUBLIC AND ITS
SUCCESSORS 263, 263-64 (Stephen F. Jones ed., 2014).
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with Iranian roots.132 The predominant religious faith is Orthodox
Christianity.133 Abkhazia enjoyed intermittent periods of political
independence in the medieval and early modem periods, although its fate
was generally intertwined with that of Georgia.134 Religiously, Abkhazia is
a mixture of Islam, Christianity, and pre-conversion, ancestral pagan
traditions.135
Georgia and Russia fought a proxy war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in the early and middle 1990s, in the period just after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.136 Regarding South Ossetia, the period 1991 and 1992 was
particularly bloody, and also saw widespread population transfers and
ethnic cleansing.137 By the middle 1990s, a condition of stalemate prevailed,
which featured a defacto division of governance between ethnic Ossetians
and Georgians.138
Regarding Georgia and Abkhazia, a similar story unfolded in the early
1990s. War was fought between August 1992 and September 1993.139
Massive ethnic cleansing was one consequence of this conflict.140 Open
132. JAMES B. MINAHAN, ONE EUROPE, MANY NATIONS: A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
EUROPEAN NATIONAL GROUPS 518-19 (2000).
133. Id. at 518. This statement is true for South Ossetians, but the Digor subdivision of the
Ossetian people, which resides in North Ossetia, is predominantly Muslim and has been
influenced by radical Islam. Id.
134. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, & Edward Allworth,
NATION-BUILDING IN THE POST-SOVIET BORDERLANDS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES
56-58(1998).
135. Id. at 58-59.
136. Lee Hockstader, Georgia's Bulldog: Shevardnadze Fights For Besieged City,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 1993; Georgian Troops, Rebels in Fierce Clash, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 20, 1993; James Rupert, Civil Wars in Ex-Soviet Republics Draw Russia Into
Troubled Morass, WASHINGTON POST July 15, 1993; Fred Hiatt, Russia Deploys Troops at
Georgian Border: Joint Peace-Keeping Effort Is Intended to Halt Fighting By South Ossetian
Separatists, WASHINGTON POST July 15, 1992; Brian Killen, Georgian Separatists Want to Merge
With Russia, REUTERS, June 22, 1992; and James Rupert, Isolated South Ossetians Press War For
Secession: Siege By Georgia Leads to Extreme Hardships, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 1992.
137. Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized
States, 53 WORLD POLITICS 524, 537 (2001); and Daniel Sneider, Georgia on the Brink as
Shevardnadze Turns to Russia, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, November 1, 1993.
138. A United Nations' observer force was situated in South Ossetia beginning in 1993. See
T.J.W. Sneek, The CSCE in the New Europe: From Process to Regional Arrangement, 5 INDIANA
INT'L COMPARATIVE L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1994), and note 250.
139. Lee Hockstader, Rebels Retreating In Georgia; With Russian Help, Shevardnadze 's
Government Retakes Territory, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 8, 1993; Juan J. Walte, Shevardnadze
Back In Capital, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1993; Michael Dobbs, Russian Jet Downed In Georgia:
Shevardnadze, At Scene, Implores Kremlin To Halt Conflict, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 20, 1993;
Shevardnadze Declares Martial Law in Abkhazia, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 7, 1993; and Steve
LeVine, Abkhazian Rebels Call Georgians Invaders, WASHINGTON POST Nov. 7, 1992.
140. Georgians Victimized By Purge in Abkhazia, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1993;
Candice Hughes, Georgians, the Dominant Ethnic Group, Flee Abkhazia, AP ONLINE, Nov. 7,
1993; Lee Hockstader, Atrocities Reported After Rebel Victory in Georgia, WASHINGTON POST,
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hostilities again occurred in April and May of 1998, but a ceasefire was
rapidly put in place.1 4 1 A fig leaf of Georgian sovereignty over both
territories was ensured, but the regions in point of fact governed their own
affairs. 142
Shevardnadze, with his diplomatic skills and his long-standing contacts
in Moscow, succeeded in keeping the peace between Georgia and Russia, in
part because he did not wish to disturb the status quo in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia nor did he wish to move abruptly out of Moscow's sphere of
influence.1 4 3 Best to maintain a studied ambiguity on both matters.1 4 4
But with his departure in late 2004, a confrontation between Russia and
Georgia seemed almost inevitable and, given the history, the flashpoint of
that conflict was bound to be South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The French-and-American-educated Mikhail Saakashvili, 14 5  who
succeeded Shevardnadze in 2005, moved swiftly to pivot Georgia from a
careful neutrality to a close alliance with the West.14 6 He sought Georgian
Oct. 22, 1993; U.N. Sends Human Rights Team To Georgia, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 1993; Russia Tells
Abkhaz Rebels To Stop Ethnic Cleansing, REUTERS, Oct. 14, 1993.
141. Russia Demands That Abkhazia Comply With Ceasefire Accord, SINOCAST May 29,
1998; Don Walton, Oil-Rich Area Vital to U.S., Hagel Says, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, May 28,
1998; Georgia, Abkhazia Sign Ceasefire Deal, SINOCAST May 25, 1998; Top Georgian
Delegation To Arrive in Abkhazia Over Conflict, SINOCAST May 25, 1998; Daniel Williams,
Russia, Allies, At Odds: CIS Seeks Unity As Summit Opens, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 1998;
Charles W. Holmes, Oil, Assassins, Global Influence Converge in Ex-Soviet Republic, ATLANTA
JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Apr. 19, 1998; Ariel Cohen, Russia Won't Be Left Out, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 8, 1998; and Lawrence Sheets, Interview: Georgia Parliament Chief Blasts Russia,
REUTERS, Mar. 4, 1998.
142. On the kind of de facto governmental autonomy these regions enjoyed, see Viacheslav
Chirikba, Geopolitical Aspects of the Abkhazian Statehood: Some Results and Perspectives, 8
IRAN AND THE CAUCASUS 341-49 (2004); Dov Lynch, Separatist States and Post-Soviet
Conflicts, 78 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 831, 834-84 (2002); and Svante E. Cornell, Autonomy as
a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective, 54 WORLD POLITICS 245,
262 276 (2002).
143. Thomike Gordadze describes a slow, incremental process by which Shevardnadze
gradually moved Georgia towards the West, but his movements were sufficiently calculated that
Russia still tried to preserve his presidency during the Rose Revolution. See Thomike Gordadze,
Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s, in THE GUNS OF AUGUST 2008: RUSSIA'S WAR IN
GEORGIA 28, 35-47 (Svante E. Cornell & S. Frederick Starr eds., 2009).
144. MITCHELL, supra note at 129 at 40. ("Throughout his presidency, Shevardnadze realized
the need to balance the United States and Russia. He was successful in doing this throughout most
of his time in office, even seeming to play the two more powerful countries off against each
other"). Id.
145. Mikhail Saakashvili studied law at Columbia University. See Elizabeth Cullen Dunn &
Austin Cowley, Capitalizing on Aid: Post-War Development and State-Building in Georgia, in
STATE AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE CAUCASUS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW
AND POLITICS 171, 173 (St6phane Voell & Iwona Kaliszewska, eds., 2015).
146. Thus Saakashvili constructed a military base that complied with NATO specifications
even though Georgia had not been admitted to NATO. A Military Base Complying With NATO
Standards Put Into Operation in the West of Georgia, DEFENCE AND SECURITY Sept. 4, 2006.
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membership in NATO and in April, 2008, President George W. Bush of the
United States took up the cause, requesting the other member states of
NATO to consider Georgia's application along with that of Ukraine.147
France and Germany, however, wishing to maintain good relations with
Russia, rejected Bush's request.14 8 Saakashvili also took steps to resolve the
stand-off with Abkhazia by placing troops in the disputed Kodori Gorge in
2006,149 and by establishing the next year a government-in-exile for
Abkhazia answerable to Georgia."o
These events almost guaranteed a hostile Russian response. But no one
expected Russia to launch all-out war on Georgia. On August 1, South
Ossetian separatists began to shell Georgian positions in that territory."'
When Georgia responded with increased shelling and a troop incursion into
South Ossetia on August 7,152 the Russian military the next day answered
with overwhelming force.153 Although elements of the Georgian Army
147. Terence Hunt, Bush Backs NATO Bids By Ukraine, Georgia, AP ONLINE, Apr. 1, 2008;
and Steven Erlanger & Steven Lee Myers, Bush Adds Drama To NATO Summit: He Lobbies To
Make Georgia and Ukraine Members, A Move Strongly Opposed by Allies, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Apr. 3, 2008.
148. GIDEON RACHMAN, ZERO-SUM FUTURE: AMERICAN POWER IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY
234 (2011); and Alexander Sosnowski, THE GEORGIA SYNDROME 170 (2012).
149. JEFFREY MANKOFF, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE RETURN OF GREAT POWER
POLITICS 239 (2d ed., 2012).
150. Id. ("Tbilisi's intent was clearly to provide an alternative to the Abkhaz separatist
leadership in hope of reconciling Abkhazia as a whole to living under Georgian rule"). Id. He also
prepared for more serious and sustained military action in Abkhazia. See Olga Allenova &
Vladimir Novikov, Terrorist POWs: Georgia Brands Abkhazian POW's as Terrorists: Tbilisi May
Mount Military Operations, DEFENCE AND SECURITY, Sept. 28, 2007.
151. This six-day period witnessed the partial mobilization of forces by South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, sniper and mortar attacks by Georgian forces, and the evacuation of endangered
civilians. See, for instance: Abkhaz Armed Forces' Eastern Grouping Put in State of Partial
Readiness, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 2008; Cossack Leader
Says More 'Volunteers' To Leave For Georgian Breakaway Region, BBC INTERNATIONAL
REPORTS, Aug. 5, 2008; Abkhazia Will Provide Help to South Ossetia At First Call Defense
Minister, INTERFAXRUSSIA AND CIS MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 2008; Marina Perevozkina,
Abkhazian Second Front, DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Aug. 6, 2008; Sniper Fire Kills Three in
Breakaway Georgian Region: Rebels, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 1, 2008; Six Killed in
Fighting in Georgia's Breakaway Region, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 2, 2008; Breakaway Region's
Security Chief Says His Force Killed 29 Georgian Troops, BBC NEWSFILE, Aug. 3, 2008; VOA
News: Russia, Georgia Trade Accusations Over Breakaway Georgian Territories, US FEDERAL
NEWS, Aug. 4, 2008; Separatists Claim Georgian Offensive in Breakaway Region, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 6, 2008; Russian Peacekeepers, OSCE Representatives Escort Children
Evacuated From South Ossetia, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 4, 2008;
Children Evacuated From Breakaway Region, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Aug. 5, 2008; and Tbilisi
Sees Evacuation of Women, Children From South Ossetia as 'Show,' INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS
MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 2008.
152. RONALD AsMus, A LITTLE WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: GEORGIA, RUSSIA, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 45-46 (2010).
153. ROBERT MANDEL, COERCING COMPLIANCE: STATE-INITIATED BRUTE FORCE IN
TODAY'S WORLD 100 (2015); Ed Harris, Battle For Rebels' Capital: Russia Sends Tanks to Stop
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acquitted themselves well and stood their ground for two days, they were
finally defeated in South Ossetia.154 The Russian Army then entered other
parts of Georgia, occupying the city of Gori5 and seizing major transport
arteries.156 Supported by a naval blockade and air support,157 the Russian
Army finally ceased its advance about twenty-five miles from the Georgian
capital of Tbilisi."'
After ten or so days in which Russia left the world guessing as to its
intentions-did it mean to advance into Tbilisi? did it mean to overthrow
Saakashvili?-Russia began a withdrawal from Georgian territory.159 On
Georgia From Seizing Back Breakaway Province, EVENING STANDARD, Aug. 8, 2008; 'War Has
Started:' Putin Declares, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 9, 2008; Shaun Walker, War in the
Caucasus: Russian Missles Rip Into Homes; Moscow's Retribution For Georgian Aggression
Over the Disputed Territory of South Ossetia, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 10, 2008; and Greg Sheridan,
Crisis Has Serious Consequences For West, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Aug. 10, 2008.
154. Georgian troops held out in the City of Tskhinvali, which was the scene of deadly
fighting, for two or three days. See Georgia-Ossetia Death Toll, UKRAINE NEWS, Aug. 9, 2009;
Georgian Army Continues to Shell Tskhninvali , INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS GENERAL
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 9, 2008; Some 7,400 Georgian Troops, About 100 Tanks, Artillery Engaged
Near Tskhinvali Peacekeepers, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Aug. 10,
2008; Tbilisi Says Russian Troops Have Entered Tskhinvali, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND XIS
GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Aug. 10, 2008; Georgian Forces Keep Shooting At Russian Peacekeepers
Near Tskhinvali, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 11, 2008; Georgian
Bombs Explode in Tskhinvali, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 11, 2008;
and We Will Establish Control Over Entire South Ossetia Soon, INTERFAX_RUSSIA AND ICS
MILITARY NEWSWIRE, Aug. 11, 2008.
155. THOMAS DE WAAL, THE CAUCASUS: AN INTRODUCTION 213 (2010); David Nowak,
Russian Forces Open Second Battlefront in Georgia: Capture Gori, GUELPH MERCURY, Aug. 12,
2008.
156. Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, Russia Expands Blitz, TULSA WORLD JOURNAL, Aug. 11,
2008; Christopher Torchia & David Nowak, Russia Opens New Front, Drives Deeper into
Georgia, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV), Aug. 12, 2008; Tom Lasseter & Steven Thomma,
Russian Troops Tighten Stranglehold, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Aug. 12, 2008; and Lara Marlowe,
'This War Has Turned Us Into Beggars, 'IRISH TIMES Aug. 14, 2008.
157. Carolina Vendil Pallin & Fredrik Westerlund, Russia's War in Georgia: Lessons and
Consequences, in CRISIS IN THE CAUCASUS: RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE WEST 150, 153 (Paul B.
Rich, ed., 2010).
158. Borzou Darahai & Maura Reynolds, Harsh Words Heat Up East-West Crisis: The
Georgia Conflict Turns into a Battle of Wills on Several Fronts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008; and
Luke Harding, Tom Parfitt, & Julian Borger, No Sign ofMilitary Withdrawal as Russian Armour
Stays Put, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 18, 2008.
159. Tom Lasseter, Bitter Defeat Plays Out On Road to Capital, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,
Aug. 15, 2008; Clifford J. Levy, Kremlin Vows To Pull Back Troops; The West Remains Wary Of
Cease-Fire in Georgia, THE TIMES (Trenton, NJ), Aug. 18, 2008; Russia Trains Its Missiles on
Tbilisi, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 19, 2008; Mike Eckel, Russia Keeps Key Posts As Forces Move
Freely, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 19, 2008; Russia Vows To Crush Defiance, HERALD SUN
(Australia), Aug. 20, 2008; As Withdrawal Date Looms, Forces' Grasp on Georgia Firm,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 21, 2008; Mike Eckel, Georgia: Russia's Strategic Chess Game Across
War-torn Land; Troops Dig In Despite Pledge, ADVERTISER (Australia), Aug. 22, 2008; Clifford
Levy, Russia Spurns Complete Withdrawal From Georgia; Most Forces Pulled Out, But Others
Dig In, Seize Ribbons of Georgian Land Abutting Abkhazia, South Ossetia, GLOBE AND MAIL
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August 25, Russia declared unilaterally that South Ossetia and Abkhazia
would henceforward no longer be provinces of Georgia.1 6 0 Rather, Russia
now recognized them as independent nations,16 1 a diplomatic gesture almost
no other nation has made.162 And in the years since, Russia has treated the
two territories as virtually part of its own soil.16 3 Russia has established
military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazial6 4 and has used these regions
for the purpose of military exercises. 16 5 In its seizure and steady
incorporation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, there is a forming scholarly
consensus that Russia violated prohibitions on the crossing of state
boundaries and the use of force to effectuate territorial change.16 6
(Toronto), Aug. 23, 2008.
160. Clifford J. Levy, Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves, N.Y. TIMES Aug.
26, 2008; Russia Recognises Georgia Rebels, BBC, Aug. 28, 2008.
161. ROBERT NALBANDOV, FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS 96 (2009).
162. In 2013, it seems that four nations recognized the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. South Ossetia Profile, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2013; that number is now down to three-
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru, following Tuvalu's decision to withdraw recognition. Oliver
Bullough, This Tiny Island Nation Just Gave Russia a Big Bruise, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2,
2014.
163. In November, 2014, Russia signed a treaty of integration and cooperation with Abkhazia,
which goes a long ways towards annexing that territory into Russia proper. Georgians Protest
Planned Military Alliance Between Abkhazia and Russia, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2014;
Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Gets Greater Control Over Abkhazia, the Lush Breakaway Georgian
Region on the Black Sea, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Nov. 24, 2014; and Treaty Ramps Up Russia's
Clout in Georgia Province, JOURNAL-GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, IN), Nov. 25, 2014. In January and
March, 2015, Russia has taken similar steps with respect to South Ossetia. Thomas De Waal,
Swallowing South Ossetia, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER, Jan. 14, 2015; Reid Standish, With
Obscure Treaties, Moscow Pulls Breakaway Regions Into Its Orbits, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan. 23,
2015; and Putin Endorses Draft Treaty On 'Integration' With South Ossetia, EURASIA REVIEW
Mar. 7, 2015.
164. On Abkhazia, see DEBORAH SANDERS, MARITIME POWER IN THE BLACK SEA 138-39
(2014); on South Ossetia, see ESMIRA JAFAROVA, CONFLICT RESOLUTION THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS: CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 77 (2015); and HOOMAN PEIMANI,
CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 79 (2009).
165. Kathrin Hille, Russia Launches War Games in Disputed Territories, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2015; and Russia Holds Big Military Drills in South, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
www.GlobalSecurity.org, last accessed Mar. 5, 2015.
166. Scholarly analyses have been nuanced, balanced, and include Robert P. Chatham,
Defense of Nationals Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia's Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLORIDA J. OF
INT'L L. 75-102 (2011), (noting that Russia's claims to defend the interests of its citizens living
abroad was significant legally but that its conduct, but that its "us[e] of aggression to regain
control of South Ossetia" still constituted a violation of international law). Id. at 77; Michael
Toomey, The August 2008 Battle of South Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal Argument for
Intervention? 23 TEMPLE INT'L AND COMPARATIVE L. J. 443-77 (2009) (concluding that
"Russia's actions in South Ossetian and Georgian territory exceed the boundaries of any
acceptable form of the self-defense or humanitarian intervention ). Id. at 476-77. Hannes
Hoffmeister, 'Don't Mess With Moscow:' Legal Aspects of the 2008 Caucasus Conflict, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L. J. 147 73 (2010) (a balanced review of the legal claims, indicating that South
Ossetia "as a stabilized de facto regime .. . enjoy[ed] at least partial international personality" (Id.
at 152-153 but concluding that Russia's intervention was unjustified given "its disproportional
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There is no question that an honest review of these events show that
Mikhail Saakashvili made a set of foolish calculations.167 His application to
NATO was premature;1 6 8 his openness to a military alliance with the West
was too threatening to Moscow;1 6 9 his assertions of jurisdiction over South
Ossetia and Abkhazia were too destabilizing.1 7 0 True, also, he made a
terrible legal and political mistake by trying to return South Ossetia to
Georgian rule forcefully.1 7 1 Still, he was a duly-elected president of a
sovereign nation, and nations are allowed to act in their own best
interests.172 And this is all that Saakashvili was doing, however ham-
handedly.
Russia's response, however, was grossly disproportionate to the
occasion. Vladimir Putinl7 3 would make an abject lesson of Georgia to cow
into submission the other nations of the Russian "near-abroad"-those
former Soviet republics now trying to establish themselves as independent
states. He would demonstrate to his neighbors a wanton disregard for rules
of proportionality and restraint. He would destroy the Georgian military,
and make it clear that he could reincorporate Georgia into Russia proper if
it ever stepped out of line again. Putin, in other words, was taking an
important step in exporting to neighboring nations the culture of terror by
which he governed at home.
use of force"). Id. at 172. Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime ofAggression, 35 YALE J.
OF INT'L L. 72-114 (2010), (reviewing numerous instances of armed aggression by the United
States and other national actors, including the "August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia"). Id. at
95. (Glennon's larger thesis is that the law of aggression requires revision and updating). See
finally, Nicolae N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention, FORDHAM INT'L L. REV.
1524-29 (2009), (making the case that Russia's "humanitarian and legal arguments" are deserving
of respect). Id. at 1549.
167. Bert Kernen & Matthew Sussex, The Russo-Georgian War: Identity, Intervention, and
Norm Adaptation, in CONFLICT IN THE FORMER USSR 91, 100 (Matthew Sussex ed., 2012).
168. RICHARD WEITZ, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH - RUSSIA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 145-
47 (2010).
169. THOMAS GOLTZ, GEORGIA DIARY: A CHRONICLE OF WAR AND POLITICAL CHAOS IN
THE POST-SOVIET CAUCASUS 259 (Expanded ed., 2009).
170. MIKE BOWKER, RUSSIA, AMERICA, AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 150 (2007).
171. ROBERT H. DONALDSON, JOSEPH L. NOGEE, & VIDYA NADKARNI, THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF RUSSIA: CHANGING SYSTEMS, ENDURING INTERESTS 198 (5 th ed., 2015).
172. ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA 86 (2009); and JOHN
AGNEW, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 104 (2009).
173. Vladimir Putin at the time of the war was prime minister of Russia, not president. He
nevertheless took a leading role in the war's planning and prosecution. In early August, he
returned home to Russia from Beijing, where he was attending the opening ceremony of the
Summer Olympics, met with military leadership, and apparently was instrumental in establishing
the key military objectives in the forthcoming war. See ARIEL COHEN & ROBERT E. HAMILTON,
THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND THE GEORGIA WAR: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 23 (2011).
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B. Ukraine
1. The Poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko
In the fall of 2004, the nation of Ukraine, another former Republic of
the Soviet Union, held presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma, the outgoing
president, had spent ten years in office but was now sunk deep in scandal.174
He was also favorably disposed to Moscowl75 and had named as his chosen
successor Viktor Yanukovich.176 Yanukovich was opposed by the reformist
Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko was a trained economist who spent almost
seven years as Governor of Ukraine's Central Bank (1993-1999).177 He had
also served briefly as Kuchma's prime minister (1999-2001) but was
dismissed when he clashed with vested economic interests.178 He now
174. The most serious scandal involved the possible role Kuchma played in the murder of the
investigative journalist Hyrhory Gongadze. Leaked tape recordings suggested that Kuchma may
have played a central role in ordering his kidnapping and murder. See HENRY E. HALE,
PATRONAL POLITICS: EURASIAN REGIME DYNAMICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 183 (2015);
and Louise Shelley, Civil Society Mobilized Against Corruption: Russia and Ukraine, in CIVIL
SOCIETY AND CORRUPTION: MOBILIZING FOR REFORM 1, 15 (Michael Johnston ed., 2005). By
2004, Kuchma was mired in more mundane forms of corruption as well, including "arms
smuggling to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. MANKOFF, supra note 149 at 225.
175. Kuchma has been described as "a thuggish former apparatchik who brutally repressed
the press and political opposition." 4 THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 171 (Cathal J. Nolan, ed., 2002). Kuchma is married to a Russian woman and speaks
Russian as his first language. Rocco M. PAONE, EVOLVING NEW WORLD ORDER/DISORDER:
CHINA-RUSSIA-UNITED STATES-NATO 4 (2001). In 1997, Kuchma signed a treaty of friendship
with Boris Yeltsin which also contained explicit promises of Ukraine's territorial integrity and
independence. TATIANA ZHURZHENKO, BORDERLANDS INTO BORDERED LANDS: GEOPOLITICS
OF IDENTITY IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE 134 (2014). Still, there was occasional friction between
Kuchma and Moscow, such as in 2002, when Kuchma showed some openness to Ukrainian
membership in NATO. This show of interest, even if slight, was sufficient to cause Vladimir Putin
to choose to become involved in the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004. Robert Donaldson,
Russia and the States of the Former Soviet Union, in, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RUSSIAN
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 432, 439 (Graeme Gill ed., 2012).
176. In 2004, Kuchma agreed to the formation of a Moscow-controlled "Single Economic
Space" which was "intended to become the principal vehicle for the Kremlin's effort to
consolidate hegemony over the former Soviet space ROBERT HORVATH, PUTIN'S PREVENTIVE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION: POST-SOVIET AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE SPECTRE OF VELVET
REVOLUTION 23 (2013). Yanukovich supported the creation of the Single Economic Space, while
Yushchenko opposed it. Vladimir Putin made plain his support for Yanukovich and his
displeasure with Yushchenko as early as the summer of 2004. Id
177. As central bank governor, Yushchenko received high marks for the way he tamed
hyperinflation and for the general spirit of reform he brought to his position. See ANDERS ASLUND
& GEORGE DE MINIL, ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 17 (2000),
(hyperinflation); and Lucio Vinhas de Souza, et al., Now So Near and Yet So Far Relations
Between the Ukraine and the European Union, in RETURN TO GROWTH IN CIS COUNTRIES:
MONETARY POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC GROWTH 144, 148 (Lftcio Vinhas de Souza & Oleh
Havrylyshyn, eds.,2006),.
178. In 2001, Yushchenko defended Kuchma in the face of popular calls for his ouster
following the revelations concerning his apparent involvement in the Gongadze murder. Tammy
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sought the top office at the head of a political party known as Nasha
Ukrayina ("Our Ukraine").179
Voting was scheduled for the end of October, 2004. Unexpectedly,
however, in early September of that year, Yushchenko began violently ill.180
He had hitherto been in good health. He was hospitalized in Vienna,"'
where he received the initial diagnosis of pancreatitis and other acute
physical disorders.1 8 2 Soon, however, it was realized that he did not suffer
from pancreatitis at all, but had been the victim of a sophisticated poisoning
plot. 183
In fact, Yushchenko had been given a near-lethal dose of
Tetrachlorodibenzidioxon (TCDD), the most potent known form of
dioxin.18 4 He "had at least 1,000 times more dioxin in his system in
September than normal.""' The poison had been specially manufactured to
Lynch, Ukraine's Post-Orange Revolution, in, UKRAINE ON ITS MEANDERING PATH BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST 137, 145-47 (Andrej N. Lushnycky & Mykola Riabchuck, eds., 2009). On
Yushchenko's dismissal, see Michael McFaul, Importing Revolution: Internal and External
Factors in Ukraine's 2004 Democratic Breakthrough, in DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM
IN THE POSTCOMMUNIST WORLD 189, 196 (Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, & Kathryn Stoner-
Weiss eds., 2010).
179. Yushchenko made the decision to enter electoral politics following his dismissal as
prime minister. "At the time, Yushchenko cut an image of a technocratic economist, not a
revolutionary. Those who knew him best worried that he did not have the drive or temperament to
become a national political leader. But he was a popular prime minister with a record of
achievement, an image of not being corrupt, an appealing biography, and a handsome
appearance. Michael McFaul & Richard Youngs, Ukraine: External Actors and the Orange
Revolution, in, TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE PERSECTIVE 120, 122 (Kathryn
Stoner & Michael McFaul eds, 2013).
180. Ukraine Presidential Candidate Falls Ill, AP ONLINE REGIONAL Sept. 18, 2004; and
Ukrainian Politician's Sudden Illness Suspect, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Sept. 18, 2004.
181. Ukrainian Opposition Leader Goes to Vienna For Medical Treatment, BBC NEWSFILE,
Sept. 30, 2004.
182. The initial diagnosis included "acute pancreatitis, a viral skin disease, and nerve
paralysis on the left side of his face." Ukraine's Top Opposition Leader Vying For President
Released From Vienna Hospital, AP WORLDSTREAM, Sept. 18, 2004; and George Jahn, Doctors:
Cause of Ukrainian Opposition Leader's Illness Still Unclear, AP WORLDSTREAM, Sept. 29,
2004.
183. Peter Finn, Yushchenko Was Poisoned, Doctors Say: Ukrainian Illness Caused By
Dioxin, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 2004; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Candidate Was Given Dioxin:
Tests Confirm Poisoning Caused Yushchenko's Disfigurement, HOUSTON CHRONICLE Dec. 12,
2004; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Yushchenko Poisoning Suggests Plot; Doctors 'Clearly' See a 'Third-
Party' Role, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2004; and Scott Shane, Yushchenko
Case Recalls KGB Practice; Soviets Long Used Poison Against Foes, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE Dec. 14, 2004.
184. Labs: Yushchenko Poison Was Worst of Dioxin Agents, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 18,
2004.
185. Ukrainian Poisoning Confirmed, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004. Other estimates
declared that he had as much as 6,000 times normal levels of dioxin. Leader Had 6,000 Times the
Normal Dioxin Levels, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (WV), Dec. 15, 2004.
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a laboratory-grade fineness.186 There was, in other words, little doubt that
someone in a position to bring to bear significant resources-laboratory
space, pharmaceutical skill, carefully-orchestrated delivery of the poison-
stood behind this assassination attempt.187 And, just before becoming ill,
Yushchenko had dined with two men in a position to have access to such
sophisticated poisons and motive to use them-Ihor Smeshko, "the
Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service ... and his deputy Volodymyr
Satsiuk."8
Yushchenko, however, did not die. His health, however, suffered
grievously although he now seems to be well-recovered.189 His face became
bloated and pock-marked, scarring that is typical in cases of dioxin
poisoning. But thanks to heroic, experimental treatments, he survived.190
And not only did he survive. He helped to topple the old regime. In the
first round of presidential voting, held at the end of October, Yushchenko
and Yanukovich finished in a virtual tie with about 39 percent of the vote
each. 191 But because neither candidate received 50 percent, the election
proceeded to a second round, held on November 21. The results were so
heavily tilted towards Yanukovich that it became apparent the election was
fraudulent. 192 And this realization led to the protests that became known as
186. Tests conducted by the "British Defence and Science Technology Laboratory" have
shown that the dioxin Yushchenko ingested was "a product of a special laboratory." BORIS
VOLODORSKY, THE KGB's POISON FACTORY: FROM LENIN TO LITVINENKO 113 (2009). Cf, Bill
Meyer, Dioxin That Poisoned Urainian Leader Viktor Yushchenko Was Very Pure, Made in Lab:
Study, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER. Aug. 4, 2009 (providing further documentation and references
to British studies of the quality of dioxin used against Yushchenko).
187. ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE'S ORANGE REVOLUTION 98-99 (2005) explores some of
the intricacies of this carefully-orchestrated plot, including the effort by parties unknown to issue
false press releases in the name of the Austrian clinic that was treating Yushchenko denying the
presence of dioxin in his system. These false press releases dominated early news coverage of the
event and delayed public acceptance of true information for a matter of weeks. Id. at 98.
188. Yushchenko and the Poison Theory, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2004.
189. Viktor Yushchenko Shows Arresting Recovery as Poison Scars Fade, DAILY MAIL Dec.
28, 2007; and Adrienne Agg, Urainian President Viktor Yushchenko's Ugly Poison Scars Have
Disappeared, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 1, 2009.
190. Glenn Kessler & Rob Stein, U.S. Doctors Treated Yushchenko: Secret Team Helped
Find Dioxin Poisoning, WASHINGTON POST Mar. 11, 2005. At the time of the poisoning,
Yushchenko granted permission for extensive data collection and has now also granted permission
for publication of peer-reviewed studies based on his course of treatment. The first such study has
recently appeared. See Jean-Hilaire Saurat, et al., The Cutaneous Lesions of Dioxin Exposure:
Lessons From the Poisoning Of Victor Yushchenko, 125 TOxICOLOGICAL SCIENCES 310-17
(2012).
191. ERIC A. MILLER, To BALANCE OR NOT To BALANCE: ALIGHMENT THEORY AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 134 (2006).
192. BERTIL NYGREN, THE REBUILDING OF GREATER RUSSIA: PUTIN's FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS THE CIS COUNTRIES 63 (2008). The scale of the fraud, which has been revealed
through leaked wiretaps, involved massive computer tampering. Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraine's
Orange Revolution, 84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 35, 37-38 (2005).
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the "Orange Revolution."193
Anywhere between half a million to two million protestors took to the
streets.19 4 Individual cities in western Ukraine-Kiev, Lviv-voted not to
honor the results.1 9 5 Yushchenko took a simulated oath of inauguration and
began to act as if he had been legally elected president.1 9 6 In eastern
Ukraine, on the other hand, where Yanukovich's support was strongest,
protestors took to the streets to defend the electoral outcome.1 9 7 In the event,
the Ukrainian Supreme Court ordered a third round of voting, which took
place at the end of December, 2004. Yushchenko this time prevailed by
approximately 52 percent to 44 percent. 198
The election returns, however, left open the most important question:
who was responsible for poisoning the winning candidate? 199 The answer
should be obvious. The circumstantial evidence is overwhelming and points
in only one direction. Putin understood the stakes in the 2004 Ukrainian
election to be large-he visited that country seven times in the summer and
193. Id. at 44-46; Alexander J. Motyl, Three Years After: Theoretical Reflections on
Ukraine's Orange Revolution, 29 HARVARD INT'L REV. 16-19 (2008); Joshua A. Tucker,
Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions,
5 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 535-551 (2007); and Marta Dyczok, Breaking Through the
Information Blockade: Election and Revolution in Ukraine 2004, 47 CANADIAN SLAVONIC
PAPERS 241, 247-60 (2005).
194. On the high end, Julia Gerlach estimates the protests to have numbered around one and a
half million. JULIA GERLACH, COLOR REVOLUTIONS IN EURASIA 11 (2014). Olga Onuch has
offered the highest estimate, at two million. OLGA ONUCH, MAPPING MASS MOBILIZATION:
UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONARY MOMENTS IN ARGENTINA AND UKRAINE 4 (2014).
195. Kiev, Other Major Cities, Consider Ukraine's Presidential Election Illegitimate, AP
WORLDSTREAM, Nov. 22, 2004; Two More Urainian Cities Refuse To Recognize Disputed Vote
Results, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 23, 2004; C.J. Chivers, Pro-Russian Named Winner In
Ukraine; But the Opposition Vows Not To Yield, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 25,
2004.
196. Steve Bickerstaff, Contesting the Outcome of Elections, in, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
PRINCIPLES: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 333 n.31 (John Hardin Young ed., 2009).
197. Pavel Polityuk, Danger of Ukraine Split Limited Despite Tension, REUTERS Nov. 29,
2004; Regions Threaten To Split: Pro-Russia Donetsk Sets Referendum Vote for December 5,
VANCOUVER PROVINCE, Nov. 29, 2004; Threat of Breakup Grows In Ukraine, NEW ZEALAND
HERALD, Nov. 30, 2004; Ukraine: Crimeans Want to Return to Russia, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA,
Dec. 1, 2004; Neil Barnett, Backing the Bad Guy? Eastern Ukrainians Credit Yanukovich For
Their Modest Prosperity, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Dec. 4, 2004; David Hearst, Those Driving
the Western-Backed Upheaval in Uraine Will Not Bring Real Democracy Unless They Accept It
as a Multi-Ethnic State, GUARDIAN Dec. 6, 2004; Fred Weir, 'Orange' Victory Sours East
Ukraine, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 6, 2004.
198. Oktay F. Tarnisever, Ukraine as a Cusp State: The Politics of Reform in the Borderland
Between the EU and Russia, in THE ROLE, POSITION, AND AGENCY OF CUSP STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 60, 70 (Marc Herzog & Philip Robins, eds., 2014).
199. Susan Viets, So Who Poisoned Yushchenko's Soup? THE INDEPENDENT (UK) Dec. 12,
2004; Terri Rupar, Remember When a Ukrainian Presidential Candidate Fell Mysteriously Ill?
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 12, 2014.
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fall of 2004.200 The poisoning was a sophisticated job that required the
cooperation of Ukrainian security officials and Russian laboratories. Who
was in a position to issue such orders? Who had the means and the
motive?20 1
2. 2014/2015: The Russian War On Ukraine
a. Ukraine 2010-2014: From Yushchenko to the Maidan
Revolution
Viktor Yushchenko served as president of Ukraine until 2010. By that
time, the voting public had grown weary of him2 0 2 and he was soundly
defeated in the election's first round with about five percent of the vote,
held in January, 2010.203
This first round of voting proved to be a precursor to the crisis that
would envelop Ukraine over the next five years. Indeed, a survey of the
major issues that confronted the candidates in the fall of 2009 reveals that
perhaps the biggest issue on voters' minds was the relationship with
Russia.20 4 Yushchenko wished to stand strong for genuine Ukrainian
200. ANGELA STENT, THE LIMITS OF PARTNERSHIP: U.S. RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 112-13 (2014).
201. See for instance, Tom Mangold, The Man Who Surivived Russia's Poison Chalice, Jan.
23, 2005, available at http//www.The Age.com; Francesca Mereu, Probing the Plot to Poison
Yushchenko, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005; Russia Blamed Over Poison Probe, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2007; Yushchenko Says At Present Russia Will Not Cooperate With Ukraine On
Case offHis Poisoning in 2004, INTERFAX INFORMATION SERVICES (Ukraine General Newswire),
Feb. 16, 2010.
202. Urainian President Says Government 'In Stagnation,' BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS,
Nov. 25, 2009; and Colin Freeman, The Orange Revolution Sours: Five Years Ago, People Power
Ushered in a New Era For Ukraine Now a Pro-Moscow Candidate Is About to Retake Power. So
What Went Wrong? SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (UK), Dec. 27, 2009.
203. Ukraine Election: Orange Leader Viktor Yushchenko Out, BBC, Jan. 18, 2010.
204. Russia's Influence on Ukraine Decreasing - Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS
PRESIDENTIAL BULLETIN, Sept. 9, 2009; Yuschenko Not Accepting Any Pressure During
Presidential Election Campaign, Including From Kremlin, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS
PRESIDENTIAL BULLETIN, Sept. 22, 2009; Ukraine's Yushchenko Asks Russia To Hand Over Key
Figures in His Dioxin Poisoning, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Sept. 28, 2009; Yushchenko Calls For
Resumed Efforts To Settle Russia-Ukraine Frontier Disputes, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 8, 2009; Yushchenko Rules Out Ukraine-Russia War, Criticizes Russia,
INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Oct. 19, 2009; Russia Evading Dialogue With
Ukraine - Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2009; Ukraine
Counts On an Objective Investigation of Border Incident With Russia-Yushchenko, INTERFAX
RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Nov. 27, 2009; Standoff Between Moscow and Kiyv Is
Temporary, Says Ukrainian President, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS PRESIDENTIAL BULLETIN, Dec.
22, 2009; Russia Should Not Teach Ukrainians How To Live-Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA
AND CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Dec. 24, 2009; and Andre de Nesnera, Will Moscow-Kiyv Ties
Improve After Ukrainian Election? VOICE OF AMERICA ENGLISH SERVICE, Jan. 15, 2010.
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independence,2 0 5 even as Russia was pressuring Ukraine and making its
desires known on a range of concerns-from naval basing rights in the
Crimean Peninsula,2 0 6 to relations with NATO and the EU,2 07 to the use of
Ukrainian pipelines to transport natural gas to other parts of Europe.2 0 8
The two candidates who made it to the final run-off were Yulia
Tymoshenko, Yushchenko's prime minster, and Viktor Yanukovich,
Yushchenko's old opponent from 2010.209 The same ethnic divisions that
plagued the 2004 election were in even sharper relief in the winter of
2009/2010 as the election unfolded.2 1 0 Eastern Ukraine continued to look to
Moscow, while Western Ukraine gazed longingly at Europe.2 1 1 This time
205. Yushchenko Accuses Moscow Of Provoking Ukraine, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Sept. 5, 2009; Ukrainian President Looks at 'Tension' With Russia, Accuses Premier of Populism,
BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 7, 2009; and President Describes Course For Democracy
as Indispensable Pillar Of Ukraine's Sovereignty, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS PRESIDENTIAL
BULLETIN, Oct. 23, 2009; and Yushchenko Again Stresses Need To Strengthen Democracy in
Ukraine, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS PRESIDENTIAL BULLETIN, Dec. 8, 2009.
206. Ukrainian President Urges Russia To Honour Fleet Treaty, Review Gas Contracts, BBC
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Nov. 19, 2009; Yushchenko Hopes Russian Fleet's Presence in
Ukraine Will Not Be Expanded By 2017, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Nov.
19, 2009; Yushchenko Again Reminds Russia ofIts Pledge Concerning Black Sea Fleet, INTERFAX
RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Dec. 3, 2009; Russian Fleet Presence a Destabilizing
Factor - Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA AND CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Dec. 1, 2009; and
Ukraine Hopes To Complete Border Demarcation, Maritime Delimitation With Russia -
Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Dec. 3, 2009.
207. Yushchenko Doesn't See Alternative to Ukraine's Membership In NATO, INTERFAX
RUSSIA & CIS MILITARY WEEKLY, Sept. 11, 2009; Yushchenko Says He's Sure Ukraine Will Join
EUIn Interview With Le Figaro Newspaper, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS PRESIDENTIAL BULLETIN,
Sept. 29, 2009; Ukraine's Integration With EU, NATO Not Targeted Against Other Parties-
Yushchenko INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Oct. 15, 2009; Yushchenko Vows To
Contribute to Work on NATO's New Strategy, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 9, 2009; European Commission Backs Idea of Urainian-Belarusian Joint Projects-
Yushchenko, INTERFAX RUSSIA & GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Nov. 6, 2009; Yushchenko Hoping For
Political Understanding 'From EU On Association Accord, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 4, 2009.
208. Gregory Feifer, Experts Downplay Fears Over Uraine-Russia Gas Crisis, RADIO FREE
EUROPE DOCUMENTS, Nov. 4, 2009; Yushchenko's Attempts to Scare Russia, Europe With Gas
Transit Crisis Is Blackmail Kremlin, INTERFAX RUSSIA & CIS BUSINESS AND FINANCE
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 19, 2009; Ukrainian President Calls For Changes To Russian Gas Transit
Policy, BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Nov. 28, 2009.
209. RICHARD SAKWA, FRONTLINE UKRAINE: CRISIS IN THE BORDERLANDS 55-56 (2015).
210. Greg Simon, The Politics of Borders and Nationalities in Ukraine: Impacts Upon
Security Sector Reform, in THE POLITICS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION'S GLOBAL ROLE 165-202 (Magnus Ekengren &
Greg Simon eds., 2011);
211. Philip P. Pan, Uraine-Russia Tensions Evident in Crimea; Kremlin Asserting Its
Influence in Region, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 6, 2009; Group of Ukrainian MPs Challenging
Ban on Russian Language at Schools, Itar-Tass, Oct. 12, 2009; Ukraine Election Result A
Balancing Act, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 8, 2010; Kirill Nourzhanov, Bad Blood and
Big Doubts Leave Ukraine in Limbo, CANBERRA TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010; Ukrainian Frontrunner
Vows to Ensure Russian Spoken Freely, BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Feb. 12, 2010.
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around, Vladimir Putin took a more balanced approach to the election, at
different times expressing support for each of the candidates, although he
was plainly pleased to see Yanukovich prevail.212
Viktor Yanukovich was in office for almost exactly four years, from
February 2010 to February 2014. These four years witnessed an
accelerating drift into ever greater levels of official corruption and an ever
widening divide between the Western half of Ukraine, which was ethnically
Ukrainian and looked to Europe, and the Eastern half of the nation, which
spoke Russian and looked to Moscow.2 1 3
Regarding corruption, writing in the Kyiv Post, Viktor Tkachuck
declared in 2012: "Corruption seems to have infected every corner of
Ukrainian society."214 Outside observers considered judicial corruption an
endemic problem in Ukraine215 - a point of view that was generally shared
by the public at large.216 The political process was seen to be corrupt.217 So
212. Philip P. Pan, Russia Trying to Unravel Orange Revolution: Observers; Many in
Ukraine Seen as Nostalgic For Soviet Era, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Sept. 15, 2009; Anya
Tsukanova, Putin Strides Into Ukraine Election Campaign, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 20,
2009; Roland Oliphant, Disillusioned Ukrainians Set To Vote Out Orange Revolutionaries:
Failure ofAlliance and Economic Chaos Play Into Hands of the Old Enemy, INDEPENDENT (UK),
Jan. 16, 2010; Benedikt von Imhoff & Stefan Korshak, Russia Already a Winner in Ukraine's
Presidential Election, DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, Jan. 18, 2010; Stuart Williams, Russia Gains
As Ukraine Awakes From Orange Dream, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 18, 2010; Anna
Smolchenko, 'Orange Sunset:'Sweet Revenge For Kremlin In Ukraine, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 8, 2010; Clifford Levy, A Revolutionary Result in Uraine, THE AGE (Australia), Feb. 10,
2010.
213. Yanukovich exacerbated the ethnic divisions. Thus Alexander Motyl wrote about
Yanukovich's minister for education and science: "He openly espouses anti-Ukrainian views. He
claims that ethnic Ukrainians in the west of the country are too westernized to be true Ukrainians.
He believes that Ukrainian culture flourished in Soviet times, when it was in fact suppressed in
favor of the colonial power's culture. He also insists that today the Russian language is
discriminated against, even as Russian-language publications and broadcasts make up the
overwhelming majority of media available in Ukraine." Alexander J. Motyl, Ukrainian Blues:
Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall, 98 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 125, 129 (2010).
214. Viktor Tkachuck, People First: The Latest in the Watch on Ukrainian Democracy, KYIV
POST, Sept. 11, 2012.
215. Ukraine is Ranked Last Out of the 43 Countries in the Europe Region, in Bottom 20 % of
Overall World Rankings, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 25, 2012 ("The judiciary is subject to
executive branch and criminal pressure, and judicial corruption is significant. Contracts are not
well enforced, and expropriation is a threat"). Id. Cf, Proposals Regarding Next Steps in Judicial
Reform in Ukraine, USAID, Ukraine Rule of Law Project, November 12, 2010 (report "based on
the results of discussions at the conference on Judicial Reform in Ukraine and International
Standards for Judicial Independence, in Kyiv").
216. Alexei Trochev, Meddling With Justice: Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted
Courts in Post-Orange Uraine, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA Apr. 10, 2010 (The judiciary in post-
Orange Ukraine is in deep crisis. By 2010, as Ukraine marked the fifth anniversary of the Orange
Revolution, both domestic and foreign observers were decrying judicial dependence and
corruption in the country). Id. Cf, Poll Reveals Ukrainians Have Little Trust in Judiciary, BBC
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Oct. 17, 2013 (Only 2 precent of Ukrainians fully trust the courts). Id.
217. Ukrainian Gloom, 36 THE WILSON QUARTERLY 76-77 (Winter, 2012); EU Leaders
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was the business world.218
One important report concluded: "The plague of corruption has
penetrated all levels of government and public institutions, starting from the
highest-level public officials. All formal and informal institutions have
become used to corruption and adapted to it, including the law enforcement
agencies that are heavily corrupted too."2 1 9 Another important study judged
Yanukovich to have been a failure and predicted disaster: "Ukraine's crisis
will only deepen and the country will become increasingly authoritarian,
impoverished, polarized, and unstable."2 2 0
Still, Ukraine might have muddled along a little while longer had
Viktor Yanukovich in the fall of 2013 not killed Ukraine's chances of
closer integration with the European Union.2 2 1 Yushchenko, Yanukovich's
predecessor, was firmly committed to a plan of phased integration with
Europe.2 2 2 Early in Yushchenko's adminstration, he and representatives of
the EU engaged in a broad range of negotiations which concluded in the
EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.2 2 3 Also in 2009, the European Union
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invited Ukraine join the Eastern Partnership project, which had as its
ambition the adoption of a broad range of joint initiatives with former
Soviet republics-Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine-that aimed to forge tight economic bonds between these nations
and Europe, but that side-stepped the question of full political and
economic union.224
Early on,Yanukovich pledged his support for these initiatives, but he
failed to meet European demands for economic and political reforms.225
Matters came to a head in November, 2013. With a summit meeting of the
Eastern Partnership Project scheduled at the end of November that would
have seen Ukraine sign a broad range of agreements with the EU,
Yanukovich scuttled the project. Vladimir Putin, it seems, had intervened at
the last minute, and Yanukovich now sharply pivoted east, towards
Moscow and away from the West.226
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At first, the European Union leadership tried to cajole Yanukovich into
changing his mind,2 2 7 and then berated him.2 2 8 Finally, they understood that
he had now definitively cast his lot with Russia and they began to plan
accordingly.229
The Ukrainian people, too, especially the western half of Ukraine, now
took matters into their own hands.2 3 0 Protestors grew furious at the
hijacking of their future by forces hostile to their interests, and began to
engage in spectacular shows of civil disobedience.2 3 1 Vladimir Putin
promised to buy fifteen billion dollars worth of Ukrainian bonds and reduce
gas prices,2 3 2 but the protestors only showed ever more resoluteness and
continued to call for Yanukovich's ouster.2 3 3
In mid-January, the Parliament passed an anti-protest law but this only
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inflamed matters.2 34 The Maidan Revolution was now on, as protestors
began seizing government office buildings in the western half the
country.2 35 The anti-protest law was rescinded-it was doing no good
anyways.2 36 This did not appease the protestors as occupations continued
across the western half of the country.237 In mid-February, Yanukovich
escalated matters. Unidentified snipers killed some eighty-eight protestors
in a two-day slaughter.2 38 Again, the crowd was undeterred and seized the
presidential palace.2 39 Yanukovich fled the country just as a warrant for his
arrest was being issued.240 An interim government was chosen.241
b. Putin Declares War
It was Vladimir Putin's long history of interference in Ukrainian
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sovereignty that brought on this impasse. A wiser foreign leader would
have realized that this was the time for letting go. Vladimir Putin, however,
took this moment to wage war on Ukraine.
On the last two days of February, 2014, groups of armed men suddenly
appeared in strategic places across the Crimean peninsula, where they
seized government buildings and airports.2 4 2 On March 1, 2014, the Russian
Parliament made it official, granting permission for the use of Russian
troops in Ukraine.2 4 3 A year later, in March, 2015, Vladimir Putin admitted
on Russian television that he first issued the orders to attack Crimea on
February 22, 2014, when Yanukovich fled the country.2 4 4
From the outset, Vladimir Putin made it clear that it was strategic
objective to sever Ukraine in two. His ultimate strategic objective was the
Crimean peninsula, that flat, low, windswept land extending southward into
the Black Sea.2 4 5 Its climate is mild,24 its southem coast almost
Mediterranean-like.2 4 7 But Putin's objective did not involve the landscape or
the weather. Rather, his interest was in maintaining access to the Russian
naval base located there, the home of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.2 4 8 The Fleet,
for Putin, was a strategic necessity.2 4 9 It was his only practical means of
reaching the Mediterranean and the only sure way of projecting power into
that part of the world, and even if the fleet had grown dilapidated, the port
itself possessed significance since the fleet might always be rebuilt.2 50
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But there is a strategic complication to simply seizing the Crimean
Peninsula. It is not connected to Russia. It is, rather, connected to Ukraine
proper by a land bridge. It is, in other words, subject to being choked off.
To protect his new acquisition meant that Putin would need to develop a
land corridor through Ukraine to the peninsula.25 1
Putin's war unfolded in accord with this strategy. First, secure Crimea,
next, secure a foothold in Eastern Ukraine, then search for transit routes to
the peninsula. Crimea was the easiest objective to obtain. Putin moved
some 150,000 Russian troops to the Ukrainian border as part of a "military
exercise."2 52 Shadowy armed men first seized the airports and other military
facilities in Crimea,253 and then took over government buildings.254 Internet
and telecommunications service between the peninsula and Ukraine was
cut.2 5 5 The local Crimean government was replaced and the head of the new
interim government expressed his desire to join the peninsula with
Russia.256 Vladimir Putin expressed his openness to the suggestion.257
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The United States and the European Union threatened the imposition of
sanctions, but Putin was undeterred.2 5 8 A referendum was hastily organized
and on March 16, 2014 and Crimean voters assented-overwhelmingly, of
course-to an annexation by the Russian Federation.2 5 9
Even before the voting on the referendum was complete, Russia was
expanding its aggression into other parts of Ukraine.2 6 0 Its next main targets
were the centers of Russian ethnicity in eastern Ukraine-the Donbass
region and its numerous towns and cities, especially the major metropolitan
centers of Luhansk and Donetsk.
The contest for the Donbass commenced with civil unrest, in early and
mid-March, 2014. Rallies in Donetsk and other cities,2 6 1 denunciations of
the European Union and the West,2 62 demands that eastern Ukraine put
secession to a vote,2 63 the sudden emergence of armed gangs who sought to
disrupt transportation.2 64 The common aim of all of these efforts was simple
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enough to discem-destabilize Ukraine.265
By April and May, hostilities had broken out across much of eastern,
ethnically Russian Ukraine.266 Russian-backed separatist fighters attacked
municipalities throughout eastern Ukraine.267 A pitched battle broke out in
Sloviansk on April 12, which led to extended military operations that
stretched into summer.268 A Ukrainian armory was seized in Artemivsk in
late April.269 Other towns and cities also became the scene of fighting.270
The main prizes, however, were Donetsk and Luhansk. As early as
April, Russian-backed separatists seized control of Donetsk's government
buildings and proclaimed the new "Donetsk Peoples' Republic."27 1 A hasty,
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mostly fraudulent referendum was then called for mid-May which "ratified"
this outcome.272
These events, however, were but a preliminary to the main battle for
Donetsk and Luhansk, which would rage for much of the summer of 2014
and involved at different points massive incursions of Russian troops, tanks,
and advanced weaponry.273 It would be tedious-and depressing-to review
the many ebbs and flows of this series of bloody conflicts for control of the
heart of the Donbass region.274 At the end of the day, in November, 2014,
the inhabitants were allowed to vote for separation from Ukraine.275 They
did so,276 and almost at once convoys of Russian soldiers arrived as
grotesque guarantors of peace.277
In early September, 2014, Ukraine and Russia agreed to a ceasefire.27 8
Vladimir Putin, however, did not yet have his land corridor to the Crimean
peninsula. It should therefore be no surprise that fighting soon flared up
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once again,2 7 9 including the area around Mariupol.2 80 Fighting continued
intermittently for much of the fall and winter, 2014.281 A second cease-fire
was agreed to in February, 2015,282 but that agreement has similarly had
little luck in curbing the combat.2 8 3
As I write this Article, in mid-March, 2015, skirmishing is even now
taking place once again in and around Mariupol.2 8 4 There is little doubt that
Putin means to take the city.28 5 It is possible, however, that his ambitions
reach beyond the establishment of a land corridor to Crimea and aims at the
destruction of western Ukraine as a functioning nation: "'Putin's main goal
279. The cease-fire in fact had begun to break down within days of its being signed. See Jim
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Commander Europe and the commanding officer of NATO).
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is not Debaltseve, Donetsk airport, or even Mariupol. They would like to
destroy Ukraine from the inside using military, economic, and political
pressure on the Ukrainian government,' Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent
Russian military analyst told the Kyiv Post."2 8 6
The war to date has had its share of atrocities. Ukraine has been
accused of using cluster munitions both last summer and more recently this
winter.2 8 7 While this is an unquestionably serious offense against the laws
of war, the most outrageous atrocity, without doubt has been the shooting
down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014.288 The plane was
brought down, it seems, by Russian separatists making use of a
sophisticated, Russian-supplied surface-to-air missile system, known as the
Buk.2 89
Regarding Russian responsibility for the war against Ukraine, Vladimir
Putin has conducted a campaign of dissembling and disinformation. 290 That
campaign has been expertly countered by the United States Department of
State.2 9 1 In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General
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and Luhansk. See Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct.
20, 2014; Ukraine Crisis: Army Accused Of Using Cluster Bombs, BBC NEWS EUROPE, Oct. 21,
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Cluster Munition Use In Ukraine, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 4, 2015; and Carol J. Williams,
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2015.
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Philip Breedlove Supreme Commander of NATO forces, described Russian
aggression against Ukraine as part of a larger strategy of threat and
intimidation.2 9 2 General Breedlove has also indicated that the scope of
Russia's military resupply effort has been large: "Over 1,000 pieces of
Russian military equipment including tanks, armored personnel carriers,
heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles have already crossed the
Ukrainian border."2 9 3 Lt. General Ben Hodge, Commander of the U.S.
Army in Europe, has estimated that Russia has 12,000 troops operating
inside Ukraine.2 94
It was left to Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, to describe and denounce the scope of Russian
aggression: "In eastern Ukraine, Russia and its separatist puppets unleashed
unspeakable violence and pillage. This manufactured conflict-controlled
by the Kremlin, fueled by Russian tanks and heavy weapons, financed at
Russian taxpayers' expense-has cost the lives of more than 6,000
Ukrainians but also of hundreds of young Russians sent to fight and die
there by the Kremlin in a war their government denies."2 95
C. Dreams of a Greater Russia
Vladimir Putin may be an opportunistic adventurer, he may pounce
when he senses vulnerability, but he is not inscrutable. He has given the
world a roadmap of sorts by which to understand his ambitions. He has
declared it his intention to revive Russian imperial pretensions. He wants to
recreate the lost world of "Greater Russia."2 9 6
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2015, p. 5 ("Russia views Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, regardless of the views of the
Ukrainian people.... Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine are the most current manifestation in
a pattern of continuing behavior to coerce its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe"). Id.
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To speak of "Greater Russia" is to revive an imperialist ideology long
thought dormant if not dead. The czars saw themselves as the inheritors of
the universal civilizing mission of ancient Rome.2 97 Moscow, after all, it
was said was the "Third Rome," the first two having been the Rome of the
Caesars and the second its eastern successor the Byzantine Empire.2 9 8 If the
czars were moved by self-interest to expand across the vastness of the
Eurasian landmass,2 9 9 they were also fueled by intense feelings of
messianism and millenarianism.3 0 0 They were bringing light to the heathen
and hastening the onset of a utopian golden age.30 1 The Soviets merely
expropriated these ideas on empire in those decades from the 1920s to the
1980s.302
This set of ideas must serve as background to a series of speeches
Vladimir Putin delivered in the nine years between 2005 and 2014. Ten
years ago, Putin addressed the Russian Federal Assembly.3 0 3 He said many
praiseworthy things. He declared that Russia must "become a free society of
free people."3 0 4 He denounced the inefficient rule of a corrupted
bureaucracy and pledged to do better.30 5 He wished to see law reform
sufficient to guarantee a stable "right to private property" and a free and fair
297. JUDITH E. KALB, RUSSIA'S ROME: IMPERIAL VISIONS, MESSIANIC DREAMS, 1890-1940
15-16 (2008); and DOMINIC LIEVEN, EMPIRE: THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND ITS RIVALS 3-26
(2000), THE CLASSICAL TRADITION (Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, & Salvatore Settis eds.,
2010).
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a Pivotal Moment, '49 JAHRBOCHER FOR GESCHICHTE OSTEUROPAS 412-429 (2001).
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visions of "messianism").
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TSARIST RUSSIA 115-43 (Robert P. Geraci & Michael Khodarkovsky eds., 2001); and Victor
Zatsepine, Surveying Manchuria: Imperial Russian Topographers at Work, in ENTANGLED
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Frank Grtiner & Ines Prodahl eds., 2014) (discussing the Russian "utopian dream" of expansion
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marketplace. 30 6 The sorts of bromides one might hear at any presidential
State of the Union address. But then he declared: "Above all, we should
acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical
disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine
drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found
themselves outside of Russian territory." 30 7
What did he mean by this? The press thought it knew. Some understood
the speech as a sign of evident or imminent Russian collapse.3 0 8 Others saw
it as nostalgia, a disturbing reminiscence about a dark time in the Russian
collective psyche, but not something that had great relevance for
contemporary politics. 30 9 Yet others struck a cautiously upbeat note-yes,
the passages on the Soviet Union were horrible, but look at Putin's
endorsement of economic freedom.3 1 0
But there were a few who perceived in it a threat to the present order. 311
Andrew Kuchins almost clairvoyantly declared that the speech reflected an
"anachronistic" concept of geopolitics and cautioned Putin: "I would ...
advise him, presumptuous as that may be, to clarify that geopolitics is an
out-dated, inappropriate, and even dangerous framework for the formulation
of foreign policy in the twenty-first century. "312
Kuchins' prescience has proven dead-on accurate. Putin has revealed
himself over the past decade as an unrelenting expansionist and
restorationist. He wants not only to protect and preserve Russian borders,
but to add territory in sometimes novel and creative ways. Thus in 2007, a
team of "50 Russian scientists . . . discovered that an underwater ridge
306. Id. at 5.
307. Id. at 2.
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called the Lomonosov ridge directly links Russia's Arctic coast to the North
Pole."313 Putin immediately claimed the ridge and the ocean waters
surrounding it as Russian sovereign territory.314
Some in the West saw the humorous side to this claim.315 Others
complained about both the quaintness and the threat implicit in it: 'This
isn't the fifteenth century,' Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay told
the CTV channel. 'You can't go around the world and just plant flags and
say, 'We're claiming this territory."'316 Putin's Russia, however, is
undeterred. Thus we learn, in November, 2014: "Russia is rapidly building
up its military forces in the Arctic in an effort to secure its claims in the
frigid region. "317
Putin's 2005 speech, and the relentless thirst for expansion which the
Lomonosov Ridge claim reveals, helps put in perspective the danger
inherent in three addresses Putin delivered in 2014, one in March, following
the Crimean annexation, and the second and third at the time of the annual
Russian Victory Day celebrations in May.
Crimea, Putin asserted, was ancestrally Russian.318 It was transferred to
Ukraine by the Bolsheviks "like a sack of potatoes,"3 19 but now the people
of Crimea have spoken and chosen to return home.320 Putin pledged to
313. Alex Palmer, Russia Rising: Moscow's Quiet Resurgence, in 33 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 32, 34 (2011); and Putin's Arctic Invasion: Russia Lays Claim to the
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315. Thus Carl Bildt took a sanguine view: [F]or the time being, neither Santa Claus, nor
anyone else, has reason to be worried. The nature of the Lomonosov Ridge will be debated for
years to come, while his thoughts and ours-are likely to be focused on more immediate issues.
Carl Bildt, The Battle for Santa Claus's Home, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Dec. 24, 2014; and Brett
Snider, Which Country Owns the North Pole, Eh?, LEGAL GROUNDS, Dec. 11, 2013 (stating that it
may take as long as twenty years for the United Nations to verify the science and in the meantime
"Santa may have as good a claim as anyone").
316. Russia Plants Flag Under N Pole, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007; and Canada and Russia
have now taken their dispute to the United Nations, Russia and Canada Seek UN Ruling on
Lomonosov Ridge, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2010; and Denmark has now also made a claim, Rick
Noack, Denmark Stakes Its Claim in the War for the North Pole, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2014.
317. Dave Majumdar, Russia Preps Its North Pole Invasion, DAILY BEAST, Nov. 8, 2014; and
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318. "Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of
ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy
predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation, and human values that unite the
peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.... In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always
been an inseparable part of Russia." Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian
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defend the interests of native Russians wherever they lived, whether in
Crimea or in Ukraine.321
He then turned belligerent. The so-called "color" revolutions were
exploited by outside forces who acted against Russian interests. There are
powerful forces conspiring against "Eurasian integration." 3 2 2 Containment,
he warned the West, was a failed policy. "They are constantly trying to
sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because
we maintain it, and because we call things as they are and do not engage in
hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything." 323
This speech has been understood by commentators as a statement of
policy. 324 Putin called into question the legitimacy of Ukraine's separate
national existence, 325 raised questions about the independence of other
former territories of the Soviet Union such as Kazakhstan and Moldova,326
and challenged the West's, especially America's role in the region.327
Six weeks later, on May 9, Victory Day, the annual Russian celebration
of victory over Nazism, Putin delivered not one but two speeches, one in
Moscow, the other in Sevastopol, the port in Crimea that is home to
Russia's Black Sea fleet. Thousands of troops marched in Moscow's
parade, together with "about 150 items of military hardware." 3 28 There,
Putin spoke of an "all-conquering patriotic force" 3 2 9 and celebrated the "iron
will of the Soviet people, their fearlessness and stamina" in triumphing over
Nazi aggression.330
Putin then headed South, to Sevastopol. He toured the Black Sea Fleet
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. Later that day, Putin addressed a rally in Moscow entitled "We are Together!" He
declared: "After a long, hard, and exhausting voyage, Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to their
harbour, to their native shores, to their home port, to Russia!" Meeting in Support of Crimea's
Accession to the Russian Federation, 'We are Together!"' http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcript/6892,
Mar. 18, 2014.
324. Vladimir Socor, Putin's Crimea Speech: A Manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism,
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, Mar. 25, 2014.
325. Id. ("His starting premise is the denial of Ukrainian nationhood in its own right"). Id.
326. Id.
327. Paul D. Shinkman, Putin Slams U.S. Perceived 'Exceptionalism' in Crimea Speech, U.S.
NEWS, Mar. 18, 2014; and Fred Weir, With a Speech and a Pen Stroke, Putin Takes Over Crimea,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2014 ("[T]he result will not be accepted in the European
Union and the US-and could bring a redefining of their relations with Russia. They call the
Crimean referendum illegitimate and view Russia's annexation of the territory as a dangerous
precedent, since no major international player has bitten off and swallowed a piece of another
country in the twenty-first century. Until now.") Id.
328. Putin Praises Russia's 'All-Conquering' Power. Russia Parades Its Military Force Amid
Ukraine Crisis to Mark Victory Day Against Nazi Germany, ALJAZEERA, May 9, 2014.
329. Id.
330. Harriet Salem & Ian Traynor, Soviets Saved Europe from Fascism, Says Vladimir Putin
on War Anniversary, THE GUARDIAN, May 9, 2014.
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by boat "while watching a flyby of 70 military aircraft."331 "There were
warships . . . and Soviet marching music. Crimea is Russia, the victor is
Putin, was the message. "332
This steady ideological message, then, must serve as backdrop for the
steady provocations and threats Putin has aimed at his neighbors. The
record is long and goes back years. I shall be selective, and focus on only a
few threats made within the last year or so.
Putin's rapid annexation of Crimea and his expressed readiness to
defend ethnic Russians wherever they might be found set off alarm bells in
the Baltic States of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Estonia and Latvia each
have Russian-speaking minorities that comprise somewhere between a fifth
and a fourth of the entire population.333 (Lithuania, on the other hand, has an
ethnic Russian population of between five and ten percent).334
Each of these nations have a long history as well of being bullied and
conquered by Russia. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were all independent
republics in the years between World War I and World War II but were
swallowed up by the Soviet Union in accord with the secret pact made
between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin.335
Each of these nations also have a recent history of treating their Russian
minorities shabbily.336 Latvian voters have rejected calls to make Russian a
second language,3 while many ethnic Russians in Estonia are not
331. Putin Visits Annexed Crimea on Victory Day, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, May 9, 2014;
and Russia TVShows Putin Live at Sevastopol Victory Day Parade, BBC NEWSFILE, May 9, 2014
(a further description of the militarism that greeted Putin's arrival in Sevastopol).
332. Commentary: Victory Party in the Midst of War, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, May 9,
2014; and John Batchelor, Putin Makes His Case for Greater Russia: While the US and EU
Dither, Moscow Pushes Its Advantages, AL JAZEERA ENG., May 13, 2014 (reviewing the disarray
of European and American responses to this show of force); and Neil MacFarquhar, From
Crimea, Putin Trumpets Mother Russia, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2014 (noting that the Secretary
General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen "condemned Mr. Putin's visit as 'inappropriate'). Id
333. Russia's Periphery: Who's Next?, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, Mar. 20, 2014.
334. In 1993, the ethnic Russian population of Lithuania was estimated at 8.5 percent of the
total. KEVIN O'CONNOR, THE HISTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES 177 (Greenwood 2003).
335. RICHARD E. QUANDT, THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN EASTERN EUROPE: A PERSONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON PHILANTHROPY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 252 (2002).
336. Marina Best, The Ethnic Russian Minority: A Problematic Issue in the Baltic States, in 2
VERGES: GERMANIC AND SLAVIC STUDIES IN REVIEW 33-41 (2013). "The Russian minority [in
each of the Baltic countries] is struggling to achieve acceptance and equality, but because of its
differences with the majority populations, it is finding it difficult to achieve these desires." Id at
33. Julia loffe, Ethnic Russians in the Baltic Are Actually Persecuted so Why Isn't Putin Stepping
In?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2014.
337. David M. Hershenhom, Latvians Reject Russian As Second Language, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2012. On the other hand, Russian does enjoy considerable unofficial status. See Aleksandrs
Berdicevskis, Predictors of Pluricentricity: Lexical Divergences Between Latvian Russian and
Russian Russian, in LARA RYAZANOVA-CLARKE, THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE OUTSIDE THE
NATION 225, 228 (2014).
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automatically given citizenship even if born there and must apply as
adults. 3 38 Lithuania, on the other hand, has been relatively accommodating
towards its Russian minority, perhaps because of its greater ethnic
homogeneity.339
In the spring of 2014, a spreading fear engulfed the Baltic states as the
realization dawned that Putin had a strong pretext for invading these
nations.3 4 0 Vladimir Putin played on these fears when he let it be known that
he could easily conquer them: "'If I wanted,"' he is reported to have
boasted, "'Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in
Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, or Bucharest too."' 34 1 Riga, Vilnius, and
Tallinn are the capitals respectively of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Early
on, it was understood that Putin might also deliver a lethal blow to NATO
by means of an attack on the Baltic States. 34 2
This realization has grown even more vivid in the months of February
and March, 2015.343 Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice President of the European
Commission and a former prime minister of Latvia declared in February,
2015, that "'Russia's aggression against Ukraine is very worrying for the
Baltic states . . . . It shows that Russia is looking to redraw Europe's
twenty-first century borders by force."' 34 4 Linas Linkevicius, the Lithuanian
foreign minister, echoed these concerns: "'Russia is behaving aggressively
now as we speak . .. I really do see threats to all countries. . . . If we fail to
338. Nastja Sokolova, Migration Patterns, in THE RUSSIAN SECOND GENERATION IN
TALLINN AND KOHTLA-JARVE 27, 34 (Raivo Vetik & Jelena Helemde eds., Univ. of Amsterdam
Press 2011); David Greene, Russian Minority Struggles in Post-Soviet Estonia, NPR, Aug. 23,
2010; and Katja Koort, The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After, WORLD AFF., July/August
2014 (asserting that matters have begun to improve for ethnic Russians in Estonia).
339. ROGER D. PETERSEN, UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC VIOLENCE: FEAR, HATRED, AND
RESENTMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EASTERN EUROPE 151 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002)
(Lithuania continues to practice an inclusive policy towards citizenship). It remains the case,
however, that ethnic Russians still face some forms of discrimination in Lithuania. THOMAS
LANE, LITHUANIA: STEPPING WESTWARD 150-51 (2014).
340. Russian Takeover in Crimea Revives Fear in Baltics, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU,
Mar. 9, 2014; and Lithuania's Deep Fear ofRussia, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, May 24, 2014.
341. Justin Huggler, Putin Privately Threatened to Invade Poland, Romania, and the Baltic
States, TELEGRAPH ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2014; and Putin Said He Could Invade Five Capitals,
DAILY MAIL (UK), Sept. 19, 2014 ("Shockwaves reverberated through Eastern Europe last night
after Vladimir Putin allegedly claimed that he could invade five NATO capitals in only two
days"). Id.
342. Jason Pack & Brendan Simms, Europe's Wake-Up Call: Two British Foreign Policy
Experts Argue that Only a Truly Integrated State Can Withstand a Resurgent Russia, NAT'L POST,
Mar. 31, 2014; This Is Not a Game Theory, FREE EXCHANGE (THE ECONOMIST), Apr. 15, 2014;
and Spiegel: NATO Unprepared ifRussia Moved into Baltic Members, DEUTSCHE WELLE EUR.,
May 18, 2014.
343. Ian Johnston, Russia's Growing Threat: After Ukraine, Fears Grow that Baltic States
Could Be Vladimir Putin's Next Targets, THE INDEP. (UK), Feb. 8, 2015.
344. Andrew Osborn, Putin a Threat to Baltic States, Western Officials Say (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.
Vladimir Putin's Culture of Terror: What is to be Done?
react properly to what's happening in Ukraine, there will be a big
temptation ... to further instigate situations elsewhere."'
3 4 5
It was British Defence Secretary Michael Fallon who spoke out most
strongly on this fear.3 4 6 On February 19, 2015, he compared Vladimir Putin
to the Islamic State, pronouncing him just as big a threat to world order as
that terrorist organization.347 He added that there was a "real and present
danger" that Putin could commence attacks soon.3 4 8 Russia responded by
buzzing the coast of Cornwall with strategic bombers.3 4 9 The Russian
Foreign Ministry denounced Fallon's words as a "breach of diplomatic
ethics" and promised that "Russia will find an appropriate response."350
The Baltic States are not alone. Putin has threatened other neighbors as
well. Kazakhstan is home to significant numbers of ethnic Russians who
form a distinct and discriminated-against community.3 5 1 The Baikonur
Cosmodrome, still a major hub in the Russian space program, is located
there.3 52 And the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is in his mid-
seventies and without any clear successor.3 53
Putin's invasion of Ukraine caused panic in Kazakhstan, especially
when he spoke in the spring of 2014 of "Eurasian integration."3 54 In
speaking to a Russian audience in late August, 2014, Putin declared that
historically there had never been a Kazakh state, but associated its present
success with the aging Nazarbayev.3 5 5 The on-going survival of Kazakhstan
was, the implication was clear, tied to the continued good health of a
septuagenarian ruler and that was about all. He went on to praise the
345. Id.
346. Ben Farmer, Putin Will Target Baltic Republics Next, UK Defence Minister Warns,
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 19, 2015.
347. Mary Gearin, British Defence Secretary Likens Putin's Russia to Islamic State,
AM/ABC.NET.AU, Feb. 19, 2015.
348. Larisa Brown, Putin Could Threaten the Baltic States Says Minister, DAILY MAIL, Feb.
19, 2015.
349. Jon Stone, Britain 'At Mercy' of Putin in a War Against Russia, Former Defence Chiefs
Warn. Russian Aircraft Have Been Flying Near Britain's Airspace, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Feb.
20, 2015.
350. Russia Accuses British Defense Minister of Breaching 'Diplomatic Ethics', LATVIA
NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 19, 2015.
351. JACQUELINE MCLAREN-MILLER, DIASPORAS AND ETHNIC MIGRANTS: GERMANY,
ISRAEL, AND POST-SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 222, 235, (Rainer
Mfinz & Rainer Ohliger, eds., 2003).
352. BERTIL NYGREN, THE REBUILDING OF GREATER RUSSIA: PUTIN's FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS THE CIS COUNTRIES 180 (2008); Marlene Laruelle & Sebastien Peyrouse,
GLOBALIZING CENTRAL ASIA: THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 298 (2013).
353. FAULTLINES OF CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY, 307, 312. (The Rand Corp., 2002)
354. Putin's Dangerous Eurasian Idea, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, May 29, 2014.
355. Putin's Statements On Kazakhstan Send Concern Signal, TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA,
Sept. 2, 2014.
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importance of "Eurasian idea" 35 6 and suggested that Kazakhs remain on
their best behavior. 35 7 The threat was not well received by Kazakhs. 35 8
Even Finland has not been immune from Putin's belligerence and his
threats. Finland was occupied by Russia for much of the nineteenth
century. 35 9 Finland gained independence from Russia following World War
I, although Joseph Stalin invaded it from the East on the eve of World War
II.3 60 Much of the Karelian Peninsula, which has strong ancestral ties to
Finland, remains under the control of Russia today.361 During the Cold War,
Finland prudently remained neutral,3 62 but relations with its large neighbor
have often been tense.3 6 3
Within the last several years, Putin has increased Finnish tensions
considerably. As early as 2012, Putin threatened that Finnish sovereignty
might be at an end of Finland should join NATO. 364 At the end of March,
2014, Russia conducted war games on the Finnish border "involving more
than 50 fighter pilots." 36 5 At the same time, a former Putin advisor mused
that Putin might have an interest in an armed invasion of Finland.3 6 6 The
356. Id.
357. Ian Traynor, Kazakhstan Is Latest Russian Neighbour to Feel Putin's Chilly Nationalist
Rhetoric, GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 2014.
358. Thus a Kazakh blogger wrote: "This, then, is the thanks Kazakhstan receives for
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about succession issues, and a reminder of the lack of Kazakhstan's lack of historical legitimacy
with dark hints about a nationalistic threat that doesn't exist, but could very well turn self-
fulfilling." Registan.net, Sept. 12, 2014. Cf., Kazakh Pundit Says Russia's 'New-Imperialist
Rhetoric' 'Unacceptable', BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 27, 2014 (Rasul Zhumaly
declared that the attack on Ukraine "has given rise to anti-Russian sentiment in Kazakhstan");
Stephen Scourfield, Music of the Steppes, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 31, 2015 ("A well-educated
young Kazakh tells me quite simply: 'We don't want to join the Russian Union."'). Id.
359. For most of this period, 1809-1917, Finland was constitutionally termed the "Grand
Duchy of Finland" and enjoyed substantial authority both politically and economically. For a
history of this period, see JUHANI PAASIVIRTA, FINLAND AND EUROPE: THE PERIOD OF
AUTONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISES, 1808-1914 (1981).
360. The story of this War is briefly told, and its casualty statistics grimly recited, in Immi
Tallgren, The Finnish War-Responsibility Trial in 1945-6: The Limits ofAd Hoc Criminal Justice,
in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 430, 432 (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry
Simpson, eds., 2013).
361. Vladimir Kolossov & James W. Scott, Karelia: A Finnish-Russian Borderland on the
Edge of Neighbourhood, in THE EU-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND: NEW CONTEXTS FOR REGIONAL
COOPERATION 194, 198-207 (Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen, & James W. Scott, eds., 2013).
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Russians allowed that news to circulate unrefuted in the Western press. 36 7
Then in the summer of 2014, Putin invited the President of Finland to meet
with him. 36 8 Finland's President promised that he would try to be helpful in
bringing the Ukrainian crisis to a peaceful resolution36 9 while Putin
reminded him that the Finnish economy was at risk because of its
participation in EU sanctions against Russia. 37 0 And in the fall of 2014, the
military provocations resumed, with numerous "naval and airspace
incursions" involving Finnish and Swedish territory.3 7 1
Over the course of 2014, former Andrei Illarionov, who once served as
an economist in the Putin administration but today has an appointment as a
Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, described Putin's plans as amounting to
a restoration of Greater Russia: 'Putin's view is that he protects what
belongs to him and his predecessors . . . . Parts of Georgia, Ukraine,
Belarus, the Baltic States, and Finland are states where Putin claims to have
ownership. "'372 Putin's Deputy Prime Minister and former Russian
Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, even proposed that the Russian
sale of Alaska was invalid and that Alaska rightly belonged to Russia.3 7 3
Talk about Alaska, of course, is meant as a sideshow, a little bit of
burlesque in the midst of a serious crisis. Putin's real goal, it is now clear, is
the destruction of NATO. 374 This objective became evident in the fall of
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2014, as it became obvious Putin had serious designs on the Baltic States.3 7 5
The Baltic States are NATO's most inviting targets.3 7 6 In Estonia,
especially, there is a restive ethnic Russian minority, alienated from the
mainstream of Estonian life, who might find reunification with Russia
attractive. 37 7 There is every reason to believe that this weakness will be
exploited in the coming months. 37 8 Article 5 of the NATO Charter declares
that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all and calls
on all members to engage in common defense. If NATO does not rise to the
challenge, it is finished as an effective defensive alliance and Putin would
have a free hand to pursue his objectives across Europe. 37 9 It is significant,
therefore, that at end of 2014, Putin revised Russian military doctrine to
declare NATO Russia's principal enemy.3 8 0
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There are those who say that Vladimir Putin is inscrutable,
unpredictable, erratic. These descriptions in fact seem meant to be somehow
reassuring about Putin: his behavior is due to some temporary fit of
weirdness and he will soon return to his senses.
In fact, Putin's intentions are transparently clear. He has spent a decade-
and-a-half building a domestic culture of terror. He has used all the tools of
the assassin-bullets, poison, even radiation-to deal death to his enemies.
He first began to export this culture of terror abroad in 2005 with the
poisoning of Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko and then
with his seizure of Georgian territory in 2008.
His recent behavior is merely part of the same logical trajectory. His
appetite for conquest is reinforced by mystical ideas of "Greater Russia."
What was Russia's, will be Russia's again, this motto seems to be his
guiding light.
There is yet one more feature of Putin's culture of terror that must be
explored, and that is the most frightening element of all-his threat to make
use of nuclear weapons to have his way.
IV. VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE NUCLEAR TRIGGER
In the early 1990s, at the close of the Cold War, the greatest nuclear
worry emanating from Russia was the fear of "loose nukes"-the
possibility that poorly-protected nuclear arsenals, either in Russia or in the
neighboring states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus-might be
diverted.3 8 1 The fear, and it was a strong one, was that a separatist
movement, or a terrorist gang, or organized crime might use bribery or
other foul means to obtain nuclear material it could then use for illicit
purposes.382
The "loose nuke" crisis and its resolution reflected a period of
unprecedented Russian-American cooperation on the management of
Russia's nuclear arsenal.3 8 3 Funds were allocated by the American Congress
to help support safety and arms-reduction goals in Russia, and in actual
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fact, the program seems to have performed its essential tasks well. 38 4 It
seems that no nuclear material was diverted. Certainly, no nuclear material
was ever used in act of terror or belligerence anywhere in the world. 385
On the question of nuclear doctrine itself, in 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev
revised Soviet military policy to direct it towards the prevention of war. 386
A principal goal of the new Soviet doctrine was the reduction of "the threat
image perceived by the other side." 38 7 In 1985, Gorbachev and President
Ronald Reagan "jointly affirmed that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and
must never be fought."'
38 8
Russian nuclear doctrine did not vary greatly from this principle for
much of the 1990s. 38 9 By the end of 1999, however, with Vladimir Putin the
rising power in the Kremlin, shifts were becoming discernible. Instead of
viewing nuclear weapons as a last resort where national survival was at
stake, 3 90 nuclear doctrine was revised to reserve to Russia "[t]he use of all
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weaponry, means, subordination of politics to the interests of militarism"'). Id. (Quoting Mikhail
Gorbachev).
389. In October, 1993, in a concession to hard-liners following the violent suppression of a
coup attempt, Boris Yeltsin promised that he "would . . . rescind the unilateral 'no first use'
nuclear weapons pledge from the Gorbachev era." HALL GARDNER, NATO EXPANSION AND U.S.
STRATEGY IN ASIA: SURMOUNTING THE GLOBAL CRISIS 39 (2013).
390. Nuclear doctrine in the last years of Boris Yeltsin can be charitably described as
somewhat confused. In 1997, Yeltsin revised doctrine once again to permit the first use of nuclear
weapons where the survival of Russia was at stake. David Hoffman, Yeltsin Approves Doctrine of
Nuclear First Use IfAttacked, WASHINGTON POST, May 10, 1997. At the same time, he proposed
that Russia would no longer target NATO countries. Ann Scales, NATO, Russia Sign Pact With a
Flourish Yeltsin Reveals Nuclear Weapons No Longer Target Treaty Members, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 28, 1997. Two years later, in 1999, Yeltsin in a moment of bluster
threatened an upgrading of nuclear readiness when upset over NATO's intervention in Kosovo.
Yeltsin: Don't Push Us Towards Military Action, GUARDIAN, Apr. 9, 1999. His generals denied
the issuance of any such order.
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forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case
[Russia] needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of
resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective."391
Commentators immediately noticed that the revised doctrine struck a
far different nuclear posture from the Gorbachev/Yeltsin policy.392 Nikolai
Sokov wrote that Putin's doctrine now "allowed for the use of nuclear
weapons as a deterrence to smaller-scale wars that do not necessarily
threaten Russia's existence and sovereignty."393 Ian Traynor found
something else to worry about in the Putin's new pronouncement: He had in
another part of his statement "unequivocally declar[ed] the West a hostile
power that must be resisted."394
Furthermore, even while he said he would not increase his nuclear
arsenal, Putin promised from his first days in office to modernize and
upgrade it.395 And as if to underscore his altered focus, in 2001 Putin moved
tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, the former East Prussian city of
Kinigsberg, now a small Russian enclave set among the Baltic States and
geographically separated from Russia proper.396
In the years since, Putin has taken steps to build a nuclear arsenal with
what is known as intermediate force capability. At law, there is an obstacle
to such development. In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev
agreed to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,3 97 which called for
the elimination of cruise missiles and ground-launched inter-continental
ballistic missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 to
3,400 miles).3 98 In February, 2007, Putin indicated a desire to withdraw
391. Quoted in Nikolai Sokov, Russia's Nuclear Doctrine, NTI.ORG, (Aug. 1, 2004)
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-nuclear-doctrine/.
392. Bruce B. G. Clarke, Russia Reheats Cold War Stance, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 26, 2000.
393. Sokov, supra note 391.
394. Ian Traynor, Russia Raises Nuclear Threat: Russia, Special Report, GUARDIAN, Jan. 14,
2000.
395. Russia Possesses Powerful Nuclear Weapons Premier Putin, SINOCAST, Dec. 17,
1999; Ian Traynor, Putin Seeks Small, Better Nuclear Force: Russia, Special Report, GUARDIAN,
Apr. 1, 2000; and Report: Putin To Maintain Russian Nuclear Weapons Program, UPI NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2000.
396. Philip C. Bleek, Moscow Reportedly Moves Tactical Nuclear Arms to Baltics, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 33 Jan./Feb. 2001; Marcus Warren, Arms Move to Baltic Takes West By
Surprise, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 6, 2001. Establishing a pattern that would repeat itself
endlessly, Putin denied doing any such thing; Marcus Warren, Putin Denies Deployment of
Nuclear Weapons, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 8, 2001.
397. LISA A. BAGLIONE, To AGREE OR NOT TO AGREE: LEADERSHIP, BARGAINING, AND
ARMS CONTROL, 85-110 (1999);
398. The Treaty's text, terms, and an analysis of its provisions can be found in THOMAS
GRAHAM, JR., & DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 512-591 (2002).
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from the Treaty.399 The Americans, he said, had taken actions inconsistent
with its obligations by proposing to construct a missile defense in Eastern
Europe400 and there was additionally a need to deter growing Chinese
nuclear capability.40 1
Putin did not formally withdraw from the intermediate forces treaty,402
although the evidence is compelling that he has now developed a modem
and sophisticated arsenal of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It was
alleged in a letter to the Russian government in the summer of 2014 that as
far back as 2008, Russia began testing "a prohibited ground-launched cruise
missile."40 3 Without providing supporting documentation, the United States
Department of State subsequently declared categorically that "the Russian
Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to
possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile [within the
prohibited range]."404
There has been substantial speculation as to the types of missiles Putin
has been testing.405 Some have suggested that the Russians might have
modified the R-500 short-range cruise missile to a range that now falls
within the Treaty's prohibition.406 Others have guessed that Russia has
modified a sea-launched cruise missile for land-based deployment.4 07 in
399. Celeste A. Wallender, Russia: The Domestic Sources of a Less-Than-Grand-Strategy, in
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHANGE AND GRAND STRATEGY 139, 171 (Ashley J. Tellis & Michael
Wills eds., 2007).
400. In a speech delivered in Miinich on Feb. 10, 2007, Putin denounced the proposed
American missile shield in Eastern Europe as evidence of an American desire for global
domination. "'[T]he unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's
world."' Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, Russian Concerns on US Anti-Missile Shield,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 42, at 3698 (2007)(quoting Vladimir Putin). For
sympathetic analyses of Putin's position as articulated in 2007, consult Simon Jenkins, The West
May Yet Come to Regret Its Bullying ofRussia, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2007; and Ian Pryde, Russia
and the West Polar Opposites or Two Sides of the Same Coin? ORGANIZATION OF ASIA PACIFIC
NEWS AGENCIES, Mar. 10, 2007. For a negative Russian appraisal of Putin's aims, see Alexei
Arbatov, An Unnecessary and Dangerous Step: The Negative Consequences of Withdrawing
From the INF Treaty, DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Mar. 7, 2007.
401. See Wallender, supra note 399 at 171.
402. On the other hand, in July, 2007, Putin's government did announce "its intention to
suspend its obligations under the 1990 Treaty reducing conventional armaments in Europe."
MICHAEL KREPON, BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY: THE IRONIES OF LIVING WITH THE BOMB 153
(2009).
403. Michael R. Gordon, US. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2014.
404. United States Department of State, ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS
CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 8 (July,
2014).
405 Jeffrey Lewis, The Problem With Russia's Missiles, FOREIGN POLICY, July 29, 2014.
406. Id. Cf, Alec Luhn, Moscow Violated Cold War Nuclear Treaty With R-500 Missile Test,
Says US, THE GUARDIAN, July 30, 2014.
407. Amy F. Woolf, RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR
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response to the Department of State's allegations, Russia threatened to
withdraw from the Treaty.40 8
In September, 2014, Vladimir Putin issued a series of more direct
challenges. He reminded the world that "Russia is one of the most powerful
nuclear nations. This is a reality, not just words." 4 09 He test-fired an inter-
continental ballistic missile. 4 10 And he declared that Russia is, indeed,
working on new generation of "nuclear and conventional weapons." 4 1 1
This brings us to the question of the uses to which a modified and
updated nuclear missile force might be put. While there are those who
suggest that Russia's actions should be seen as essentially defensive in
character,4 12 Vladimir Putin's conduct and threats since 2008, however, are
inconsistent with a benign interpretation of intentions.
In February of 2008, as Ukraine deliberated whether to seek NATO
membership or to be included under the proposed American missile shield,
Vladimir Putin issued a series of provocative nuclear threats.4 13 Using street
slang,4 14 he promised to target Ukraine and other unspecified locations in
Europe should Ukraine dare to take these steps.41 5 For good measure, he
buzzed the American Pacific fleet with a strategic bomber.4 16
FORCES (INF )TREATY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Dec. 16, 2014.
408. Alec Luhn & Julian Borger, Ukraine: Arms Treaty In Peril, THE GUARDIAN, July 30,
2014; and Russia May Withdraw From INF Treaty, Lawmaker Says, ITAR-TASS, Aug. 14, 2014.
409. Michelle Jones, World War 3 Worries Loom Again After Russia's Comments, VALUE
WALK, Sept. 8, 2014.
410. Mary Gearin, Putin Fires Nuclear Missile: Russia's President Vladimir Putin Test-Fired
an Intercontinental Nuclear Missile Overnight, WORLD TODAY, Sept. 11, 2014.
411. Vladimir Isachenkov, Putin: Russia Developing New Nuclear, Conventional Weapons in
Response to Moves By U.S., NATO, CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 10, 2014. Cf, Putin Takes Control of
Russia's Defence Industries and Calls For New Weapons, EURONEWS, Sept. 10, 2014 ("President
Putin ... has personally taken command of Russia's defence industries and is calling for new
weapons"), id; Russian Rearmament Grows, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept.
15, 2014 (Russia "is planning its next long-range rearmament effort through 2025, focusing on
nuclear rearmament and long-range aviation platforms"). Id
412. STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, THE NEW NUCLEAR DISORDER: CHALLENGES TO DETERRENCE
AND STRATEGY 45 (2015) ("The sensitivity in Russia toward NATO or US actions in their former
Soviet space is not only political or military but it is based on the hard facts of geography ....
Russia [is capable of noticing] that NATO's air-land conventional deep-strike options are ...
impressive relative to Russia's ability to trade space for time"). Id.
413. Luke Harding, Putin Issues Nuclear Threat to Ukraine Over Plan to Host US Shield,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 2008.
414. Russian President Putin Goes Ballistic Against the West: Threatens to Point Missiles at
West, VANCOUVER PROVINCE (Canada), Feb. 15, 2008 (Putin used "invective [laced] with insults
and threats often expressed in the argot of the Russian street"). Id.
415. Mike Eckel, Putin: Russia Could Aim Nuclear Missiles at Ukraine If It Joins NATO,
CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 12, 2008; and Putin Threatens Ukraine With Nuclear Cross Hairs,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 13, 2008.
416. James A. Lyons, Jr., Putin Can't Have It Both Ways, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 24,
2008.
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In August, 2008, the nuclear threats were directed at Poland.4 1 7 "'By
deploying, Poland is exposing itself itself to a strike-100 percent,' warned
Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn."418 Russia also let it be known that it
would henceforth equip its Baltic fleet with nuclear weapons as a
countermeasure.4 1 9 The Economist suggested that Russia was trying to
replay the Cold War, but now looking for a different ending.4 2 0
The next year, in September, 2009, Russia and Belarus held a set of war
games, called zapad ("West") on the Polish border. The premise was that
Russia had been attacked by gangs of Lithuanian terrorists backed by
NATO and a military response was urgent.4 2 1 The games involved a large
array of Russian military assets-including new aircraft and computer
systems.4 2 2 Russian television covered the highlights.4 2 3 A main feature of
the games was a simulated nuclear attack by Russian forces on Warsaw.4 2 4
Poland, understandably, viewed the exercise as "another attempt at
intimidation."4 2 5
In 2010, Russia once again modified its nuclear doctrine. It defined
417. Harry de Quetteville & Andrew Pierce, Russia Threatens Nuclear Attack On Poland
Over US Missile Shield Deal, TELEGRAPH (UK), Aug. 15, 2008; Matthew Lee & Anne Gearan,
Russia Threatens to Nuke Poland, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Australia), Aug. 17, 2008.
418. Ian Traynor, Luke Harding, & Helen Womack, Moscow Warns It Could Strike Poland
Over US Missile Shield, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 15, 2008.
419. Mark Franchetti, Warhead Plan For Fleet in Baltic Sea, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 18, 2008;
and Russia's Baltic Fleet To Have Nuke Warheads To Counter US Defence Shield, HINDUSTAN
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008.
420. The West and Russia: Lights, Camera, and a Different Ending, THE ECONOMIST, Feb.
16, 2008. Cf, Out Of All Proportion: Russia's Threat of a Nuclear Strike Against a US. Defense
System in Poland Crosses a Dangerous Line, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 18, 2008 ("The
Russian government's position on the defensive missiles arises from something other than rational
concern for national security. The missiles do not carry highly destructive warheads; they would
not be effective against ground targets and are only good for shooting down incoming missiles.
The only way they would affect Russia would be for Russia to engage in aggression and launch a
missile strike against the United States or its allies"). Id
421 Robert Czulda, Russia-NATO: Towards a Partnership or a New Cold War, in NATO:
TOWARDS THE CHALLENGES OF A CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 2013 165, 177 (Robert Czulda &
Robert Lzo eds., 2013); and War Games: Jitters in Eastern Europe Over Russia's Military
Manoeuvres, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2009.
422. Nikolai Makarevich, ZAPAD - 2009: A Serious Test of Battle Preparedness, DEFENSE
AND SECURITY, Sept. 16, 2009; Active Phase of Russian-Belarusian Military Exercise Begins,
BBC INT'L REPORTS, Sept. 22, 2009; Russian Commentator Outlines Zapad 2009 Drill Goals,
Participating Assets, BBC INT'L REPORTS, Oct. 1, 2009; Russian Air Force Uses New Computer
System In Zapad-2009 Air Exercise, BBC INT'L REPORTS, Oct. 2, 2009.
423. Russian TV Upbeat On Cooperation, Team Play at Joint Drill in Belarus, BBC INT'L
MONITORING, Sept. 22, 2009; and Russian TVReports From Final Stage of Zapad-2009 Exercise,
BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Sept. 30, 2009.
424. Matthew Day, Russia 'Simulates'Nuclear Attack On Poland, TELEGRAPH (UK) Nov. 1,
2009.
425. Intel Brief Poland On Edge Over Russian Drills, ISN (International Relations and
Security Network, Zurich), Nov. 18, 2009.
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NATO, including attempts to expand NATO eastward, as its principal
external security threat.4 2 6 It declared that nuclear weapons remained an
important feature of its war-fighting capability.4 2 7 Nuclear weapons might
be employed, the document continued, in either a large-scale war or a
regional war, especially where the existence of the state was
"imperill[ed]."4 2 8 It stressed that "[t]he fielding of missile-defence systems,
again in direct proximity to Russia, poses an undoubted danger."4 2 9
NATO struck a conciliatory tone. Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared
that NATO had no hostile intentions.4 3 0 France, he pointed out, had "just
sold a Mistral assault ship to Russia."4 3 1 He insisted that NATO harbored no
hostile intent against Russia and had, in fact, invited Russia to consult with
it as NATO "prepar[ed] a new Strategic Concept."4 3 2 He noted that the
Obama Administration had been conciliatory on the subject of missile
defense and he invited Russia to become a part of a common missile
defense system.4 3 3
Even though there is an air of unreality to the 2010 iteration of Russian
military doctrine (Anders Fogh Rasmussen's conciliatory remarks neatly
captured the attitude of NATO, circa 2010), Russian nuclear saber-rattling
became pronounced in 2013 and 2014, as it ramped up for its aggression in
Ukraine.
Russia's Zapad military exercises for 2013 were perhaps the largest
since the end of the Cold War, involving maneuvers "from the Arctic to
Veronezh [in far Southern Russia].""' All branches of the service were
426. ("The main external military dangers are: the desire to endow the force potential of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the
norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO members countries
closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc"). Russian
Military Doctrine, February 5, 2010, Sec. 11.8 (a), (English translation on the website of the
Carnegie Endowment for World Peace).
427. Id at Sec. 11.16.
428. Id
429. New Russian Military Doctrine Mentions Future Use of High-Tech Weapons, Paper,
BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Feb. 10, 2010.
430. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Reaching Out to Russia, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Feb. 22, 2010.
431. Id
432. Id
433. Id ("I would very much like to see Russia integrated in a common U.S.-NATO-Russia
missile defense system"). Id At least some Russian analysts disagreed with the premises of the
doctrine. Dmitriy Travin, a scientific director of St. Petersburg European University Centre for
Modernization Studies gently mocked the doctrine's premises the "Georgian wolf' does not
pose a threat, and neither does Estonia. Travin concluded: "There is no more dangerous and
shortsighted policy for Russia than to see NATO as its principal enemy and for this reason rush
into all kinds of dubious antiwestern alliances"). See Russia's New Military Doctrine Looks For
Enemies in Wrong Direction Analyst, BBC INT'L REPORTS, Feb. 23, 2010.
434. Stephen Blank, What Do the Zapad 2013 Exercises Reveal? EURASIA DAILY MONITOR,
Oct. 4, 2013, available at http://www.jamestown.org
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involved - "land, sea, air, air defense and air bome - special forces
(Spetsnaz)."4 35 "Near-simultaneous war games occurred in Central Asia,
Mongolia, and the Pacific.4 36 The next month, in October, Russia conducted
nuclear exercises "involv[ing] launches of ballistic missiles [and] drills by
air defense and missile defense units."437
In late March, 2014, shortly after launching its invasion of Ukraine,
Russia conducted another nuclear exercise.438 In May, 2014, there was
another nuclear drill, and yet another one in September.4 39 A Russian
spokesman boasted that "the scale of air power involved was unprecedented
for exercises of this kind."440 The month of October, 2014, saw Russian
strategic bombers making practice nuclear runs off the coast of Great
Britain.44 1
Russian leadership also began to engage in provocative and
irresponsible nuclear threats.442 It was in the summer of 2014 that word
began to leak out that Vladimir Putin believed that he could prevail in a
nuclear war.443 Andrey Piontkovsky Russian mathematician and dissident
described what he believed was Putin's ultimate strategy: "'[I]n a more
volatile geopolitical situation, a nuclear power focused on changing the
existing status quo, enjoying the advantage of political will and indifferent
to the value of human lives (its own and others), and affected by a certain
adventurism, could achieve serious foreign policy results by the threat of
the application or the limited application of nuclear weapons."'
4 4 4
Putin, Piontkovsky stressed, was not suicidal. He would not fight a
nuclear war with the United States. 4 45 "Instead, his goals are 'significantly
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Zachary Keck, Russia Conducts Surprise Nuclear Readiness Drill, THE DIPLOMAT, Oct.
31, 2013.
438. Zachary Keck, Russia Military Begins Massive Nuclear War Drill, THE DIPLOMAT, Mar.
29, 2014; and Tomas Jivanda, Ukraine Crisis: Russia Carries Out Massive Nuclear War Exercise
Involving 10,000 Troops, INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 30, 2014.
439. Russia's Strategic Forces to Hold Major Exercise This Month, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept.
3, 2014; Zachary Keck, Russia To Conduct More Nuclear Drills, THE DIPLOMAT, Sept. 5, 2014.
440. Russia's Strategic Forces, supra note 439.
441. NATO Tracks Large-Scale Russian Air Activity in Europe, NATO ALLIED COMMAND
OPERATIONS, Oct. 29, 2014; Dave Majumdar, Dark Skies: Are Russian Bombers Flying Nuclear
Drills Near Europe-Or Just Testing NATO? THE DAILY BEAST, Oct. 30, 2014.
442. Beware the Rise of Putin the Terrible, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 4, 2014;
and Anne Applebaum, Is It 1939 Again in Europe? WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 31, 2014; and
Masha Gessen, Russians Love Their Children, Too But That Alone Won't Stop a Nuclear War,
("Most Western analysts have chosen to ignore the many ways Russia has found recently to
threaten the world with the potential use of nuclear arms"). Id.
443 WouldPutin Go Nuclear? PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REV., Sept. 5, 2014.
444. Paul Goble, Putin Believes He Can Win a War With NATO, Piontkovsky Says, Aug. 8,
2014 (quoting Andrey Piontkovsky), available at http//www.interpretermag.com
445 Id.
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more modest: the maximum extension of the Russian World, the destruction
of NATO, and the discrediting and humiliation of the US as the guarantor
of the security of the West.'446 in waging such a limited war, furthermore,
Putin would rely not on ICBMs but on "the first use of tactical nuclear
weapons in war."447
And that is where we stand, in mid-March, 2015, as I write this Article.
We are witnessing, on the part of NATO, an awakening to exactly the
gravity of this threat. Sir Adrian Bradshaw, NATO's deputy commander of
forces in Europe, has quite rightly stated that this crisis is an existential
moment for the western alliance.44 8 And, it is a relief to note, the alliance is
finally responding to the urgency of the moment. NATO has decided to
expand its rapid reaction from 13,000 troops to 30,000.449 It has also chosen
to create an elite "spearhead" unit of 5,000 troops for immediate
deployment in a crisis.4 50 Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of the European
Commission has raised the subject of a European Army.4 51 It is imperative
for many reasons that Europe achieve a greater level of political
integration4 52 and a European Army may serve that long-term goal as well
as the more immediate matter of addressing Russian aggression.
The United States is also rising to the military challenge posed by
Russian expansionism in Eastern Europe. A military convoy has been sent
on a "show-the-flag tour" of six East European countries.453 Large numbers
of soldiers and large quantities of supplies have now landed in Latvia to
"participate in multinational training exercises with Latvia, Estonia, and
446. Id. (Quoting Andrey Piontkovsky).
447. Russ Wellen, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus (fpif.org), Sept. 16, 2014.
448. Peter Walker, Russian Expansionism May Pose Existential Threat, Says NATO General,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 2015. U.S. General Ben Hodges has said much the same thing. See
Justin Huggler, Vladimir Putin Wants to Destroy NATO, Says US Commander in Europe Ben
Hodges, TELEGRAPH Mar. 4, 2015 ("'I am sure Putin wants to destroy our alliance, not by
attacking it but by splintering it,' [Hodges] said in a speech to military and political leaders in
Berlin"). Id.
449. NATO Rapid Response Force to Expand to 30,000 troops Stoltenberg, LATVIA NAT'L
NEWS AGENCY, February 5, 2015; NATO Due to More Than Double 'Rapid Response'Force in
Reaction to Ukraine, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, Feb. 5, 2015.
450. Defence Ministers Agree to Strengthen NATO's Defences, Establish Spearhead Force,
STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 6, 2015; and NATO To Establish New Spearhead Force,
PROGRESSIVE DIGITAL MEDIA NEWS Feb. 6, 2015.
451. Juncker Calls For Collective EU Army, DEUTSCHE WELLE EUROPE, Mar. 8, 2015; and
Brooks Tigner, European President Calls For a European Army, JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY, Mar.
11,2015.
452. Daniel Woker, A European Army? Mar. 16, 2015, available at
http//www.Interpretermag.org (exploring the connection between European common defense and
larger questions concerning European integration).
453. Brad Lendon, US. Army Sending Armored Convoy 1,100 Miles through Europe, CNN,
Mar. 14, 2015.
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Lithuania."4 5 4 American military hardware and personnel are now stationed
just yards from Russian territory in the Baltics.4 5 5 A Patriot anti-missile
battery, together with the crew to man it, has been moved to Poland.45 6
Ashton Carter, President Obama's nominee to serve as Secretary of
Defense, has declared his support for providing arms to the Ukrainian
military.4 5 7 Victoria Nuland has called for the creation of NATO command-
and-control centers in Bulgaria, Romania, and other nations of Eastern
Europe.4 5 8
And how has Putin responded? He destroyed the city of Debaltseve in
Ukraine with a savagery and barbarity unknown in Europe since the days of
World War II. Virtually every building in the city has been damaged or
destroyed.4 5 9 Some 40,000 people (out of a population of 45,000) have been
forced to flee.4 60 Dogs, it is said, have begun to eat the bodies of the
unburied dead.4 6 1 Whole classes of persons-Tatar Muslims who might
threaten the regime, and others who fall under suspicion of State Security-
are being abducted, tortured, and being made to disappear at alarming
rates.4 6 2
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11,2015.
458. NATO Must Install Command and Control Centers in All Six Frontline States Nuland,
UKRAINE GENERAL NEWSWIRE, Jan. 28, 2015; Bulgarian Defence Minister Details Plan to Set
Up NATO Command Centre, BBC INT'L REPORTS, Feb. 10, 2015; NATO Will Set Up Two
Command and Control Centers in Romania, ACT MEDIANEWS, Feb. 6, 2015.
459. Stefan Huijboom, Desperation, Destruction in Wake of Ukraine's Debaltseve Retreat,
KYIV POST, Mar. 12, 2015.
460. Tim McFarlan, Shocking Pictures Show Scale of Destruction Inside City Which Has
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461. Kiran Moodley, Dogs Ate Bodies in the Aftermath of the Battle For Debaltseve in
Ukraine, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 11, 2015.
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THE DAILY BEAST, Mar. 17, 2015; Olena Goncharova, Kremlin's Mercenaries Post Videos of
Captive Ukrainian Soldiers; Human Rights Activists Charge War Crimes Committed, KYIV POST,
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And Putin has renewed, once again, his threats against world order. He
has dispatched nuclear-capable strategic bombers to Crimea.4 6 3 He has sent
nuclear-capable cruise missiles to the Polish border.4 6 4 Dozens of aerial
provocations have been occurring along the European, British, and North
American coasts.4 6 5 Putin is conducting military exercises on a scale and
with a sophistication "not seen since the end of the Cold War."4 6 6 He has
proclaimed his readiness to use nuclear weapons openly, on Russian
television.4 6 7 When Denmark indicated a desire to be protected behind a
future missile shield, Mikhail Vanin, Russian Ambassador to Denmark,
threatened Danish shipping with tactical nuclear weapons.4 6 8 In a deliberate
provocation that may open to the door to further aggression, Putin's forces
abducted an Estonian military officer from Estonian territory.4 6 9
Will there be a war between the superpowers, a large war, one with
devastating consequences? 47 0 Some sober-minded and experienced minds
are beginning to contemplate that horrific thought. Michael Fallon, British
Defence Minister has said that Vladimir Putin, with his reckless words and
463. Russia Scrambles Nuclear Bombers to Crimea in Anniversary Show of Might, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH, Mar. 17, 2015; and Urgent: Crimea Bombers Transfer, ITAR-TASS,
Mar. 17, 2015 ("Strategic missile carriers TU-22MS will be transferred to Crimea in the course of
a surprise combat readiness inspection"). Id.
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INTEREST, Nov. 12, 2014. Cf. Thomas K. Grose, Vladimir Putin's Army Built To Reassert Russian
Influence In a Modern World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11, 2015 (Russia's Army
restructured "to fight so-called hybrid, or asymmetric wars that eschew full-scale assaults for
sleight-of-hand tactics, including fomenting insurgencies, covert and special-operations measures,
terrorism, cyberattacks, and propaganda"). Id.
467. Will Stewart, Putin's New Nuclear Threat: Russian Leader Nearly Started World War
Three Over the Crimea War, EXPRESS (UK), Mar. 16, 2015; and Larisa Brown, The New Cold
War: Putin Issues New Threat as NATO Chief Says Tensions with Russia Could End in 'All-Out
Conflict,' THE DAILY MAIL, Feb. 21, 2015.
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TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 21, 2015.
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prelude to aggression elsewhere in the region. Interview with Aija Krutaine, Anna Ringstrom, &
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deeds, has "'lowered the threshold' for using nuclear weapons."471 Retired
British commander of NATO forces Sir Richard Shirreff has warned that
Putin's conduct risks the "threat of total war."472 And that great and wise
man Mikhail Gorbachev, when asked whether "there could be another
major war in Europe" responded: "Such a scenario shouldn't even be
considered. Such a war today would inevitably lead to a nuclear war. But
the statements from both sides and the propaganda lead me to fear the
worst. If one side loses its nerves in this inflamed atmosphere, then we
won't survive the coming years."473
Thus has Putin's culture of terror brought us to the brink of the
unthinkable, a nuclear standoff where the risk of miscalculation is large.
International law, over the last two decades, has moved decisively in the
direction of delegitimizing even the threat of the offensive use of nuclear
weapons. Vladimir Putin's loose talk and his aggressive military posturing
are returning us to the dark days of an older generation, when nuclear
threats hung heavy over the planet. We must make sure such threats do not
emanate again from a world leader.
V. WHAT Is To BE DONE?
A. Russian Autocracy
To know what must be done we must take the measure of Putin the
man, for he is not only bringing the world to the brink of grave danger, he
threatens the well-being of his own nation. As I have written in another
context, he is a "radical, romantic conservative."47 It is not surprising,
therefore, that he is a Russian nationalist. He has presented himself as a
nationalist for many years,475 but his commitment to what he perceives to be
the spirit and the genius of the Russian people has recently taken on virulent
overtones.47 6
471. Adrian Croft, U.K. Concerned Over Threatening Russian Nuclear Strategy, REUTERS,
Feb. 6,2015.
472. Jason Beattie, Vladimir Putin's War Chiefs 'Could Go Nuclear,' Defence Bosses Have
Warned, MIRROR, Feb. 6, 2015.
473. Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, Former Leader of USSR, SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Jan. 16,
2015).
474. Charles J. Reid, Jr., A Radical, Romantic Conservative: Explaining Vladimir Putin,
FACTS AND ARTS (Helsinki), Apr. 3, 2014.
475. Writing as far back as the year 2000, Astrid Tuminez predicted that "it has become clear
that Russian nationalism will be an important feature of [Putin's] leadership." ASTRID S.
TUMINEZ, RUSSIAN NATIONALISM SINCE 1856: IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN
POLICY 297 (2000).
476. Mr. Putin Amplifies His Anti-Western Propaganda, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 13, 2014;
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STAR (Lebanon), Mar. 10, 2015..
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Historically, classically, in the age of the czars, Russian nationalism had
three pillars: an abstract idealization of the Russian nation; a central role for
the Orthodox Church; and the rule of one, the autocrat.4 7 7
Putin is now playing each of these chords. Kimberly Marten has called
attention to shifts in the way Putin speaks of the Russian nation. Rossiski, in
Russian, means inhabitants of the Russian state, regardless of ethnic origin.
Russki, on the other hand, refers to ethnic Russians.4 7 8 Putin, Martin points
out, has shifted his frame of reference from the capacious and inclusive
Rossiski to the ethnically more dangerous and divisive Russki. 47 9
Putin has explained his aggression in Ukraine as being in accord with
his vision of Russian nationalism. "Today, Russia's opposition to the West
has evolved as a purely nationalist project. Russia's military response to the
events in Ukraine is framed as a protection of 'ours'-and 'ours' are
Russian." 48 0 In his speech justifying his armed seizure and annexation of
Crimea, Putin explained himself in terms of nationalism: Crimea "has
always been an inseparable part of Russia" and it was thanks to the "will of
millions of our people, our national unity . .. [and] this patriotic spirit" that
Crimea has been brought back home. 481 A year later, on the first anniversary
of the takeover, Putin was playing the same tune, claiming that he could not
abandon Russian Crimea "to be crushed" by its enemies.4 8 2
More broadly, Putin has been playing the nationalist card for years.
Through near-monopoly control of the media, he has been able to construct
a whole historical narrative centered on the greatness of the Russian nation
and its grievances against the outside world.48 3 He has aroused the hate and
the chauvinism associated with the worst aspects of any form of
nationalism. 48 4 Chechens and other Muslim minority groups have been
477. Sean Cannady & Paul Kubicek, Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism: A
Comparison ofNicholas land Vladimir Putin, 5 J. OF EURASIAN STUDIES 1,2 (2014).
478. Kimberly Marten, Vladimir Putin: Ethnic Russian Nationlist, WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
19, 2014.
479. Id It has been pointed out, however, that "[e]ven the term russki can be used in an
inclusive sense." Henry E. Hale, Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlin's Actions on
Ukraine, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 29, 2014.
480. Masha Lipman, Putin's Nationalist Strategy, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 2, 2014.
481. Full Text of Putin's Speech on Crimea, PRAGUE POST, Mar. 19, 2014. "Crimea," Putin
added, "is our common historical legacy." Id Putin gave lip service to the existence of other
nationalities in Crimea-Tatars, and ethnic Ukrainians but claimed that they would be happy
under Russian rule. Id And he promised that he would defend the interests of Russians wherever
they were in Ukraine. "Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine ....
Russia will always defend their interests." Id
482. Putin: Russia Could Not 'Abandon' Crimea, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 9,2015.
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singled out for hatred.4 8 5 Gays have become another target of the regime.4 86
So also has the West.4 8 7 An anti-western hysteria, it is safe to say, has swept
over Russia.4 8 8 Indeed, Putin is surfing a swelling wave of grievance even
now.4 89 Russia, credible observers testify, is veering perilously close to
fascism.4 9 0
Sadly, Putin has enlisted the Russian Orthodox Church in the ignoble
cause of Russian nationalism.4 9 1 And, tragically for the cause of Christianity
in Russia, the Church's hierarchy has joined the movement. Thus Patriarch
Kirill has lent support for Putin's actions in Ukraine and "[has] stood
shoulder-to-shoulder [with Putin] on other foreign issues."4 9 2 Rod Dreher,
the perceptive American Orthodox writer, rightly fears for his Church as it
embraces "uncompromising faith and patriotism" and endorses something
THE NATION, Nov. 1, 2013. Cf, ANDREW FOXALL, ETHNIC RELATIONS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA:
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485. EMMA GILLIGAN, TERROR IN CHECHNYA: RUSSIA AND THE TRAGEDY OF CIVILIANS IN
WAR 13 (2010); MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN, PUTIN'S WARS: THE RISE OF RUSSIA'S NEW
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Consequences, in COLOR STRUCK: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 459, 471
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489. Christopher Dickey, Kremlin Calling: Why Putin Did It, THE DAILY BEAST, Mar. 18,
2018.
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8, 2014, available at http://www.interpretermag.com,; and Owen Matthews, Igor Strelkov: The
Face ofRussia's Frightening Future, SPECTATOR, Aug. 30, 2014.
491. Joshua Keating, Russia Gets Religion: Is Vladimir Putin Trying to Build a New
Orthodox Empire? SLATE Nov. 14, 2014; Peter Pomerantsev, Putin's God Squad: The Orthodox
Church and Russian Politics, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 2012.
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Ukraine, REUTERS, Mar. 7, 2014.
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akin to "Holy War." 49 3 This unfortunate development, however, is entirely
in keeping with the ancient Russian nationalism of the czars which was
always predicated on a close unity between Church and State.4 94
The final element to the nationalist edifice Vladimir Putin is working so
hard to erect is "autocracy," the rule of the one. This component of Russian
nationalism dates officially to the reign of Nicholas I (1796-1855).495 Putin
has emphasized his autocratic rule in at least two different ways. First, he
has spent years developing an outsized cult of personality. 4 9 6 There are all
the pictures and poses of course-hunting, 4 97 and hang-gliding,4 98 and riding
bare-chested on horseback. 499 His birthday celebrations have also become
the stuff of legend. His most recent birthday, commemorated last October,
featured "[p]ro-Putin street murals in seven cities" and "[a]n exhibition
called 'The Twelve Labors of Putin . .. modeled on the myth of
Hercules."soo
He has constructed around his rule a kind of royal court of climbers and
sycophants seeking to enrich themselves.5 1 The independent oligarchs,
those with money who might have challenged Putin's primacy, have all
been jailed or murdered or exiled, 50 2 and all channels of wealth distribution
493. Rod Dreher, Russia's 'Orthodox Jihad, 'THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, Feb. 5, 2015.
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707 (2010). TOTALITARIANISM AND THE PERSONALITY CULT: 15 YEARS OF PUTIN's REIGN IN
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now run through his office.5 0 3 His is a court of "mass corruption."5 0 4 Putin is
now accounted one of the wealthiest men in the world.0 5 But those closest
to him profit handsomely also.50 6
But even while he has cornered the market on graft in Russia,5 0 7 Putin
has made himself publicly an indispensable figure.0 s He has no
successor.5 0 9 When, in March 2015 he disappeared from public view for ten
days, it touched off a storm of speculation. 10 What happens should he be
removed from office, or becomes ill, or is disabled? No one knows.511 After
all, he is the autocrat.5 12
B. Support For Liberal Democracy
Armed with this knowledge, we can start to outline an answer to the
question, "What is to be done?" We should begin with the premise that
liberal democracy represents the only way forward for Russia.5 13 Liberal
democracy may not thrill the passions like romantic nationalism, but in the
end it is a political order much closer to human nature. 5 14 The simple
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Jeffersonian ideal, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," has captured
imaginations around the world, and would find a welcome place in Russia
too.515
It was for this ideal that Boris Nemstov stood and for this dream that he
gave his life. 51 6 He died so that others might have the freedom to speak
openly, to criticize their government, and to choose their leaders freely,
without fear of death or reprisal.5 1 7 It was the same ideal of human rights
that moved the dissidents of the late-Soviet period.5 18 Thus Andrei Sakharov
stood for free speech and free elections, 51 9 and when Boris Yeltsin faced
down the coup that threatened to roll back the Gorbachev reforms, he did so
in the name of Russian liberty.52 0
A liberal democratic order has never really been tried in Russia. 52 1 Boris
Yeltsin pledged to uphold such an order but he encountered insuperable
difficulties. 52 2  His own grave shortcomings contributed to his
administration's failure.5 2 3 He drank too much,5 2 4 he was visibly out of
touch,5 2 5 and he was never able to exercise full control of his own
515. Thus David Deudney and G. John Ikenberry propose that the United States should
embrace a "grand strategy" of "democratic internationalism" and that that strategy should aim at
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government.5 2 6 The rise of the Russian kleptocracy also dealt a crippling
blow to the frail democracy that was beginning to take hold.52 7
Still, Russia has some of the main ingredients that might give rise to a
democratic order. It has a small and irrepressible civil society52 8 and an
exciting, daring creative class.52 9 It has an educated public, 5 30 and a citizenry
that is not afraid to express itself.5 31 It was, after all, a spontaneous mothers'
movement, spilling its grief about the waste of life in Afghanistan, that
helped bring that war to a close.5 32 Russia is also a multi-ethnic society. It is
a nation of many peoples, who might yet find common purpose in a
government that respects their traditions and their freedoms.5 3 3 Many
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groups, pursuing their projects privately and peacefully-work and family,
love of hearth and home-Russians of whatever ethnic heritage can
embrace this vision.5 3 4
The United States, however, should be careful in being too obvious in
supporting democracy in Russia for at least two reasons.5 3 5 First, given the
present anti-western hysteria, American efforts might be discredited simply
because they emanate from the United States.5 36 Secondly, however, and
more important, given the climate of murder and assassination that is found
at the highest levels of Russian society, the United States needs to ensure
that highly-motivated, highly-principled Russian citizens are not exposed to
the possibility of deadly retaliation.5 3 7
Still, there are positive ways the United States might contribute to
shaping the course of events. Simply providing access to information
unfiltered by Russian media would be a good start.5 3 8 Putin has expressed
his fear of a Maidan-style revolution in Russia. 5 39 And I frankly think that
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Minister, VOICE OF RUSSIA, May 23, 2014; and Anthony Cordesman, Russia and the 'Color
Revolution:' A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES (CSIS), May 28, 2014.
537. Melissa Block, Russian Democracy Activist Says Nemtsov Death a Major Turning Point,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 6, 2015 (interview with a Russian democracy activist who
predicts more assassinations).
538. Unfortunately, it is becoming more difficult to disseminate information. Russia is
increasing its control over the internet. See Natalie Duffy, Internet Freedom in Vladimir Putin's
Russia: The Noose Tightens, AEI RESEARCH, Jan., 2015; and Pavel Sharikov, Russian-American
Confrontation in the Age of the Internet, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER, Nov. 28, 2014. Russia has
canceled a foreign-exchange program that allowed Russian high school students to attend
American schools on the pretext that these students are exposed to positive information about gay
relations. See Alec Luhn, Russia Ends US Student Exchange In Part Over 'Friendly Relations' of
Gay Men, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2014. Unfortunately, the United States has also reduced
funding that would allow Russians to study in America. Pavel Koshkin, The Uncertain Future of
U.S.-Russia Educational Exchanges, RUSSIA DIRECT, Nov. 5, 2014.
539. Katrin Hille & Neil Buckley, After Nemtsov: Anti-Maidan Movement Creates Climate of
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such a revolution is possible. It is certainly desirable. We saw a protest
movement briefly flourish during the 2012 Russian presidential election.540
Why, in the last resort, not support democracy, given the obvious failure of
every other form of government in Russia, including most recently
Putinism?541
C. Economic Sanctions
Related to these efforts at the promotion of democratic institution-
building, the United States should tighten the circle around Vladimir Putin's
wealthy associates.542 Thus far, the United States has imposed sanctions on
approximately 140 or so named individuals and a significant number of
businesses54 3 while the EU has acted against slightly more than 150 named
persons and more than 30 businesses and other joint ventures.544 Many of
the affected individuals constitute Putin's closest advisers and persons who
have been greatly enriched during their time in office.545 Other sanctions
have targeted specific types of economic activity, such access to
international credit markets.546
Fear in Russia, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015; Adam Michnik, Putin Has Big Fear of Maidan-
Style Protests in Red Square, CHARTER97, Jan. 6, 2015; Scholar: Putin's Biggest Fear Is a
Maidan In Moscow, EurActiv.com, Mar. 24, 2014; and Matthew Kaminski, Why Putin Fears
Ukraine: It's an Alternative Russia, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 7,2014.
540. See, for instance, Sergei L. Loiko, In Russia, Thousands Protest Presidential Election
Results, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012; Haroon Siddique & Ben Quinn, Hundreds Detained After
Moscow Anti-Putin Protest, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2012; Martha Wexler, Moscow Protesters
Demand a 'Russia Without a Putin, 'NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 6, 2012; and Will Stewart &
Mark Palmer, 'The Result Was Never Really In Doubt:' Observers Say Putin's Win Was a Sure
Bet, as Tens of Thousands Flood Into Moscow For Mass Protests, DAILY MAIL, Mar. 7, 2012.
541. See, for instance, Sharon L. Wolchik, Putinism Under Siege: Can There Be a Color
Revolution? 23 J. OF DEMOCRACY 63-70 (July, 2012) (suggesting ways in which the Putin regime
might succumb to a democratic movement).
542. Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions, BBC NEWS EUROPE, Dec. 19, 2014 (identifying
members of Putin's inner circle, their wealth, and how sanctions have affected them).
543. The scope of American sanctions against individuals and businesses is set forth in a
series of four executive orders. See Executive Order 13685 (Dec. 19, 2014), 79 FED. REGISTER
(2014), 77357-59; Executive Order 13662 (Mar. 20, 2014), 79 FED. REGISTER (2014), 16169 71;
Executive Order 13661 (Mar. 16, 2014), 79 FED. REGISTER (2014), 15535-38; and Executive
Order 13660 (Mar. 6, 2014), 79 FED. REGISTER (2014), 13493-95. The Department of Treasury
has periodically issued lists of names of persons and businesses subject to sanctions and the names
can be gleaned from a variety of public sources, including the Department of Treasury website.
544. The most recent list as this Article is being completed is dated February 16, 2015, and is
found on the website of the Council of the European Union.
545. See, for instance, Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions, BBC NEWS EUROPE, Dec. 19,
2014 (identifying members of Putin's inner circle, their wealth, and how sanctions have affected
them).
546. Matt O'Brien, Remember Russia? It's Still Doomed, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 27, 2015;
Henry Foy, Sanctions On Russia: The All-Round Impact, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015; and
Greg Satell, Here's How Obama's Russia Sanctions Will Destroy Vladimir Putin, FORBES, Apr.
28, 2014.
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We should hold firm in this sanctions regime. Economists and
international lawyers have often debated the effectiveness of sanctions. 54 7
Many dispute their utility.5 48 Still, it appears that these sanctions have had
an impact on the Russian bottom line 9.54 Thus, since Russia has found it
very difficult to obtain international finance, business ventures are
struggling.5 o One of the biggest threats to the current round of sanctions,
however, is the opposition found to them in some comers of the European
Union.5 Only a unified front can make sanctions work, and it would be
preferable to employ only those sanctions for whose application general
agreement can be obtained. Fortunately, a united front seems to be
coalescing.552
But this may not be the end of the story. The great question about
sanctions concerns the next step to take in the event of future Russian
aggression. Consider: If Putin, for instance, moves against a member-state
of NATO, it would seem that Russia must be subjected to the severest
forms of sanctions. And I would include among those sanctions the
547. See, for instance, DAVID ROBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND CONFUSING
POLITICS 92 (2006) (citing research indicating the frequent failure of sanctions regimes only to
offer a qualification: "Trade sanctions are only an effective instrument for very large economies,
such as the US or EU, where to deny access can cause pain"). Id.
548. See, for instance, Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L
SECURITY 90-136 (1997) (examining a number of sanctions regimes to conclude that their track
record of success is ambiguous at best).
549. The impact seems to have been felt primarily through the declining value of the ruble on
international exchanges. See, for instance, Global Carmakers Suspend Supplying Russia On Ruble
Slide, http//www.RT.com, Mar. 19, 2015; Lyubov Pronina, Top Russian Ruble Forecaseter Sees
Fresh Run at Record Lows, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 11, 2015; Tim Worstall, The Russian Sanctions Are
Working: That's What Is Hitting the Ruble, FORBES, Dec. 17, 2014; and James Miller, It's Not
Just Oil and Sanctions Killing Russia's Economy: It's Putin, http//www.interpretermag.com, Dec.
16, 2014.
550. Priyanka Boghani, What's Been the Effect of Russian Sanctions On Russia? FRONTLINE,
Jan. 13, 2015; Irina Reznik, Evgenia Pismennaya, & Ilya Arkhipov, Putin Clans Said Gridlocked
Over Arrest as Sanctions Bite, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 5, 2014 ("Russia's wheels of power are
grinding to a halt"). Id.
551. Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, has not only criticized the sanctions, he
has taken steps to enter into trade deals with Russia. See, for instance, Hungary Eyes Closer Ties
With Russia, DEUTSCHE WELLE WORLD, Feb. 2, 2015; Hungary Seals Gas Deal With Russia on
Putin Visit, ENERGY MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Feb. 18, 2015; and Putin Shows He Still Has a
Friend in Europe With Visit to Ally In Hungary, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Feb. 18, 2015. Czech
Republic President Milos Zeman has also criticized European sanctions. Sanctions Are Not Good
For EU, Russia, Zeman Says, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 13, 2015. Zeman, however, has
encountered substantial domestic opposition in this view. Over 10,000 People Sign Petition
Against Zeman, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 4, 2015 (reporting on a popular petition drive to
force Zeman to resign or to have him impeached for his support of Vladimir Putin).
552. It seems, it should be added, that even in the face of some internal pressure, the
European Union has resolved to remain firm in its sanctions policy. See Adrian Croft & Elizabeth
Pineau, EU Agrees Russia Sanctions to Stay Until Ukraine Peace Terms Met, REUTERS, Mar. 19,
2015.
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comprehensive expropriation of Russian assets in the West.5 53
D. Diplomacy: China and India
The Western alliance should also be active in building the largest
international united front possible. It is in the interest of the world not to
permit aggression to stand, and this must become the message the United
States and European powers should take the world.
For a variety of reasons, the most important international player yet to
commit itself on the Russian crisis is China. 554 An historical analogy might
help in recommending a diplomatic course to follow where China is
concerned. Granted, no historical comparison is perfect, nevertheless, this
one may be instructive. The Chinese ruling class in the early twenty-first
century bears resemblance to the British ruling class of the mid-nineteenth
century. Like the British ruling class, the Chinese leadership is faced with a
restive population.555 Like England in the mid-nineteenth century, China has
experienced explosive economic growth but the benefits of that growth
have been felt very unevenly.556 Chinese leadership recognizes that their
prime concern must be economic well-being and prosperity557 and it keenly
appreciates that its economic success is intimately connected with internal
stability and trade abroad.
553. It would be comparable to the American freezing of Iranian assets in the aftermath of the
seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran. ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1-3
(1994).
554. See, for example, Leslie H. Gelb & Dimitri K. Simes, Beware Collusion of China,
Russia, THE NAT'L INTEREST (July/August 2013); Virginia Marantido & Ralph A. Cossa, China
andRussia's Great Game in Central Asia, NATIONAL INTEREST, Oct. 1, 2014; and Artyom Lukin,
Why the Russian Far East Is So Important to China, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 12, 2015, for a sense
of the range of issues implicated in the China-Russia relationship.
555. See, for example, Tom Orlik, Unrest Grows as Economy Booms, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Sept. 26, 2011; Frank Langfitt, Chinese Farmers Revolt Against Government Land
Grab, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 5, 2013; Ann Lee, Civil Unrest Would Be Devastating For
the World Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2013; and Unrest In Hong Kong: It's Not Over, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2014.
556. See, for example, Li Wenpu & Gong Min, China's Growth Model and Structural
Imbalance in the Open Economy, 77 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 37-54 (2013); Damian
Tobin, Inequality in China: Rural Poverty Persists as Urban Wealth Balloons, BBC NEWS
BUSINESS, June 29, 2011; Michael Sainsbury, After 90 Years, the Party Struggles to Keep
Control, AUSTRALIAN, July 2, 2011; Kevin Voigt, New Leaders Face China Wealth Divide, CNN,
Nov. 15, 2012; and The Chinese Dream For Higher Education and the Dilemma It Presents,
EDUCATION MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Dec. 17, 2014.
557. Liang Fook, China's External Relations and Global Governance: Introduction, in
CHINA: DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE 393, 395 (Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian eds.,
2013); and XIAOGIN GUo, STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
CONFUCIANISM, LENINISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 132 (2003).
558. Weixing Chen, Political Leadership in China in the Twenty-First Century, in THE
ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 259, 262-63 (Joseph Masciulli,
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We can continue the historical comparisons. What was British strategy
in the nineteenth century? Primarily, it seems, Britain assumed the role of
the globally responsible enforcer of order.55 9 It committed itself
diplomatically to maintaining a balance of power on the European
Continent. 56 0 It employed its navy to keep sea lanes open561 and to perform
the occasional morally good deed, like suppressing the slave trade. 56 2 It
grounded its economic policy on global free trade.56 3 And while Britain
fought its share of small wars 56 4 and was as immersed in colonialism as any
of the other European powers,5 6 5 Britain succeeded in keeping the world
safe from catastrophic war, such as was fought by Napoleon and his
opponents for most of a century.5 6 6
How, then, will China see its global responsibility? So far, it seems,
China is taking a rather too narrow and opportunistic view of the crisis
brought on by Vladimir Putin. China is sensing the chance to do business.
Thus China has purchased large quantities of natural gas and petroleum
from Russia. 567  China and Russia have signed long-term purchase
agreements for future delivery of natural gas. 56 8 The two nations may soon
start construction on a natural gas pipeline between the two states. 56 9 Russia
Mikhail A. Molchanov, & W. Andy Knight eds., 2009); Jian Yang, China's Security Strategy and
Policy, in ASIAN SECURITY REASSESSED 86, 101-02 (Stephen Hoadley & Jargen Riland eds.,
2006).
559. Jirgen Osterhammel, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 455 (2014); G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE
ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 16 (2011).
560. MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY 137-45 (1996).
561. ANDREW S. THOMPSON, IMPERIAL BRITAIN: THE EMPIRE IN BRITISH POLITICS, C. 1880 -
1932 131 (2000).
562. LAWRENCE SONDHAUS, NAVAL WARFARE: 1815-1914 2 (2001).
563. RICHARD PRICE, BRITISH SOCIETY, 1680-1880: DYNAMISM, CONTAINMENT, AND
CHANGE 88 (1999).
564. Andrew Porter, Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century, in 3
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1, 10 (Andrew Porter
ed., 1999).
565. DAVID FRENCH, THE BRITISH WAY IN WAR, 1688-2000 141 (2015).
566. NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND
THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER 304 (2002).
567. China Buys Record Russia Crude as Putin Seeks to Avoid Recession, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Dec. 22, 2014; Oil, Natural Gas Sales Made Up 68 % of Russia's Export Revenues,
http//www.oilonline.com, Dec. 23, 2014; Russia Pumps Up Sales of Oil to Asia, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Feb. 17, 2015.
568. Russia Signs 30-Year Gas Deal With China, BBC NEWS BUSINESS, May 21, 2014; Eric
Yep, New Russia-China Deal Could Further Hit Natural Gas Prices, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Nov. 10, 2014; and Wayne Wilson, To Survive, Putin Is Mortgaging Russia's Energy Assets to
China, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2015.
569. Russia and China Launch Gas Pipeline, BBC NEWS BUSINESS, Sept. 1, 2014; and
Daniel J. Graeber, Planning Under Way For Gazprom's Power of Siberia Pipeline, UPI, Feb. 13,
2015. But see now Denis Pinchuk, Svetlana Buristrova, & Katya Golubkova, Exclusive: Russia
Could Postpone Gas Pipe To China Touted By Putin Sources, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2015.
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has also begun work on a high-speed bullet train that will allow passengers
to travel between Beijing and Moscow in just forty-eight hours.570 On a
different note, China has signed currency agreements with China that have
helped stall the precipitous decline in the value of the Russian ruble. 571
China has purchased military hardware from Russia 572 and have engaged in
joint military exercises.573
It is said that President Xi Jinping of China has a fondness for Vladimir
Putin's authoritarianism. 574 President Xi, it is further asserted, is troubled by
western-style freedom of expression and the messiness of doing business in
such an environment.575 Putin, in contrast, to Western leaders, is someone
whose style he recognizes and understands. 576 But perhaps President Xi has
ulterior motives in building a relationship with Russia. He may, in fact, see
Russia as approaching failed-state status and he could well foresee China
developing an increasingly hegemonic position over the Eurasian
landmass. 577 Doubtless, an awareness of China's large territorial claims over
570. Stefano Pozzebon, Russia Is Building a Train That Will Zip From Moscow to Beifing in
Just 48 Hours, SLATE, Jan. 3, 2015; and Michael Arnold, China, Russia Plan $242 Billion
Beifing-Moscow Rail Link, Jan. 22, 2015, available at http//www.Bloomberg.com.
571. China Offers Russia Help With Currency Swaps, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 21, 2014;
and Wayne Arnold, China Plays Long Game With Ruble Deal, http://online.barrons.com, Dec. 29,
2014.
572. Harry Kazianas, Why Would Russia Sell China Su-35 Fighter Jets? THE DIPLOMAT,
Nov. 19, 2013; China To Receive Russian S - 400 Systems In Exchange For Political Support,
http//www.pravda.ru, Nov. 28, 2014.
573. Jamil Anderlini, China and Russia in Naval Co-operation Vow, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov.
19, 2014; Fred Weir, Russia, China Plan War Games, Arms Sales. Could Alliance Be in the
Cards? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 21, 2014; and Matthew Bodner, Russia-China
Military Ties Deepen Amid Western Pressure Over Ukraine, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014.
574. Yang Henjun, Why Xi Jinping is China's Putin, THE DIPLOMAT, July 15, 2014; and
Leonid Bershidsky, The Vladimir Putin School ofLeadership, BLOOMBERG VIEW, Aug. 5, 2014.
575. Kristian McGuire, Xi Is Leading China Away From Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5,
2015; China Universities 'Must Shun Western Values,' BBC NEWS CHINA, Jan. 30, 2015; and
Simon Tisdall, Chinese Repression of Dissent Intensifies Under Ruthless Xi Jinping, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 30, 2014.
576. Peter Baker, As Russia Draws Closer to China, U.S. Faces a New Challenge, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2014; Tom Philips, Xi Jinping: The Growing Cult of China's 'Big Daddy Xi,'
TELEGRAPH (UK), Dec. 8, 2014.
577. Zachary Keck, China Powers 'Two World' Economy, THE DIPLOMAT, Jan. 12, 2013;
Ilan Berman, Russia, Poised For Failure, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2013; Paul Goble, Russia, Not
Ukraine, Is a Failed State, Shteppa Says, interpretermag.com, May 8, 2014; Ivan Sukhov, Russia
Showing Signs of 'Failed State,' BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Dec. 7, 2014; and Jon Basil
Utley, Libertarians and Putin's Catastrophic Corruption: Russia Risks Becoming a Chaotic
Failed State.'Here's How We Should Respond, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, Jan. 2, 2015. Putin it
seems, also senses that this is a real possibility. David Tweed, Why Putin Fears China,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Feb. 15, 2015; Josh Cohen, Putin's Fear of China Weakens Russia's Asia
Pivot, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014. Cf, Richard Weitz, Putin's Grand Plan For Asia,
THE DIPLOMAT, Mar. 13, 2012 ("The reality is ... Putin and other Russians fear becoming
China's junior partner in world affairs"). Id.
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Siberia is lodged firmly the backs of both men's minds.578
This would be opportunism on a grand scale, to be sure, but it would be
preferable for China if it acted as a responsible partner in the larger world
community and began to trim its economic contacts with Russia for the
duration. Vladimir Putin, with his reckless nuclear threats and cross-border
aggression is destabilizing the international order. By helping to curb
violations of the global order, China might become a force for stability on
the world stage and thereby become the West's co-equal partner. This is an
opportunity China should not want to miss.
Next, there is the matter of India. At the moment, India has continued to
do business with Russia and seems unconcerned with Russian aggression in
the West.57 9 India's new president, Narendra Modi, has been compared to
Vladimir Putins.5 " Aside from matters of personality, there are strong
historical reasons to explain India's close ties with Russia. During the Cold
War, even though India was officially nonaligned, it tilted towards Moscow
in its diplomacy and politics. 8 ' Even today, Russia remains a principal arms
supplier to the Indian military.582
Still, there are strong reasons India why should now consider a pivot
towards the West where Russia is concerned. The Indian leadership is well
aware that theirs is a dangerous neighborhood.583 Pakistan, which is not
only a neighboring state but a nation that has gone to war with India several
times since the 1940s, is a nuclear power.584 Russia has now begun to sell
578. Frank Jacobs, Why China Will Reclaim Siberia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2015; Peter Zeihan,
Analysis: Russia's Far East Turning Chinese, ABC NEWS, July 14, 2014; and Rod Dreher, How
Will Russia Lose Siberia to China? THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, July 7, 2014.
579. Ahmad Masood, India To Negotiate Free Trade Zone With Russia-Led Customs Union,
RT BUSINESS, Feb. 26, 2015; and Carol J. Williams, Outcast Russia Turns to Cold War Ally India
For New Billions In Trade, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014.
580. Jason Burke & Shaun Walker, Putin and Modi Have Much In Common, Say Aides Ahead
ofSummit, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2014; and Peter Eltsov, India's Mystery Man: Narendra Modi
Is a Little Too Close To Vladimir Putin For Comfort, POLITICO MAGAZINE, Oct. 5, 2014.
581. SERGEY RADCHENKO, UNWANTED VISIONARIES: THE SOVIET FAILURE IN ASIA AT THE
END OF THE COLD WAR 88-102 (2014); and Artemy M. Kainovsky, The Cold War in South and
Central Asia, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE COLD WAR 178, 181-89 (Artemy M.
Kalinovsky & Craig Daigle eds., 2014).
582. Douglas Busvine & Denis Dyomkin, Modi To Putin: Russia To Stay India's Top
Defence Partner, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 2014; Allan Smith & Armin Rosen, Here's Why Russia Has
Sent $13 Billion Worth of Weaponry to India In Recent Years, BUSINESS INSIDER, Aug. 14, 2014;
and Harsh V. Pant, India's Arms Acquisition: Devoid of a Strategic Orientation, in THE GLOBAL
ARMS TRADE: A HANDBOOK 65, 68-69 (Andrew T.H. Tan ed., 2010).
583. Adnan R. Khan, The Most Dangerous Place in the World: On the Pakistan-India
Border, Two Nuclear Powers Are Quietly Edging Closer to War, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 25, 2014.
584. Jeffrey Goldberg & Marc Ambinder, The Ally From Hell, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 28, 2011;
and Seymour M. Hersh, Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads
Be Kept Safe? THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 16, 2009.
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advanced weaponry to Pakistan.8 5 Russia, in other words, is flailing,
turning everywhere it can to find ready cash. That alone should be reason
enough for India to consider pivoting Westward. But there is yet another,
stronger reason. India is at particular risk should Putin succeed in lowering
the nuclear threshold given its unreliable next-door neighbor, Pakistan. It is
in India's compelling interest to maintain the strongest possible taboo on
even loose talk about nuclear war. And restraining Vladimir Putin is a good
place to start.
E. European Economic Integration
If Vladimir Putin can be said to have a strategy where Ukraine is
concerned, it has been to cripple that state politically and economically. 58 6
He has waged war against it, dismembered it, and means to keep it engaged
in an expensive, draining state of low-level hostilities. 58 7 He intends, in
other words, to wreck that nation.8 8 It is a strategy that one can well
imagine Putin might repeat in other eastern European nations, such as the
Baltic states, or Georgia.5 8 9
It is therefore imperative that these nations be made into economically
thriving, western-oriented success stories. In the spring and summer of
2014, it appeared as if the economy of Ukraine might have been
irretrievably damaged. 59 0 Today, the International Monetary Fund predicts
that Ukraine might enter economic recovery in 2016 although it has
cautioned that much depends on whether Russia resumes its hostilities. 591
We should assume the worst: IMF predictions of recovery have proven
notoriously unreliable in many places 59 2 and Putin is likely to do his best to
585. Russia Lifts Embargo On Arms Supplies to Pakistan, ITAR-TASS, June 2, 2014; Matthew
Bodner, Russia Signs Landmark Military Cooperation Agreement With Pakistan, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014; Tim Craig, As Obama Visits India, Pakistan Looks to Russia For Military,
Economic Assistance, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 28, 2015.
586. Adrian A. Basora & Aleksandr Fisher, Putin's 'Greater Novorossiya:' The
Dismemberment of Ukraine, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, May, 2014; Chrystia
Freeland, Putin's Goal Is To Dismember Ukraine, KYIV POST, Mar. 18, 2014.
587. Ukraine Economy: How Bad Is the Mess and Can It Be Fixed? BBC NEWS BUSINESS,
May 1, 2014; and War In East Ukraine To Leave Economy In Ashes: Who Will Pay For
Recovery? http//www.RT.com, Aug. 21, 2014.
588. Michael Kofman, Putin's Grand Strategy For Ukraine, NATIONAL INTEREST, Apr. 25,
2014; and No Sign Putin Has Changed Strategy on Ukraine: UK Foreign Minister, REUTERS,
Mar. 8, 2015.
589. Paul Goble, Putin's Strategy In Ukraine Sow Panic, Provoke, Invade, and Then Repeat
the Process, http//www.interpretermag.com, Nov. 3, 2014.
590. Why the Ukrainian Economy Is In Deep Trouble, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2014.
591. New Figures Show Ukrainian Economy Shrank 6.8 % in 2014, UKRAINE TODAY, Mar.
20, 2015.
592. An IMF self-study concluded that IMF predictions of economic recovery "have tended
to be consistently over-optimistic in times of country-specific, regional, and global recessions."
Vladimir Putin's Culture of Terror: What is to be Done?
frustrate any return to normalcy in Ukraine. 593
The West should therefore be aggressive in providing financial
assistance to Ukraine. The International Monetary Fund has pledged
assistance, 59 4 although it is likely the assistance is inadequate to the task.595
The United States has now also agreed to guarantee a new Ukrainian bond
issuance. 596 George Soros has made the case for greater aggressiveness in
tackling Ukraine's economic crisis. 597 Soros has pointed out that democratic
reforms have taken firm hold in Ukraine and that a spontaneous volunteer
movement is hard at work trying to rebuild the country. 598 Financial support
is required for the success of this project. For Soros, "[n]ot only the future
of Ukraine but also the future of the EU itself is at stake." 59 9
I fully agree with Soros and stress that the frontline states of Eastern
Europe require the kind of assistance that was once provided war-
devastated Europe in the wake of World War II. Something akin to the
Marshall Plan would not be out of place.6 0 0 The historical moment is right
for such boldness. Politically, these nations now know that their future lies
with the West.6 0 1 The West should use the cement of generous financial aid
to make that bond permanent.
Today, what is remembered about the Marshall Plan is its success. But
Hans Genberg & Andrew Martinez, On the Accuracy and Efficiency oflw Forecasts: A Survey
and Some Extensions, IEO Background Paper, Feb. 12, 2014.
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at the time, it was met with all the usual objections-it was too costly, it
would lead to higher taxes, it would stifle American growth, and it would in
the end fail to stimulate European recovery.602 Of course, we now know the
opposite to have been true and that the Marshall Plan was indispensable to
economic recovery in Western Europe.603
West Germany in particular experienced an economic recovery that
came to be called the "German miracle." 604 The time has come for Germany
to "pay it forward." 60 5 Fortunately, Angela Merkel has now taken the
measure of Vladimir Putin and she seems ready to confront the aggression
that is being waged against another European nation.606 The United States,
Germany, and the wealthy states of Western Europe, Britain, France, the
Scandinavian nations, should form a coalition of the generous and put
together an economic rescue package equal to the one that saved Post-
World-War II Europe.607
Moving beyond the urgent matters of the moment, Europe must act
quickly to integrate Ukraine and the other frontline states within the great
European umbrella organizations. Some welcome first steps have, it must
be noted, been taken in this regard. In March, 2014, Ukraine and the
European Union executed the political portion of an Association Agreement
between the two entities. 608 On June 27, 2014, Ukraine and the European
Union executed the economic part of this Agreement. 609 The Agreement has
602. MARK S. BYRNES, THE TRUMAN YEARS, 1945-1953 43-44 (2014)(reprint of 2000
edition); MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE (1987); and Harold L. Hitchens, Influences On the
Congressional Decision to Pass the Marshall Plan, 21 WESTERN POL. QUARTERLY 51, 51 (1968).
603. JOHN GIMBEL, THE ORIGINS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 4-5 (1976); and JAMES DOBBINS,
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604. THOMAS GEORGE WEISS, ET AL., U.N. VOICES: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 158-61 (2005); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, WORLD ECONOMIC PRIMARY,
1500-1990 167-69 (1996); and ROBERT A. DEGEN, THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM 185-86 (2008).
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Douglas Ernst, Merkel On Putin: He Acts the Way He Does to Prove He Is a Man,' THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014; and Putin 'Sabotaging Next-Door States:' Merkel Accuses
Russian President of 'Creating Problems' For Countries that Want Closer Ties With the EU,
DAILY MAIL, Dec. 7, 2014.
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POSTMEDIA NEWS (Canada), June 27, 2014. Moldova and Georgia executed free-trade agreements
with the European on the same day. See Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and EU Sign Free Trade
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been speedily ratified by the European Parliament and individually by most
of the Union's members.6 1 0
Russia raised a number of objections to the ratification and also
threatened Ukraine with loss of access to natural gas supplies. 6 1 1 To
accommodate Russia, implementation of Title IV, which deals with the sale
of goods, was delayed until the end of 2015.612 In light of continuing
Russian aggression against Ukraine, however, I believe that the EU should
move promptly to implement this Title today.6 1 3 Russian bad faith is
palpable. The European Union and Ukraine did, however, act to implement
immediately the first three titles, which deal with questions like political
liberty, administration of justice, and cooperation in national security. 6 14
Moldova and the European Union have also taken steps towards
achieving a greater integration. Moldova and the European Union executed
an Association Agreement in late June, 2014, at the same time as
Ukraine.6 15 The European Parliament ratified the Agreement in mid-
November, 2014, two weeks before Moldovan national elections. 6 1 6 In those
elections, a pro-European party narrowly defeated a well-funded Russia-
sponsored party.617  Despite the closeness of the election and the
contentiousness of the issue,6 1 8 Moldova's new Prime Minister, Chiril
Zone Agreement With EU, YEREPOUNI DAILY NEWS (Lebanon), June 27, 2014.
610. Tom Parfitt, Uraine Approves Historic EU Deal, Breaking Ties With Moscow,
TELEGRAPH (UK), Sept. 16, 2014; Roman Olearchyk, EU and Ukraine Ratify Trade Agreement In
Historic Vote, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014.
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Sept. 18, 2014.
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PRESSE AGENTUR, Sept. 12, 2014; and EU-Ukraine Trade Deal Delayed as Concession to Russia,
DEUTSCHE WELLE, Sept. 12, 2014.
613. I share the view of Ulrich Speck that this delay was a mistake since it gives Russia
much-needed time to disrupt implementation. This error should be remedied at once. Ulrich
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30, 2014.
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available at http//www.Euobserver.com
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Gaburici, a thirty-eight-year old businessman, has declared his intention to
move swiftly to bring Moldova into EU compliance.619 The European Union
should reciprocate and move speedily to ensure that Moldova is safely
ensconced within Europe because Moldova is very much at risk.620
The European Union, finally, is taking a similar set of steps with
Georgia.621 As with Ukraine, as with Moldova, so also with Georgia: the
sooner integration can be achieved, the better, both for the sake of achieving
economic progress and prosperity, but also for ensuring that Georgia is not
once again victimized by Russia.622
F. Military Responses
We should be honest in our language. Vladimir Putin has launched a
war against the West. He invaded and dismembered a sovereign nation, he
is threatening to invade other nations, and he is even now flexing nuclear
muscles. He has broken international law, he has made himself a menace to
the security and peace of the world, and he must be contained. In analyzing
the appropriate response, I should like to distinguish among three separate
issues: the immediate arming of frontline states; the expansion and
extension of NATO to the Russian border; and deployment of a robust
missile defense. I shall discuss each issue in turn.
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620. On the threats Moldova faces, see Moldova: Europe's Next Powderkeg? DEUTSCHE
WELLE, Mar. 2, 2015; and Valentina Ursu & Robert Coalson, Moldova's Creaking Political
System Could Be a Gifi For Moscow, RADIO FREE EUROPE DOCUMENTS, Feb. 20, 2015. On
Gaburici's first steps towards the West, see US Welcomes New Moldovan Government, Pledges
Support For EU Integration, PHILIPPINES NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 20, 2015; and Moldovan Newly-
Appointed PM, EU Officials Discuss Cooperation, Reforms, BBC INT'L REPORTS, Feb. 27, 2015.
621. The European Union entered into an Association Agreement with Georgia at the same
time it did with Moldova and Ukraine. Naftali Bendavid & Laurence Norman, EU Signs Pacts
With Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 27, 2014. It was ratified by the
European Parliament in December of 2014. EU Approves Association Agreement With Georgia,
FINANCIAL SERVICES MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Dec. 19, 2014; Georgia Lauds Ratification of EU
Deal, BBC NEWSFILE, Dec. 18, 2014. The United States has signaled its approbation. Nana
Kirtzkhalia, Washington Welcomes European Parliament's Ratification ofAssociation Agreement,
TREND BUSINESS NEWS, Dec. 19, 2014.
622. The European Institute warns that Putin's Russia has imposed trade embargos on goods
and produce from each of these nations in retaliation for their westward move. Kelsey Fraser, The
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1. Arming Ukraine
In his confirmation hearing in February, 2015, Ashton Carter defended
the idea of arming Ukraine. Without committing himself on the type of
arms to be furnished, he testified: "I incline in the direction of providing
them with arms, including, to get to what I'm sure your question is, lethal
arms."6 2 3 He was blunt in describing the nature of Russian aggression and
declared that no one should any longer keep up the pretense that "it isn't
[Putin], it isn't Russia" that has invaded Ukraine.6 2 4
A month later, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, testified even more firmly on the subject of Russian aggression and
lethal aid to Ukraine. Russia, he declared has engaged in "coercive and
destabilizing actions [that] have threatened NATO's eastern flank."6 2 5
General Dempsey continued: "I think we should absolutely consider lethal
aid and it ought to be in the context of NATO allies because [Russian
President Vladimir] Putin's ultimate objective is to fracture NATO."6 2 6
These statements, and others like them, have set off a vigorous policy
debate the likes of which has probably not been seen since the Cold War. A
group of Washington DC policy advisers-including Ivo Daalder, Strobe
Talbott, Michele Flournoy, and others who have filled senior positions in
government-made the case in a paper published in February, 2015 by the
Atlantic Council that arming Ukraine was the necessary next step.62 7 Russia
is no longer even bothering to conceal its aggression in Ukraine, the authors
warn, and is flooding Ukraine with heavy weaponry in preparation, it
seems, for a future offensive.6 2 8 "Russia," they declare, "has broken the
cardinal rule of post-war European security, i.e., states must not use military
force to change international borders."6 2 9
The group described a Ukrainian Army that has shown a willingness to
fight and to fight hard, but that lacks the sophisticated weaponry to turn the
tide of battle against further Russian aggression.6 3 0 The risk of not
623. Andrew Buncombe, Ashton Carter: Barack Obama's Nominee For US Defence
Secretary Backs Providing Lethal Arms' to Ukraine, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 4, 2015 (quoting
Ashton Carter).
624. Dion Nissenbaum, U.S. Defense Nominee Leans Toward Arms For Ukraine In Fight,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 4, 2015.
625. Posture Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey ... Before the 1 14 th Congress Senate
Armed Services Committee, Mar. 3, 2015.
626. US Military Chief Backs Arming Ukraine Against Separatists, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 3,
2015.
627. Ivo Daalder, et al., Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression:
What the United States and NATO Must Do, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, Feb. 2015.
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supplying weapons, they added, went well beyond Ukraine. There is no
reason to believe that Putin would halt his aggression with Ukraine. His
own self-proclaimed motive for invasion and annexation was the protection
of the Russian-speaking population. 63 1 A similar justification might be used
for the launching of aggressive war against Estonia, Latvia, or other
independent nations.6 3 2
Daalder, Talbott, Flournoy, and their co-authors recommended the
provision of particular defensive weapons systems: sophisticated radars
"that can detect and locate the origin of multiple launch rocket systems."633
They urged the provision of drone aircraft to be used for surveillance
purposes. 634 They proposed "[e]lectronic counter-measures for use against
opposing [drone aircraft]." 6 35 They stressed the need to make available
"[s]ecure communications capabilities" and "[a]rmored Humvees."6 3 6 in
addition to these weapons, however, the group advocated for "light anti-
armor missiles." 637 A future Russian offensive will likely "make heavy use
of tanks and armored personnel carriers" and only anti-tank missiles offered
the chance of stopping their advance. 6 38 And, to reduce Russian air
superiority, they suggested that NATO members "provide equipment and
weapons from their stocks." 639
Ashton Carter and General Dempsey spoke only in generalities about
the types of weapons to be provided. Daalder and his associates made
explicit exactly what was required.
These recommendations, and others like them, have been subjected to
substantial criticism. Kimberly Marten and Rajan Menon have contended
that sanctions have not proven effective in stopping Putin's aggression even
though they have caused a general collapse of economic conditions. 64 0 Why,
therefore, expect a different result where the supply of military hardware is
concerned? Both Marten and Menon premise their argument on a set of
propositions they take for granted: Putin's position at the top of the Russian
political structure is secure, his policies continue to enjoy wide public
support, and popular Russian support for military confrontation with the
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Daalder, et al, supra note 627, at 4.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 3-4.
637. Id. at 4.
638. Daalder, et al, supra note 627, at 4.
639. Id.
640. Kimberly Marten, Endangering USA Won't Stop Putin: Opposing View, USA TODAY,
Feb. 4, 2015; Rajan Menon, Want to Arm Kiev? Better Have a Plan B, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015.
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West would only grow should the West introduce lethal military aid.641
These beliefs, however, are open to question. From March 5 to March
16 Vladimir Putin disappeared from public view. There has been much
speculation as to why, but it is certainly credible to think that it was because
he had to deal with threats to his position at the top of the political order. 642
And regarding public support for Putin, one need only note the wide and
spontaneous outpouring of relief, even joy, on the part of many ordinary
Russians that greeted his disappearance. 641  Residents of Eastern Ukraine
and Crimea, furthermore, in the year since Putin's forces took over their
lands, have come to regret the support they gave to Russia.644 It is even the
case that some Russians have chosen to take up arms and fight for
Ukraine.645 In such circumstances, a show of strength might be enough to
drain Putin's power while timidity or acquiescence would only allow him to
crush whatever internal opposition he might be facing.
The editors of Bloomberg View argued that lethal assistance should not
be provided because "the U.S. and its NATO allies don't have sufficient
interests at stake to go all the way." 64 6 In response one might ask, what is
there to stop Vladimir Putin from going all the way? His interests seem to
include at least this much: the creation of a corridor connecting Crimea and
Russia; the retaking of further territory where ethnic Russians comprise a
significant minority and he can win a victory without much resistance; and
the final fracturing of NATO, probably through aggressive action against
Latvia or Estonia. Are we prepared for those consequences?
641. Thus Marten asserts: "[Putin] has built his reputation on standing up to Western pressure
while stoking an increasingly ugly form of anti-Western nationalism." Marten, supra note 640.
Menon asserts: "The Russian people would approve." Menon, supra note 640.
642. Thus George Voloshin wrote with a matter-of-fact tone: "Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unexpected ten-day disappearance ... naturally drew much attention from Moscow-
watchers as his regime is rumored to be in the midst of power struggles." George Voloshin, Power
Struggles in Moscow Prompt Corruption Scandals in Russian Far East, Mar. 20, 2015, available
at www.jamestown.org. See also, for a flavor of the speculation, some less informed than others:
Tom Porter, Nemtsov Murder Exposes Brutal Power Struggle at the Heart of Russia's Security
State, INT'L BUSINESS TIMES (UK), Mar. 19, 2015; Neil Thompson, Vladimir Putin's
Disappearance Is Only Strange If You're Used to the Prying Eyes of the Western Media, THE
INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 17, 2015; Howard Amos and Nick Squires, Mystery of Putin's
Disappearance Deepens With Russian State Media's 'Mistake, 'TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 14, 2015;
and Russia Update: Is There a Slow-Motion Coup Under Way? Mar. 14, 2015, available at
http//www.Interpretermag.com
643. A collection of some of the best of these spontaneous expressions of joy can be found in
Nick Robins-Early, Where In the WorldIs Vladimir Putin? HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2015.
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Mar. 22, 2015; and Daniel Schearf, One Year Later, Crimea Adjusts to New Realities, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Mar. 20, 2015.
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FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 22, 2015.
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Dmitry Gorenburg maintained that all Putin is really interested in is
reestablishing a Russian sphere of influence: "Putin has for years been
offering a deal in the old realpolitik tradition-let's draw a line, you run the
world on that side, and I'll run it on this side." 64 7 The response to this
reasoning is this: the entire thrust of international law has been to relegate
realpolitik to the pages of history. We have spent more than half a century
trying to escape those archaic rules of power politics, so why do we want to
return to them now?
General Ben Hodges, for his part, proposed reliance on diplomacy "to
protect Ukraine's sovereignty, and ensure that the NATO alliance doesn't
splinter, while at the same time leaving Russia a path to eventually
rejoining the international community. "648 What makes General Hodges
believe that diplomacy will be successful, given the situation? And what
would a reintegration of Russia back into the international community look
like? Although General Hodges did not say so, it seems he had in mind a
conference of the warring parties that would allow for the dismemberment
of Ukraine. Such an outcome would confer legal status on territorial gains
won by force of arms.
Congressional support for providing lethal assistance is rising.64 9 NATO
military commander General Philip Breedlove has stressed that the failure
to deliver weapons to Ukraine might itself be destabilizing. 65 0 And while I
appreciate the risks-NATO must remain united in the face of possible
adversity, the nation must commit itself for the duration, the allies must be
on board-it seems like military aid is the least bad option.
2. Expansion and Extension ofNA TO
Vladimir Putin has accomplished something entirely unintended. He
has brought new life to NATO, and has caused nations, such as Ukraine and
Moldova, which were formerly wavering, to move decisively westward. 651
As part of that westward move, NATO should act quickly to incorporate
those two states, in addition to Georgia, within its protective shield.
647. Dmitry Gorenburg, West Must Either Commit to Ukraine or Back Off THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015.
648. Yochi Dreazen, Top U.S. General In Europe: Arming Ukraine Jsn't a Strategy,'
FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 17, 2015.
649. Jeremy Herb, Obama Pressed on Many Fronts To Arm Ukraine, POLITICO, Mar. 11,
2015.
650. Laurence Norman, NATO Military Chief Philip Breedlove Flags Ukraine Risks:
Inaction Could Be Destabilizing, 'Says Breedlove, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 22, 2015.
651. Michael Birnbaum, Confronting a New, Unstable Reality, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 1, 2015
("[A]fter the most tumultuous stretch of President Vladimir Putin's 15 years in power, Russia is
confronting a new reality. Ukraine the part not held by rebels has turned firmly toward
Europe"). Id.
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Two or three years ago, both Ukrainians and Europeans were luke-
warm at best over whether Ukraine should join NATO. 65 2 Both parties have
now changed their views dramatically in light of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine.6 5 3Ukraine is even now the subject of Russian aggression.6 5 4
Russian-backed separatists have been launching artillery barrages against
Ukrainian positions in Donetsk in violation of the Minsk ceasefire. 65 5 Even
now, Russian war games provocatively threaten Ukraine. 65 6 The Ukrainian
government has now asked all military and law-enforcement personnel "to
be in full [combat] readiness." 65 7 Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of
NATO, has accused Russian troops of fighting without proper insignia or
identification and engaging in the tactics "of a terrorist State." 65 8 The
fighting has fouled the water supply in much of eastern Ukraine, posing
public-health risks.6 59 Corey Flintoff, reporting from the front line, predicts
that more fighting is imminent.660
Until the present moment, there was little sense of urgency to resolve
the question of Ukraine's admission to NATO. Now, however, time is of
the essence.6 6 1 In November, 2014, Vladimir Putin's spokesman Dmitry
Peskov "accus[ed] NATO of breaking a historic promise by gradually
approaching Russia's borders."6 6 2 Such a promise has been invalidated not
652. Andre de Nesnera, Will Ukraine Join NATO Any Time Soon? VOICE OF AMERICA, Apr.
3, 2014 (reviewing older polling data indicating limited support for NATO membership).
653. Adrian Croft, Most Europeans In Poll Think EU Should Offer Uraine Membership,
REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2014 (results of European polling); and Ukraine's ComplicatedPath to NATO
Membership, EURONEWS, Dec. 23, 2014 (reviewing Ukrainian polling).
654. Josh Rogin, NATO Says Russia Still Pouring Arms Into Ukraine, BLOOMBERG VIEW,
Mar. 22, 2015.
655. B6atrice Le Bohec, Artillery Rocks Ukraine Rebel Bastion Donetsk Despite Truce,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 22, 2015; Igor Kovalenko, Ukraine Blames Rebels For Shelling,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 21, 2015.
656. Russia Targets NATO With Military Exercises, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE, Mar.
19, 2015; and Timothy Heritage & Darya Korsunskaya, Russia Rules Out Handing Back Crimea,
Expands War Games, REUTERS, Mar. 17, 2015.
657. Urainian Premier Urges Full Combat Readiness For Army, Law Enforcement, BBC
INT'L REPORTS, Mar. 16, 2015.
658. Joint Press Point With NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President Dalia
Grybauskaitd ofLithuania, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 21, 2014.
659. Gabriela Baczynska, Foul Stench In Rebel-Held East Ukraine as War Hits Water
Treatment, REUTERS CANADA, Mar. 18, 2015.
660. Corey Flintoff, In Eastern Ukraine, A Cease-Fire In Name Only, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO, Mar. 16, 2015.
661. In December, 2014, Ukraine dropped its neutral position and has now resolved to seek
an alliance with the West. Sarah Begley, Ukraine Inches Closer to NATO In Important Vote,
TIME, Dec. 23, 2014. Ukraine had begun the process of seeking NATO membership in August,
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REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2014.
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by NATO, but by Russian misconduct.
The same argument holds for Moldova. Moldova's situation has been
complicated because of the confused relationship it presently has with a
small breakaway region known as Transnistria.663 In 1990, as the Soviet
Union was cracking up, one of its provinces, Transnistria, declared
independence and fought a two-year war with Moldova. 6 64 This war ended
in a ceasefire, but the legal relationship between this tiny territory and
Moldova proper has never been resolved.665
Moldova remains constitutionally a neutral state.666 As such, there is a
growing consensus that Putin's Russia could target Moldova for mischief. 6 67
Moldovan voters have made it clear that they see their future is with the
West. As with Ukraine, so with Moldova. If Moldova wishes to amend its
constitution and drop its neutral stance, NATO membership should be
expedited. And even if Moldova chooses to remain officially neutral, its
territorial integrity must be defended against possible Russian aggression. 668
Finally, there is the question of Georgia. Georgia was the first victim of
Russian cross-border aggression, when South Ossetia and Abkhazia were
violently removed from Georgian jurisdiction in the summer of 2008. In the
spring and early summer of 2014, however, there was still substantial
opposition in Western circles to the admission of Georgia into NATO. 6 6 9
With increased Russian aggression in the late summer and fall of 2014,
came a greater willingness to admit NATO.670 In February, 2015, NATO
663. Transnistria's population consists largely of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, unlike the
remainder of Moldova, which is largely Romanian in ethnic composition. Steven D. Roper, From
Frozen Conflict to Frozen Agreement: The Unrecognized State of Transnistria, in DE FACTO
STATES: THE QUEST FOR SOVEREIGNTY 102, 107 (Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, & Henry
Srebnik eds., 2004).
664. Steven D. Roper, Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia, in
ETHNICITY AND TERRITORY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 101, 106-09 (John Hughes &
Gwendolyn Sasse, eds., 2014) (reprint of 2002 edition).
665. "[R]esolving the status of Transnistria is one of the key dilemmas facing Moldova as the
country integrates into European institutions." Steven D. Roper, Moldova Since 1989, in CENTRAL
AND SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN POLITICS SINCE 1989 473, 476 (Sabrina P. Ramet ed., 2010).
666. STEVEN WOEHREL, MOLDOVA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. POLICY 7 (2014).
667. Adrian Croft & Aleksandar Vasovic, NATO Commander Warns of Russian Threat to
Separatist Moldova Region, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 2014; Thomas Burrows, Russia Issues Thinly-
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REUTERS, June 25, 2014.
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and Georgia issued a joint statement noting that the two entities had
approved a "Package" which "aim[ed] to strengthen Georgia's defence and
interoperability capabilities with the Alliance, which will help Georgia in its
preparations towards membership in the Alliance." 671
3. Missile Defense
Since the early and middle 2000s, NATO and the United States have
been engaged in constructing a missile defense system for Europe. 672
Ostensibly, the missile shield was not directed at Russia but at security
threat emanating from the Middle East.673
In 2010, at Lisbon, Russia and NATO agreed on ways "to cooperate on
a Europe-wide missile interceptor system." 674 NATO extended assurances
to Russia that Moscow's missiles would not be targeted by the system it
was then developing and deploying.675 The United States, however, refused
to enter into a legally-binding guarantee on this question. 67 6
In 2012, NATO announced at a summit meeting in Chicago that it had
achieved "an Interim Capability for NATO ballistic missile defense." 677
Russian representatives present at the summit meeting objected and
declared that the system "undermines the Russian Federation's defence
capabilities."678 Independent observers attending the Summit expressed a
fear that there was a possibility of future confrontation between Russia and
NATO on missile defense and urged the "creat[ion of] a framework for a
constructive process that takes into account opinion from across the
Georgia Is Making a Case For NATO Membership, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014.
671. Joint Statement of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the Level of Defence Ministers,
Feb. 5, 2015. Russia responded on March 18, 2015 by signing a treaty with South Ossetia "that
almost completely integrates it with Russia." Russia, Rebel Georgia Region Sign Treaty; West
Alarmed, VOICE OF AMERICA, Mar. 18, 2015. NATO has condemned this treaty as a violation of
international law. Adrian Croft, Russian Treaty With South Ossetia Breaks International Law:
NATO, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2015.
672. STANLEY R. SLOAN, NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY:
THE TRANSTLANTIC BARGAIN CHALLENGED, 141-43 (2d ed., 2005).
673. RICHARD DEAN BURNS, THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 138-39 (2010); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAN'S ROCKET AND
MISSILE FORCES AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS 155-62 (2014).
674. Tom Z. Collina, NATO To Declare Missile System Ready, 42 ARMS CONTROL TODAY
38, 38 (April, 2012).
675. NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE: A NEED FOR COOPERATION, NOT
CONFRONTATION, www.nato.int, Dec. 6, 2011.
676. U.S. Offers Dialogue But No Legal Pledge To Russia On Missile Defense, GLOBAL
SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Nov. 1, 2013.
677. Fact Sheet: Chicago Summit: NATO Capabilities, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, May 20,
2012.
678. Conference Highlights Russia-NATO Differences in Missile Defence, BBC INT'L
REPORTS, May 8, 2012.
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spectrum. "679
Two major scientific studies of the feasibility of missile defense in
Europe, however, returned highly critical verdicts, the first in September
2011, and the second one year later.68 0 Laudably, under the circumstances
President Obama continued to negotiate with the Russians and dialogue
continued for much of the spring and summer of 2013,681 but by the end of
summer negotiations had broken down.6 82
Russian aggression and, in particular, reckless Russian nuclear threats,
make future collaboration on missile defense impossible. At this juncture,
NATO must move as expeditiously as possible towards implementing a
comprehensive missile defense system over the European Continent.
Indeed, Russian bellicosity opens the door to ask whether the time has
come to build a strategic nuclear defense for the United States proper. For
many years, the United States was constrained by the terms of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. This Treaty was designed to force the
major nuclear powers of that era, the United States and the Soviet Union, to
rely on the strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD).6 8 3 It has been
plausibly argued that it was the sheer folly of relying on MAD that provided
incentives for the nuclear arms-control and arms-reduction treaties that
were entered into in the latter stages of the Cold War.6 8 4 In 2002, however,
with the Cold War relegated to history, the United States withdrew from the
ABM Treaty.6 8 5
The United States has begun to put in place a missile defense system to
679. Oliver Meier & Paul Ingram, The NATO Summit: Recasting the Debate Over U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe, ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8, 13 (May, 2012).
680. The first report was issued by the Defense Science Board, the second report was done by
the National Academy of Sciences. Tom Z. Collina, Report Critiques U.S. Missile Defense, 42
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 30-32 (October 2012); and Philip E. Coyle, Back to the Drawing Board:
The Need For Sound Science in U.S. Missile Defense, 43 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8-14
(January/February, 2013).
681. Tom Z. Collina, Some See Chance For Missile Defense Deal, ARMS CONTROL TODAY
37-41 (January/February, 2013); and Tom Z. Collina, Missile Defense Talks Resume, 43 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 26 (May, 2013).
682. Tom Z. Collina, Summit Off U.S.-Russian Talks Go On, 43 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 34-
35 (September, 2013).
683. William A. Kinsel, The Role ofArms Control in Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: SDI, M4D,
andthe ABM Treaty, 62 WASHINGTON L. REV. 763, 763 (1987).
684. See, for example, GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 30 32 (2001); Marianne Hanson, Arms Control, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES 155, 156-57
(Richard Devetek, Anthony Burke, & Jim George, eds., 2007); and Douglas J. Hoekstra,
Presidential Beliefs and the Reagan Paradox, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 429, 432,
446-47 (1997).
685. Terence Neilan, Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty, Putin Calls Move a Mistake, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001; Wade Boese, U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,
32 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 14-15 (July/August, 2002).
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protect the homeland, but it is directed primarily against the small-scale
arsenals of countries like North Korea and Iran.686 The system would seem
to require major expansion to provide effective defense against Russia's
dangerous atomic posturing.
G. Vladimir Putin: Constraining Boldness Born of Weakness
"Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose"
-Kris Kristofferson
Vladimir Putin's greatest strength is, paradoxically, his very weakness.
He has freedom other political leaders lack. His nation is a shambles, and he
has taken advantage of the circumstances to strike boldly.
Still, Russia is a nation-state, the largest country by geographic size on
the planet, and in the end, even a reckless autocrat like Putin will be
constrained by the rules and social realities that govern nation-states.
Consider three areas of profound weakness Putin's Russia presently
confronts. The first is economic. In December, 2014, British economics
writer Ambrose Evans-Pritchard described the parlous state of the Russian
economy. 687 Thanks to declining oil prices and economic sanctions, the
Russian economy had shrunk "in just nine months from a $2.1 trillion
petro-giant to a mid-size player comparable with Korea or Spain." 688 But
even when its gross domestic product was at its height, at $2.1 trillion, it
trailed badly the European Union ($17.3 trillion) or the United States ($16.8
trillion).689 In other words, even in flush times, Russia does not have the
wherewithal to oppose the combined strength of America and Europe.
Under the sanctions regime imposed by Europe and the United States,
Russia has lost access to Western markets for dual-use technology
(technology that might be used for war-fighting as well as peaceful
purposes), 690 oil and gas exploration and extraction equipment, 69 1 and bank
credit. 692 A Russian bank executive in January, 2015, described the
686. Jonathan Masters, Ballistic Missile Defense, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Aug.
15, 2014.
687. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Capital Controls Feared as Russian Rouble Collapses,
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2014.
688. Id.
689. Jim Edwards, Russia's Economy Has Shrunk So Much It's Now Almost the Same Size As
Spain, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 2, 2014.
690. Alexander Panin, Sanctions On Technology Imports Leave Russia Playing Catch Up,
THE Moscow TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014.
691. Alexander Panin, Western Sanctions Could Damage One-Fifih of Russia's Oil
Production, THE Moscow TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014; Olga Ivshina, Russian Oil Industry Facing
Deep Freeze, BBC NEWS EUROPE, Nov. 27, 2014; and Canada Slaps Sanctions On Russian Oil
Industry, REUTERS, Dec. 19, 2014.
692. New Coordinated U.S. and EU Sanctions Target Russian Banks, Oil Industry, ENERGY
MONITOR WORLDWIDE, July 31, 2014; Dan Roberts, Sweeping New US andEU Sanctions Target
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sanctions as "economic war. "693
They might or might not be war, but they are having their intended
effect. Russia's GDP continued to shrink for most of the fall of 2014694 and
is continuing to show signs of shrinkage in March of 2015.695 Even though
the Russian ruble is no longer in free fall, as it was in December, 2014,696
inflation rates are predicted to remain in the ten to eleven percent range, if
they do not range higher.69 7 Western investors are being advised to avoid
Russia. 69 8 And the Russian budget deficit is large and widening. 69 9
Furthermore, while the sanctions regime that has been imposed is
substantial,7 0 0 there are additional steps the Alliance might yet undertake to
devastating effect. In particular, Russia could yet be blocked from
employing the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication) banking network.7 0 1 If Russia were blocked from
SWIFT, "Russian banks and their customers [would be prevented from]
readily send[ing] or receiv[ing] money across the country's borders which
would wreak havoc with trade, investment, and millions of routine financial
transactions."7 0 2 Such a move would cripple Russia's ability to sell oil
Russia's Banks and Oil Companies, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2014.
693. Holly Ellyatt, Sanctions on Russia Are 'Economic War,' CNBC, Jan. 30, 2015.
694. Alanna Petroff, Russia Losing $140 billion from sanctions and low oil prices, Nov. 24,
2014, available at http://www.money.cnn.com; Elvin Mirzayev, Sanctions and Oil Prices Bring
the Russian Economy Near Collapse, January 21, 2015, available at http://www.investopedia.com
695. Russia's Monthly Economic Developments, www.worldbank.com. Mar. 10, 2015. Cf.,
Nadia Kazakova, Russia's GDP Cheer May Not Last, Mar. 9, 2015, available at
http://www.investopedia.com (predicting that stabilization of Russian GDP in February, 2015,
was solely dependent on a short-lived stabilization of petroleum prices and will not last).
696. Olga Tanas, Russian Inflation Exceeds 10 % in December on Ruble's Decline,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Dec. 24, 2014; Jon Hartley, Online Prices Indicate Russian Inflation
Spike After Ruble Decline, FORBES, Jan. 1, 2015.
697. Finance Ministry: Russia Inflation To Reach 11 or 12 Percent in 2015, LA PRENSA,
Mar. 19, 2015; Vladimir Tikhomirov, Russia's Inflation Dilemma, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 29,
2015.
698. Elvis Picardo, How US and European Union Sanctions Are Crippling Russia,
INVESTOPEDIA STOCK ANALYSIS, January 15, 2015 ("Given the number of risks facing the
Russian economy in 2015, investors would be well advised to avoid the region and look elsewhere
for investment opportunities"). Id.
699. Anna Andrianova, Russia Braces For Wider Deficit as Oil Curbs Revenue, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS, Jan. 19, 2015; and Russian Finance Ministry Ups 2015 Budget Deficit Forecast to 3.8
Percent/GDP Document, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2015.
700. Michelle Linderman, James Rose, Carlijn Ruers, Russia and Crimea Sanctions-Where
Are We At The Start Of 2015? MONDAQ, Feb. 16, 2015; Russia and the West Are Now Firmly
Locked In a War of Economic Attrition, FINANCIAL SERVICES MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Nov. 11,
2014; and How Far Do EU-US Sanctions On Russia Go? I BBC NEWS EUROPE, Sept. 15, 2014.
701. Ian Wishart & Robert Hutton, UK Wants EU To Block Russia From SWIFT Banking
Network, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 29, 2014.
702. Carol Matlack, Choking Russia's Banks Would Be the Ultimate Sanction, BLOOMBERG,
Sept. 1, 2014.
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denominated in dollars and would damage its debt-servicing capacity.703
Also threatening to push the economy further into the doldrums are
declining oil prices. Russia is a nation that came to depend crucially on high
petroleum prices. 04 Official numbers in 2012 indicated that Russia met 60
percent of its budget needs from the sale of commodities.705 Indeed, Russia
built its global position70 6 and military renewal on the strength of high
prices.707 But oil prices are depressed and are expected to remain depressed
for the foreseeable future.708 The Russian economy, in other words, is in a
circling vortex of disaster.709
Military spending, however, continues to represent a large and growing
part of the Russian budget.710 This circumstance cannot continue. With or
without further declines in commodities prices or the pressure of additional
sanctions, I would guess that Putin's military may soon encounter some
hard economic truths.711
The second great reality Vladimir Putin must contend with is
demographic. The Russian demographic crisis of the 1990s is well
known. 712 Life expectancy crashed, 7 13 as did public health.7 14 Alcoholism
703. Sanctions On SWIFT Could Hit Russia Where It Hurts Most, February 23, 2015,
available at http://www.investopedia.com
704. MICHAEL KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL: THE DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S
GROWING DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED PETROLEUM 154 (2004); and Danny Vinik, Chart: Russia
Is Insanely Dependent On Oil and Gas Money, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2014.
705. Al Fin, Putin Plays Down Russia's Deadly Dependence on Oil and Gas Revenues, Oct.
30, 2012, available at http://www.oilprice.com
706. JANUSZ BUGALSKI, DISMANTLING THE WEST: RUSSIA'S ATLANTIC AGENDA 124
(2009).
707. Jakub M. Godzimirski, Russian Energy: Summing Up and Looking Ahead, in RUSSIAN
ENERGY IN A CHANGING WORLD: WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR THE HYDROCARBONS
SUPERPOWER? 177, 181-92 (Jakub M. Godzimirski ed., 2013).
708. Graeme Wearden, Oil Price Slides After Goldman Sachs Slashes Forecasts Business
Live, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2015; A. Gary Shilling, Get Ready For $10 Oil, BLOOMBERG
VIEW, Feb. 16, 2015; Oil Plunges to Six-Year Low. Is $30 a Barrel Next? Mar. 16, 2015,
available at http://www.Money.cnn.com; Jake Rudnitsky, Here's the Next Big Threat to Global
Crude Prices AndIt Isn't OPEC, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 20, 2015.
709. Maria Snegovaya, Think of Russia as an Ordinary Petrostate, Not an Extraordinary
Superpower, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2015; Wenyuan Qiu, Oil Crash Is Crushing Russia,
THE MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 15, 2015; Raushan Nurshaeva, Denis Dymkin, & Timothy Heritage,
Ex-Soviet States Battle Challenge of Low Prices, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2015; Darya Korsunskaya,
Lidia Kelly, Lower Oil Prices To Have Long-Lasting Impact Russian Central Bank, REUTERS,
Mar. 23, 2015.
710. Grigory Dukor, Russian Defense Budget To Hit Record $81 Billion in 2015, THE
MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 16, 2014; Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Continues Massive Military
Modernization Despite Economic Woes, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 4, 2015 available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-continues-massive-military-modernization-despite-
economic-woes-2015-2; and Mike Bird, Here Are the High-Tech Weapons Russia Is Buying With
Its Record Military Budget, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 13, 2015.
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712. Masha Gessen, The Dying Russians, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 2, 2014.
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was rampant,715 and the simple process of human reproduction proved
difficult.716 Because of rampant drug and alcohol abuse, birth defects were
commonplace.7 17 Because of inadequacies in public health, dread epidemics
such as AIDS spread catastrophically through the population.718
What is less well appreciated is that Russia has not come close to
recovering from this demographic nightmare. While life expectancy has
recovered somewhat from the depths of the 1990s, it still remains
shockingly low.7 19 Public health services continue to be crude and
rudimentary.720 Birth rates remain well below replacement rates721 and the
level of birth defects continues to be elevated.722 Also widespread, with sad
713. A study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association indicated that
male life expectancy declined from 63.8 to 57.7 years from 1990 to 1994. Women's life
expectancy also fell, but not as dramatically. The report's authors concluded that the "[s]triking
rise in Russian mortality is beyond the peacetime experience of industrialized countries." Francis
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DEVELOPMENT 104-6 (2005).
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Dale R. Herspring, eds., 2009).
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RUSSIAN FAR EAST 32 (2003); Glenn Eldon Curtis & Marian Leighton, The Society and Its
Environment, in RUSSIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 239, 269 73 (Glenn Eldon Curtis ed., 1998); Elena
Sargeant, The 'Woman Question' and the Problem of Maternity in Post-Communist Russia, in
WOMEN IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 269, 271 72 (Rosalind J. Marsh ed., 1996); and Celestine
Bohlen, The World: In the New Russia, Children Are Born Fighting the Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1992.
718. ULLA PAPE, THE POLITICS OF HIV/AIDS IN RUSSIA 73-74 (2014).
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TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013. Alcohol is considered a main cause of premature death. See Rachel Nuwer,
Why Russian Men Don't Live as Long,_N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014; and Tulip Mazumdar, Vodka
Blamed For High Death Rates in Russia, BBC NEWS, Jan. 31, 2014. Alcohol not only is a main
cause of physical debility but a large contributing factor to Russia's surging homicide rates. See
Elm K. Bye, Alcohol and Homicide in Europe, in HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN HOMICIDE
RESEARCH: PATTERNS, EXPLANATIONS, AND COUNTRY STUDIES 231, 237 (Marieke C.A. Liem &
William Alex Pridemore, eds., 2012); and William Alex Pridemore, Vodka and Violence: Alcohol
Consumption and Homicide Rates in Russia, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1921-30 (2002).
720. Christine Danton, The Health Crisis in Russia, in Topical Research Digest: Human
Rights in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics 42-50 (in HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN
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and dire consequences is alcohol abuse72 3 and the abuse of narcotics. 24 And,
just as sadly, Russia's rate of HIV/AIDS infections is still among the
highest in the world. 25
Nicholas Eberstadt has written movingly and worryingly of the "Dying
Bear."726 Eberstadt notes: "In 2009, overall life expectancy at age 15 was
estimated to be lower in Russia than in Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea,
Madagascar, Niger, and Yemen; even worse, Russia's adult male life
expectancy was estimated to be lower than Sudan's, Rwanda's, and even
AIDS-ravaged Botswana's."727
The demographic crisis is manifesting itself also in other, subtler ways.
Thus increasing numbers of Russians are seeking ways to emigrate from
Russia. Russia's official statistics service, Rosstat, states that 186,382
Russians left the country in 2013 and 122,751 in 2012. These numbers
represent a significant increase over the 36,774 that left in 2011 and the
33,578 in 2010.728 It is thought, furthermore, that Rosstat understates the
true numbers.72 9 It seems as well that emigration numbers for 2014 and
2015 will be even higher as Russians grow disenchanted with war.7 30 It is
estimated that over 200,000 Russians emigrated in the first nine months of
2014, and that many of these were the well-trained and highly-skilled.7 31
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RUSSIA 74, 92 (Judyth L. Twigg & Kate Schechter eds., 2003).
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January/February, 2013, available at www.worldaffairsjoumal.org; and BertrandAudoin & Chris
Beyrer, Russia's Retrograde Stand on Drug Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012.
725. Ed Adamczyk, Russia Warns of HIV/AIDS Epidemic, UPI, Nov. 27, 2014; Kenneth
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Ancker, Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Russia: Projections, Analysis, and Policy
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726. Nicholas Eberstadt, The Dying Bear: Russia's Demographic Disaster, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
95-100, 101-4 (November/December, 2011). Cf, Nicholas Eberstadt, Putin's Hollowed-Out
Homeland, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 7, 2014 (updating Eberstadt's earlier research).
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729. Id.
730. Alissa de Carbonnel, Disenchanted With Putin, Some Russians Vote With Their Feet,
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Indeed, western commentators are now speaking bluntly of a Russian "brain
drain as men and women with financial resources and transferable skills
make new lives for themselves in the West." 7 3 2
Russia's demographic woes are genuinely tragic. They reflect a slow-
motion human disaster that no one would want to witness, let alone
experience. That said, Russia's demographic disaster represents a second
limitation on Vladimir Putin's power to make war. Not only is Russia in the
midst of an economic catastrophe that Western powers can yet make much
worse, but Russia would likely face serious manpower shortages should
sustained military operations continue much longer.733 Indeed, Russia's
military personnel currently number "700,000 instead of the envisioned
1,000,000."734 Indeed, Russia has now found itself having to recruit
foreigners to serve in its army. 735
Finally, a third reality that constrains Putin's freedom of action is the
political situation in Russia. He presides over what has been called a "mafia
state." 7 36 Wikileaks in fact confirmed the total entanglement of the Russian
state and Russian criminal elements. 7 3 7 High-ranking government officials
see their positions as vehicles for self-enrichment.738 Putin's inner circle
consists of men of staggering wealth, 7 39 and such men are likely to want to
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call a stop to foreign adventures that directly threaten their sources of
wealth.
And this leads into a second source of political instability Putin must
contend with-his autocracy, his "rule of one," breeds its own opposition.
Autocracy breeds paranoia,7 4 0 and there is now a significant body of
evidence suggesting that Putin has now descended into a debilitating
paranoia that poses risks not only to others but to his own continued rule.7 4 1
Autocracy is also especially prone to ridicule, mocking, and satire.74 2 The
guffaw,7 4 3 the exaggerated tone of voice, even sexual innuendo7 4 4 can help
to subvert the regime or arouse it to murderous anger.7 4 5
Putin now seems likely to lash out in self-defeating ways. There are
now reports that he plans to target opposition leaders living abroad.7 4 6 Putin,
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it is said, is "driven by a paranoid fear of encirclement."74 7 It is further
alleged that, thanks to his massive mistrust, it is becoming impossible to
work with him on a diplomatic level.748 Vladimir Ryzhkov, former Speaker
of the Russian Parliament and still a stirring voice for liberal reform,
summed it up well: "[T]he country's leaders believe that Russia is a
besieged fortress. . . . Their objective [has become] to fend off the external
enemy and identify and eliminate all enemies within Russia's borders."749
And therein lies the self-destruction that destroys autocracies.
A final source of political instability comes from the nationalist forces
Putin has either unleashed or has allowed to flourish. .750 He used the Sochi
Winter Olympics as a showcase for Russian nationalism,751 adapting themes
that would have been instantly recognizable to a Russian audience, even if
lost on foreign observers. Thus the opening ceremony made use of Gogol's
famous Russian troika-a Russian viewer would instinctively grasp, as
Western observers did not, that in the literary work referenced "all nations
and states 'step aside,' giving Russia-troika 'the right of way."'
7 5 2
But there is compelling evidence now that Putin has lost control of
nationalist sentiments and that, in fact, they are turning extraordinarily,
dangerously toxic. On the one hand, Russian nationalism poses the danger
of unleashing centrifugal forces that might tear apart Russia,753 or even rend
the whole Eurasian region.754 Vladimir Ryzhkov, indeed, predicts that the
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entirety of what was once the Soviet Union could be engulfed in a series of
nationalistic wars uglier than the conflicts fought over the bones of 1990s
Yugoslavia. 55
But nationalism poses a second risk, and that is its very extremism.
Skinheads, who do not always shave their heads, have made life wretched
for immigrants for some years.7 56  Cossacks, inhabitants of the
Russian/Ukrainian steppes, famous for their martial bravery and their
loyalty to the czars,7 57 have, some of them, become shock troops for ultra-
nationalism.758 "Rodina, the Russian National Patriotic Union," has been
attempting to build close ties with European far-right movements, like
Greece's Golden Dawn, and the extremist German politician Udo Voigt.7 5 9
Politically, furthermore, this alliance seems to be paying some dividends as
Europe's far-right political parties are now calling for detente with
Russia. 60 Most distressing of all, in a nation that was first devastated by and
then defeated Nazi Germany, one finds in Russia today elements of Neo-
Nazism making an appearance.76 1 This truly is profoundly saddening.
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Thus, while Putin might have greater freedom of action than many
Western leaders if only because of the weakness of his position, his
freedom is not absolute. Economics, demographics, and his nation's divided
and extremist politics all put constraints on the range of actions he might
take.
CONCLUSION: SADNESS AND HOPE
Julia Smirnova has written about new Moscow, the hip Moscow, the
Moscow that was created by "the efforts of people who lived according to
the motto, 'act as if.' They imagined that they lived in the '90s-not in
Moscow, but in Berlin or New York."7 62 This Moscow has now been
shattered. Smirnova uses striking language to describe the current situation:
"Moscow resembles a room in which there is a corpse. And everybody is
trying not to notice it. The corpse, of course, is the war with Ukraine."7 63 It
is smelling, it is festering, it is rotting and could yet bring death. Yet, people
try to get on with their daily business, afraid to speak up, or to call attention
to the obvious and ugly truth.7 6 4 Pointing to the weakening economy, to
internal political oppression, to the uncertain geopolitical situation, Anna
Nemtsova asked bleakly, "Can Russia Survive After Ukraine?"7 65
Clearly, a mood of pessimism surrounds Russia's future. One has the
sense that if Russia does not explode into a supernova of international
bloodletting, it may yet collapse in on itself by the own gravitational weight
of its own contradictions. And yet I have hope. Vladimir Putin is sealing his
own fate. We should, as a matter of policy, at his removal from the
international stage, but factors internal to Russia may resolve the crisis for
us.
And then we must bear in mind that Russia is and always will be a
continental great power. It possesses the strength of culture to be a powerful
force of good in the world. It is the nation that gave us Leo Tolstoy and a
host of literary and religious thinkers. It is a land of great scientists and
mathematicians, authentic world-class thinkers like Alexander Friedmann
and Andrei Linde. It has been the home and motherland of such musical
geniuses as Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky and Alexander Borodin. Russia can
yet realize its true destiny-a great culture, a great civilization, a place of
learning and creativity, and a nation always willing to generously share its
wisdom and insights with the world, while peacefully doing business with
its neighbors.
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